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ABSTRACT
In Anarchy, State. and Utopia Robert Nozick offers a
solution to the problem of when it is permissible to use
force to prevent a person from doing a non-aggressive risky
act. In this thesis I argue that Nozick's solution to the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts is radically mistaken
and that the reasons why it is mistaken reveal the limitations
of his state of nature approach to the problem of what prin-
ciples characterize the just state.
In Chapter One I introduce the concepts which I use to
state my argument against Nazick's solution. Most importantly,
I explain what each of the following is: 1) an emergent prob-
lem, 2) an emergent constraint, 3) an optimal solution to an
emergent problem, 4) the libertarian side constraint against
aggression, 5) a law bound principle, 6) the natural position,
7) the force principle, and 8) the independence principle.
In Chapter Two and Chapter Three I examine the arguments
which Nozick uses to defend his commitment to the libertarian
side constraint against aggression. Most importantly, I ex-
plain how his commitment is related to his beliefs that each
person is separate, inviolable, and not a resource for any
other person. In Chapter Four I establish that the problem of
non-aggressive risky acts is an emergent problem relative to
the clear beliefs which lead Nozick to accept the libertarian
side constraint against aggression.
In Chapter Five I argue that Nozick does not offer any
compelling reasons to justify his crucial belief that we must
adopt the force principle and the independence principle as
constraints on solutions to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts. This belief is crucial because it leads Nozick
to the further belief that the correct solution must view
each non-aggressive risky act as an isolated act in which
one person subjects another to a risk. Consequently, he de-
fends a solution which is in sharp contrast with solutions
which interpret the problem of non-aggressive risky acts as
a problem which concerns all of the people in an area and
which takes account of the fact that in the normal course of
events each person is both a risk bearer and a risk creator.
A person who interprets the problem in this way will almost
certainly solve it by appealing to a law bound principle,
i.e., a principle which a) specifies an end result and b) is
used to evaluate enforceable public rules assigning entitle-
ments to perform non-aggressive. -risky acts according to how
close compliance with the rules comes to achieving the end
result. Furthermore, a person who appeals to law bound prin-
ciples will almost certainly also accept the natural position,
i.e., the position that law bound principles create the need
for special principles, perhaps democratic principles, for
evaluating procedures which select the people who alone have
the right to publish, interpret, and enforce the public rules
which are needed to satisfy the law bound principles. Once
we see that Nozick cannot defend his commitment to the force
and independence principles, we must ask whether there are
any reasons to prefer his solution to the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts to a solution which appeals to law
bound principles and the natural position.
In Chapter Six I examine Nozick's solution and argue
that it has many counter-intuitive implications. In Chapter
Seven I identify an emergent constraint and argue that a
solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts which
appeals to law bound principles and the natural position sa-
tisfies this constraint to a higher degree than Nozick's
solution. This permits me to conclude that Nozick's solu-
tion is not the optimal solution.
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INTRODUCTION
In Anarchy., State, and Utopia Robert Nozick offers a
solution to the problem of when it is permissible to use
force to prevent a person from performing a non-aggressive
risky act. Non-aggressive risky acts are, roughly speaking,
acts which are done for legitimate purposes and which create
risks of harm to others. In most cases where people drive
automobiles they perform non-aggressive risky acts. When an
epileptic drives he performs a very risky non-aggressive act.
Non-aggressive risky acts also include many acts which pollute
the environment. In this. essay I am going to argue that
Nozick's solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts
is radically mistaken. Furthermore, I am going to argue that
the reasons why it is mistaken reveal the limitations of his
state of nature approach to the problem of what principles, if
any, characterize the just.s~tatae,...
Nozick interprets state of nature theory to consist of
an account of what moral principles apply in. a nonstate situ-
ation in which people's moral relations have not been compli-
cated by prior state action, and a discussion of whether a
state would naturally arise from this situation by morally
permissible means, He believes that a demonstration that a
state would naturally arise amounts to a justification of the
state and that the principles which characterize the state
9
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which arises are the principles which characterize the just
state. 2  Furthermore, he believes that the study of state of
nature theory will lead to three important conclusions. The
first is that we must take seriously the anarchist's doubts
about the possibility of providing a justification of the
state. 3 The second is that it is possible to overcome the
anarchist's doubts and to provide a justification of the
4
state.4 The third and most important conclusion is that it
is not possible to provide a justification of a state which
is more extensive than the night-watchman state of classical
liberal theory which is "limited to the functions of pro-
tecting all its citizens against violence, theft, fraud, and
to the enforcement of contracts, and so on."5 Nozick believes
that the just state is not permitted to use force in the pur-
suit of any paternalist, perfectionist, or egalitarian goals.
Clearly, Noazick's beliefs about whether it is possible
to provide a justification of the state and what principles
characterize the just state depend upon the moral principles
which he accepts. Therefore, the heart of Nozick's position
is his defense of those principles. My aim is to show that
Nozick does not and cannot defend the moral principles which
he uses to solve the problem of non-aggressive risky acts.
One obstacle to accomplishing this aim is Nozick's concession
that he does not adequately defend nor even completely state
the moral theory to which he appeals.6 Furthermore, he
10
specifically concedes that there may be problems with his
statement and defense of the principle which he uses to solve
the problem of non-aggressive risky acts.7  He insists,
however, that "something like it will do."5  I will argue
that his solution is radically mistaken and that nothing like
the principle which he uses will do.
One of the significant features of Nozick's solution is
its assumption that any principle which is used to solve the
problem must be a principle which any person acting alone in
the state of nature is entitled to enforce. Another signi-
ficant feature of his solution is its assumption that we must
view each risky act as an isolated act in which one person
subjects another to a risk.* 0  That is, we must abstract
from the facts that a) a risk bearer must often bear the risks
of more than one person at a time and b) in the normal course
of a person's life he will be both a risk bearer and a risk
creator. These assumptions put his solution in sharp con-
trast with solutio-ns which assume that the problem is pro-
perly interpreted as a problem which concerns all of the
people in an area and takes account of the fact that in the
normal course of events each person is both a risk bearer
and a risk, creator, A person who makes this assumption will
almost certainly adopt a solution appealing to a principle
which a) specifies an end result and b) evaluates enforceable
public rules assigning entitlements to perform risky acts
II
on the basis of how close they come to achieving this re-
sult. We will call a principle of this type "a law bound
principle" and we will say that a public rule satisfies a
law bound principle when compliance with its requirements
achieves the end result. It is counter-intuitive to claim
that any person acting alone in the state of nature is en-
titled to publish and enforce the public rules which are
needed to satisfy a law bound principle. Therefore, a
person who believes that there are law bound principles
faces the problem of determining who is entitled to publish
and enforce these public rules. A natural solution is to
posit special principles, perhaps democratic principles,
whose purpose is to evaluate procedures which select the
people who alone have the right to publish and enforce them.
I will argue that the optimal solution to the problem of
non-aggressive risky acts is one which appeals to both law
bound principles and democratic principles.
My argument that a solution which appeals to these
types of principles is preferable to Nozick's solution does
not, by itself, threaten Nozick's principal conclusion that
the only just state is the night-watchman state. It only
forces him to accept the more specific conclusion that the
night-watchman state is just only if it uses democratic pro-
cedures to determine which people are specially entitled to
publish and enforce the public rules required by acceptable
12
law bound principles, Additional arguments are mneeded to
force Nozick to retreat from his claim that the just state
is not permitted to use force in the pursuit of any paterna-
list, perfectionist, or egalitarian goals. Although I
believe that these arguments can be given, I will not attempt
to give them here.
The argument which I will use to show that Nozick's
solution to the problem of non-aggressive acts is unaccep-
table will be quite complex. One reason why it is complex
is that Nozick's book is complex. It contains many different
themes and it is not always clear how they are related to
each other. I have made a serious attempt to show how they
form a coherent whole. This attempt forces me to commit
Nozick to theses which he does not explicitly accept in the
text. Those who are attracted to Nozick's view will be skep-
tical about whether a person who intends to criticize Nozick
can be trusted with the delicate task of discovering the
real structure of his theory. To them I can only say that I
have tried to be fair and that I have given them the oppor-
tunity to clarify and defend his theory by showing where I
have gone wrong.
In Chapter One I will introduce the concepts which I
need to state my criticisms of Nozick's solution to the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts. Most importantly, I
explain a) what an emergent problem is, b) what the optimal
13
solution to an emergent problem is, c) what Nozick means by
"the libertarian side constraint that prohibits aggression
against another,"1 and d) how NOzick's solution to the pro-
blem of non-aggressive risky acts differs from solutions
which appeal to both law bound and democratic principles. In
Chapters Two through Four I examine the beliefs which lead
Nozick to accept the libertarian side constraint against
aggression and I show that the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts is an emergent problem relative to those beliefs.
In Chapters Five through Seven I argue that the optimal solu-
tion to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts is
one which appeals to both law bound and democratic principles.
Insofar as my criticism of Nozick's solution takes as given
his commitment to the libertarian side constraint against
aggression, it can be interpreted as an internal criticism
of his theory. Therefore, it should be of special interest
to those who take libertarian views seriously.
14
THE BASIC CONCEPTS
1 . The Initial Simplifying AssurPtions: Nozick believes
that we should construct a moral theory around our clearest
moral beliefs. In fact, one of his reasons for studying
state of nature theory is his belief that our clearest moral
beliefs include our beliefs about how to resolve con-flicts
which arise in a pre-institutional state of nature. More
specifically, he appears to believe that we have very clear
beliefs about how to resolve many conflicts which arise
between people, when we make the following assumptions about
the context in which these conflicts occur:
1. There has been no prior state action.
2. There is an abundance of natural resources.
3. There have been no public announcements that
certain acts are prohibited and that those who do them
will be punished.
I will refer to these assumptions as Nozick's "initial sim-
plifying assumptions." Nozick believes that when we focus on
conflicts which arise in the simplified world characterized
by these assumptions we will often arrive at clear beliefs
about what principles should be used to solve them and what
"root ideas,"1 to use Nozick's own expression, justify
15
using those principles. These principles will include a
list of rights which are natural rights because they are
held by people in a pre-institutional state of nature.
Nozick's list of natural bights certainly includes:
21) a natural right to one's body, 2) a natural right to
one's labor,3 3) a natural right to what one has legitimately
acq uired,4 4) a natural right to make contracts, 5 5) a
natural right to pursue one's life plan, 6 and 6) a natural
right to "enforce one's natural rights. Furthermore, he
believes that the best explanation for why people have
these rights must appeal to the following root ideas:
1. No person may be sacrificed for the benefit
8
of any other person.
2. Each person must always be treated as an end
and never merely as a means.
3. No person is a resource for any other person. 0
4. Each person is individually responsible for
choosing his life plan. 1
Finally, Nozick would insist that these root ideas also put
constraints on how we should resolve i) the pre-institutional
conflicts about which we do not have clear beliefs and ii)
the conflicts which will emerge when we drop each of the
three initial simplifying assumptions.
16
When Nozick concedes that his book "does not present
a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights" 12
he is conceding that he has not established either a) that
his root ideas, as he interprets them, constitute the best
foundation for a correct moral theory, or b) that there are
valid arguments in which his root ideas appear as premises
and his moral principles, including his account of natural
rights, appear as conclusions. In this essay I will, for
the purpose of ariument, accept his root ideas and assume
that they can be used to establish his account of what rights
people have in a world characterized by the initial simplify-
ing assumptions. In fact, I will attempt to explain how to
interpret them so that they can be used to establish some
of the conclusions he wants to defend. I will argue, however,
that they cannot be used to establish his solution to the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts. Now I will turn to the
task of explaining why Nozick makes each of the three initial
simplifying assumptions.
It is essential to understand the role which each of
the simplifying assumptions plays in the development of
Nozick's theory. We must ask why he makes each and what prob-
lems emerge when he drops it. He would defend the first sim-
Plifying assumption by claiming that a) the correct account
of how prior state action complicates people's moral rela-
tions almost certainly presupposes an account of what is and
17
is not legitimate state action, b) we do not have particu-
larly clear beliefs about what is and is not legitimate
state action, and c) one aim of studying state of nature
theory is to throw light on what is and is not legitimate
state action., Furthermore, the assumption enables us to
postpone the difficult question of whether the state might
be necessary (as at least a temporary measure) to assure that
those who had been victims of illegitimate state action were
properly compensated.
Nozick would defend the second simplifying assumption
by claiming that it is necessary to bring our attention to
our clear beliefs about how to evaluate distributions of
natural resources and the benefits which result from their
use when natural rdsources are abundant. 1 3 There is an abun-
dance of a natural resource when one person's appropriation
of a bequeathable property right in some of that resource
leaves, in the words of Locke, "enough and as good left in
common for others." 14 Conditions of abundance are not condi-
tions in which every desire of every person can be satisfied.
Even in conditions of abundance a person may have a desire
to use another's body, to benefit from another's labor, or
to receive another's affection which conflicts with the
other's desire. Conditions of abundance are not even condi-
tions in which every person may satisfy his desires for
natural resources. Some natural resources may be situated
18
in places which are only accessible to the strong, the swift,
or the smart, Consequently, we can see that even in condi-
tions of abundance those who are unwilling or unable to
appropriate these resources may make claims on those who
have them or have the ability to get them. It should be
clear that even in conditions of abundance people will put
forward conflicting claims on natural resources and the
benefits which result from their use. Therefore, we need
a theory to resolve these conflicts.
Nozick believes that the theory which applies to the
problem of evaluating distributions of natural resources and
the benefits which result from their use in conditions of
abundance is transparently clear. He would, for instance,
say that each of the following is transparently clear: a)
a person owns his body and his labor, b) a person owns what-
ever unappropriated natural xesources he appropriates by
non-aggressive means, c) a person owns what others, who
previously owned it, voluntarily give him, and d) a person
owns whatever he makes from the natural resources and other
things which he owns. These considerations must lead Nozick
to conclude that a) in conditions of abundance a distribu-
tion is just whenever each of the steps which led to it was
itself just, b) we can determine whether any step is just
without appealing to an established set of public rules which
imply that it is just and, therefore, c) in conditions of
19
abundance there are no special principles for evaluating
distributions which give a central authority the right to
take what some have legitimately acquired for the purpose of
satisfying some desirable pattern or some desirable end
state.
Nozick is aware that we do not live in a world in
which there is an abundance of natural resources. When
people appropriate natural resources in our world there
comes a time when there is no longer "enough and as good
left in common for others." Some people's appropriations
will eventually make others worse off either by depriving them
of the opportunity to appropriate bequeathable property
rights in resources of,that kind or, more weakly, depriving
them of the right to use resources of that kind freely.
When we change our focus from conditions of abundance to
conditions of non-abundance we can justify a system which
permits the appropriation of bequeathable property rights in
natural resources only if we can establish that it is justi-
fiable to make others worse off in these ways. In conditions
of abundance the appropriations of some did not, by hypo-
thesis, make others worse off in these ways. The emergent
problem of non-abundance is the problem of how to evaluate
distributions of natural resources and the benefits which
result from their use when we drop the assumption of abun-
dance. Nozick appears to believe that the correct solution
20
must attempt to simultaneously satisfy two constraints: a)
it must assure that those who are made worse off in the
specified ways are compensated for their losses and b) it
must preserve the root idea of the clear theory for condi-
tions of abundance - the idea that each person owns his
labor. We can now see why Nozick makes the second simpli-
fying assumption: it brings our attention to the constraints
we must adopt in solving the problem of how to distribute
natural resources and the benefits which result from their
use in conditions of non-abundance and it postpones the
difficult task of solving this problem.
The reason why the task is difficult is that it may
not be possible to defend a solution which assures adequate
compensation to those who are made worse off in the specified
Ways without compromising the idea of self-ownership which
Nozick finds in the clear theory for abundance. In condi-
tions of abundance self-ownership implies that no person
is required to aid another whom he has not consented to aid.
In conditions of non-abundance, however, it may be impossible
to provide adequate compensation to all in a manner that is
fair to all without requiring some contribution from each.
Assuring adequate compensation to all will be viewed as a
joint undertaking which each person is required to partici-
Pate in regardless of his consent. I will not attempt to
state and evaluate Nozick's solution to the emergent problem
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of non-abundance. I will, however, bring the reader's
attention to the relation between his solution to this
problem and his claim that the only just state is the night-
watchman state, He can defend this claim only if he can
defend a solution which does not appeal to principles whose
satisfaction depends upon the establishment of a central
authority with the right to sometimes take what people have
legitimately acquired in order to aid othe=s whom they have
not consented to aid.
We now come to the third simplifying assumption. It
may, at first sight, appear to be an 'dd assumption. If an
act is forbidden and punishable how does it complicate matters
if a person makes a public announcement that it is forbidden
and punishable? The answer is that it doesn't. The purpose
of the assumption is to bring our attention to our clearest
beliefs about which acts are forbidden and punishable,
Nozick appears to believe that we can arrive at these beliefs
by asking the following question: When is it permissible to
punish a person for doing A in the absence of a warning that
he will be punished for doing A? We should be clear about
the answer to this question before we approach the more
difficult question about whether there are any acts which
are wrong and punishable only when they are preceded by a
public announcement that they are prohibited and that those
who perform them will be subjected to punishment, Furthermore,
22
our clear beliefs about how to answer the first question will
put constraints on what we can accept as an answer to the
second question in the same way that our clear beliefs about
how to evaluate distributions in conditions of abundance put
constraints on how we can solve the emergent problem of non-
abundance.
What problems do we postpone by making this final
simplifying assumption? One problem which we postpone is the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts. We can reach this con-
clusion from two different directions. First, we will dis-
cover that Nozick does not include non-aggressive risky acts
among the types of acts which are clearly punishable in the
absence of a warning that they are forbidden. Once we have
an account of which types of acts are punishable in the
absence of a warning, then we must consider whether there are
any pressing problems which can only be solved by appealing
to additional rights to punish. It turns out that serious
problems do emerge in a world in which there are no rights
to punish non-aggressive risky acts, -A second way to reach
this same conclusion is to note straightaway that the third
simplifying assumption postpones the problem of whether people
are ever collectively responsible for producing certain
results. If people are collectively responsible for pro-
ducing some result, then we need public rules which coor-
dinate their behaviour so that they produce this result. A
23
person will usually be liable to punishment for failing to
do his share in producing the result only when there is an
established set of public rules which is designed to coor-
dinate people's behaviour to produce this result and he has
been warned that he is liable to punishment for failing to do
what the rules require. One aspect of the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts is the problem of cumulative risk: the
Problem of how to coordinate the non-aggressive risky activi-
ties of many people so that they do not collectively subject
any person to a serious risk. For each of these reasons we
can conclude that the problem of non-aggressive risky acts is
an emergent problem relative to our clear beliefs about when
it is permissible to punish a person in the absence of a
warning that his act is forbidden and he will be punished for
doing it.
1.2 Emergent Problems and Optimal Solutions:
I have introduced the concept of an emergent problem by
giving examples of problems which Nozick would recognize as
problems which are emergent relative to problems about which
we have clear beliefs.15 We can generalize from these ex-
amples and adopt the following definition:
A problem M is emergent relative to a problem N
and a set of principles P for a theorist T if
24
and only if a) T accepts P, b) P is sufficient
to solve N, and c) T's belief that P is suffi-
cient to solve N is not based on a prior belief
that P must also be sufficient to solve M.- When
M is emergent relative to N and P for T it is
because T either needs additional principles to
solve M or additional arguments to establish that
P is sufficient to solve M.
The reader should not be alarmed by this apparently complex
definition. The concept of an emergent problem is a simple
concept once we understand the approach to theory construc-
tion with which it is associated. The essential feature of
this approach, which I will call "the intuitionist approach,"
is that in constructing a moral theory we should be guided by
our intuitive belief that there are compelling theoretical
reasons why some moral problems merit their own principles.
It is not difficult to find people who have argued that
special principles are appropriate for each of the problems
of: punishment, preventive detention, compensating the
victims of injustice, distributing the costs of accidents,
distributing natural resources and the benefits which result
from their use, paternalism, free speech, political obliga-
tion, and evaluating procedures for selecting public offi-
cials. This list could certainly be expanded. Let us call
a theory for a particular problem, or domain, "a local
theory." A local theory consists of a set of principles
25
which can be used to solve problems in its domain and an
explanation for why it is appropriate to use those principles
to solve the problems. A person who develops a local theory
for one domain does not believe that those principles must be
used to solve the problems in some other domain: a person
who develops a theory of free speech does not believe that
its principles must be used to solve problems of reparations;
a person who develops a theory of punishment does not believe
that its principles must be used to solve problems of pater-
nalism; and a person who develops a theory about how to
distribute the costs of accidents does not believe that its
principles must be used to solve problems concerning how to
treat non-human animals. All of this is obvious. It is
intended to make the obvious point that when a person develops
a local theory for one of the domains listed above he re-
cognizes the problems in other domains as emergent problems.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, I will bring the
reader's attention to four facts about the intuitionist
approach. The first thing to note about the intuitionist
approach is that the only theorists who appear to reject it --
and, therefore, to have no use for the concept of an emergent
problem -- are the ones who believe that a moral theory is
coherent only if it contains one principle, or one set of
Principles, which can be used to solve all moral problems.
A person who accepts the act utilitarian principle falls into
26
this category as does the person who believes that the act
utilitarian principle is objectionable only because it must
be supplemented by an equal distribution principle. On
their view there are no problems which merit special prin-
ciples. An act utilitarian will, for instance, say that a
law is right if and only if it maximizes utility, a person
ought to obey a law if and only if it maximizes utility to
obey it, and a person ought to be punished if and only if it
maximizes utility to punish him. The principle which he
defends as appropriate for solving one moral problem, he
intends as appropriate for solving every other moral problem.
The second thing to note about the intuitionist ap-
proach is that people who agree that it is the correct
approach may disagree over which problems merit their own
principles. Although Rawls and Nozick agree that it is the
correct approach, they disagree over which problems merit
their own principles. That Rawls believes it is the correct
approach is beyond dispute. Most of his efforts in A Theory
of Justice are devoted to solving the problem of what prin-
ciples characterize the basic structure of a perfectly just
society under favorable economic conditions. He is well
aware that once he solves this problem he will need addi-
tional principles to solve the difficult emergent problems
which remain, These include: 1) the problem of political
obligation,7 2) the problem of justice between generations,8
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3) the problem of how to distribute the costs of compensating
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people who have been victims of unjust institutions, and
4) the problem of weighing one form of institutional injus-
tice against another.20 Although Nozick also accepts the
intuitionist approach he certainly disagrees with Rawls's
claim that the problem of what principles characterize the
basic structure of a perfectly just society under favorable
economic conditions merits its own principles. In fact, part
of his reason for studying state of nature theory is to esta-
blish that we can do without these special principles.
A third thing to note about the intuitionist approach
is that it involves two types of simplifying assumptions and,
therefore, gives rise to at least two types of emergent prob-
21lems. First, it involves isolating a type of problem which
there is reason to believe merits its own principles. A per-
son may, for instance, believe that there are compelling rea-
sons why the problem of punishment merits its own principles
and, therefore, view the problems of paternalism and how to
distribute natural resources and the benefits which result
from their use as emergent relative to it. Similarly, a per-
son may believe that this latter problem merits its own prin-
ciples and view the problems of paternalism and punishment
as problems which are emergent relative to it. Once a per-
son decides that a certain type of problem merits its own
principles, however, he maya then make simplifying assumptions
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whose purpose is to direct our attention to aspects of that
problem about which we have clear beliefs. After we have
isolated these clear beliefs, we can drop the simplifying
assumptions and use the clear beliefs to aid us in solving
the other aspects of the problem which emerge. Nozick's
assumption that there is an abundance of natural resources
provides an example of this second type of focusing. Its
purpose is to direct our attention to our clearest beliefs
about how to solve the problem of how to evaluate distribu-
tions of natural resources and the benefits which result
from their use. Once we have isolated these clear beliefs
we must use them as constraints on how to solve the difficult
emergent problem of non-abundance. Other examples of the
second type of focusing are easy to provide. A person who
is constructing a theory of punishment may, for instance,
make the simplifying assumption that there are no monetary
costs associated with punishing people. This postpones the
difficult emergent problem of how to weigh the benefits of
increased deterrence against other benefits, such as better
schools, which also cost money to provide. Similarly, a
person who is constructing a theory about how to distribute
the costs of accidents may begin by assuming that there are
no monetary costs involved in identifying the victims of
accidents and making payments to them or in identifying the
people who caused the accidents and collecting payments from
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22them. This postpones the difficult emergent problem of
how we should respond to the distortions which are created
by high transaction costs.23
It is easy to show that Nozick makes use of both types
of simplifying assumptions in the development of his theory.
We can do this by bringing attention to how he develops and
defends his theory of property rights. He believes that a
person's rights to his property establish a boundary in
moral space around the property which give the person claims
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against those who cross the boundary.24 He would say that
a complete theory of property must include solutions to each
of the following problems:
1. How do we determine whether something is one
person's property rather than another person's?
We will call this "the problem of who owns what."
2. How do we determine what boundary a person's
property rights establish around the property? We
will call this "the problem of what constitutes a
crossing."
3. How does one person's right to his property
limit the liberty of another person? We will
call this "the problem of how property rights
limit liberty."
It is obvious what judgments we are able to make when we
have a solution to the problem of who owns what: this is
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John's land, that is Mary's book, Smith owns two hours of
Jone's labor, and the state owns 20% of Brown's income.
Nozick believes that the solution to the problem of who owns
what is given by the solution to the problem of how to
evaluate distributions of natural resources and the bene-
fits which result from their use. He believes that this
problem merits its own principles and that these principles
are included in the solution to the emergent problem of
non-abundance. Once we have solved that problem, however, we
must solve the problems which are emergent relative to it.
The problems of what constitutes a crossing and how property
rights limit liberty fall into this category.
It may be less obvious what judgments we are able to
make when we have a solution to the problem of what consti-
tutes a crossing. These judgments will include judgments of
the following types: 1) Smith's act crossed the boundary
established by Brown's property right in his land, 2) Green's
act is certain to cross the boundary established by White's
property in his labor, and 3) Larson's act is likely to cross
the boundary established by Gray's property right in his body.
In many cases we have clear beliefs about what constitutes a
crossing. It is, for instance, clear that I cross the boun-
dary established by your property right in your sewer pipe
when I ignore your wishes and break it with a sledge hammer.
It is also reasonably clear that I cross the boundary when
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I do blasting on my property which causes earth tremors
which shatter the pipe. It is not so clear, however, that
I cross the boundary when I plant a tree on my property whose
spreading roots destroy your pipe.
A solution to the problem of what constitutes a
crossing tells us when one person's act crosses the boundary
established by another's property rights. It does not,
however, tell us how property rights limit liberty. There
are many possibilities. 25 One possibility is that others
are forbidden to cross the boundary even when the person
gives his consent to the crossing. When a right establishes
a boundary of this type we say that it is inalienable.
Nozick denies that there are any inalienable rights. His
denial follows from his belief that the natural right to make
contracts includes the absolute right to permit others to
cross the boundaries established by your rights. A second
possibility is that others are forbidden to cross the boun-
dary without the consent of the person whose boundary it is.
A third possibility is that others .are permitted to cross
without consent provided that they compensate the person
whose boundary it is for the harm caused by the crossing.
All that we can conclude from the fact that A's act crosses
the boundary established by B's right to his property is
that this crossing gives B some claim against others. In
order to determine what this claim is we must solve the
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emergent problem of how property rights limit liberty.
Clearly, the problem of non-aggressive risky acts is one
aspect of the problem of how property rights limit liberty.
Furthermore, we shall see that Nozick regards the problem
of non-aggressive risky acts as a problem which is emergent
relative to our clear beliefs about how property rights
limit the aggressive behaviour of another.
What problems remain after we have a solution to the
problem of how property rights limit liberty? The solution
to this problem enables us to determine which acts which
threaten the boundary established by another's property
rights are permitted and which are forbidden. Furthermore,
it will enable us to distinguish between acts which are
merely permitted and acts which a person has a right to do.
An act is permitted when a person does not act wrongly in
doing it. He has a right to do it, and is not merely per-
mitted to do it, when he is permitted to do it and others
are obligated not to interfere with his doing it. If we
conclude that a person has a right to do it then, like an
ordinary property right, it establishes a boundary around
the person which gives him claims against others when it
is crossed. If we conclude that an act is forbidden, then
we must solve the emergent problem of how people are per-
mitted to respond to forbidden acts. Nozick denies that we
can go straight from the fact that an act which threatens
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the boundary established by another's property rights is
forbidden to the conclusion that it is permissible to use
force to prevent it or to punish the person who did it.27
It is an important feature of his theory, however, that the
right to enforce one's natural rights includes the right to
use force to prevent one from doing a forbidden act as well
as the right to use force to punish a person for doing such
an act.28 Furthermore, it is an important feature of his
theory that the right to use force to prevent a forbidden
act includes the right to use force to take compensation from
a person who has crossed the boundary established by your pro-
perty rights without your consent. This follows from his
belief that it is never permissible to cross the boundary
established by another's property rights without his consent
and to refuse to pay compensation. 2 9  Finally, the solution
to the problem of when it is permissible to use force to re-
spond to forbidden acts will include a solution to the problem
of how severely we are permitted to punish a person for doing
a forbidden act. In summary, Nozick believes that a solution
to the problem of how property rights limit liberty still
leaves us with the complex emergent problem of when it is
permissible to use force to respond to forbidden acts which
threaten the boundaries established by another's property
rights.
This brief discussion of the structure of Nozick's
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theory should leave no doubt that Nazick makes ample use of
the first type of simplifying assumption. There is over-
whelming evidence that he believes that different problems
merit their own principles. This discussion should also
give the reader some sense of how complex the structure of
Nozick's theory is and, therefore, help the reader to iden-
tify exactly where the problem of non-aggressive risky acts
fits into that structure. The evidence that Nozick uses the
second type of simplifying assumption is also compelling.
Our discussion of how he approaches the task of solving the
problem of who owns what has already provided dramatic evi-
dence that he uses it. We will see further evidence that he
uses it when we discuss his solution to the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts. He appears to believe that we can
arrive at our clearest beliefs about how to solve this
problem by considering it as it arises in a world in which
there are no transaction costs. 30 It is only after we have
solved it as it arises in this simpler world that we should
drop the assumption of no transaction costs and attempt to
solve it as it arises in the world in which we live.
A final thing to note about the intuitionist approach
is that a person who uses it must eventually defend solutions
to the problems he recognizes as emergent problems. Let us
assume that a person believes that a certain domain merits
its own principles. Let us further assume that he approaches
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the problem of constructing a theory for that domain by
making use of a simplifying assumption which brings our
attention to what he believes a.e our clearest beliefs about
how to solve problems in that domain. When we drop the sim-
plifying assumption we must solve the problems in that domain
which emerge. How do we decide from among all of the possible
solutions to one of these emergent problems which the optimal
one is? There is no problem when the root ideas which we
arrived at by means of the simplifying assumption are suffi-
ciently powerful to entail a solution to the emergent problem.
When this is the case we simply accept the solution which is
entailed as the optimal solution. When it is not the case,
then we must look for an emergent constraint which can be
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used to compare the competing solutions.
A natural place to look for emergent constraints is in
other local theories. Perhaps the root ideas of one local
theory put constraints an how we can develop another local
theory. A complete moral theory is, after all, no more than
a coherent combination of local theories. A person who uses
the intuitionist approach must, therefore, be prepared to
answer the following types of questions:
1. Are some problems completely independent
from other problems so that the theory which we
adopt for one has no implications for the theory
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we adopt for the other?
2. Are some problems completely dependent on
other problems so that the theory we adopt for
one forces us to adopt a particular theory for
the other?
3. Are some problems partially dependent upon
other problems so that the theory we adopt for
one puts some constraints on what theory we can
adopt for the other but does not force us to
adopt a particular theory?
Is the problem of who owns what completely independent of
the problem of free speech? Is the problem of how property
rights limit liberty partially dependent upon the problem
of who owns what? Is the problem of paternalism pa=tially
dependent upon the problem of free speech? Is the problem
of how to distribute the costs of accidents completely de-
pendent upon the problem of punishment? It is impossible
to answer these questions in the abstract, We must have
particular local theories at hand. As I explain and criticize
Nozick's solution to the emergent problem of non-aggressive
risky acts I will often raise these types of questions.
What happens, however, if all of the root ideas from
all of the local theories do not force a conclusion as to
what the optimal solution to the emergent problem is? In
this case we must defend a new emergent constraint which a)
is consistent with all of the root ideas which are included
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among our clearest beliefs, b) identifies a property which
it is desirable to have in a solution when the problem is
examined from an impartial point of view, and c) can be used
to rink competing solutions. The solution which satisfies
this property to the highest degree is the optimal solution.
In order to establish that Nozick's solution to the emergent
problem of non-aggressive risky acts is not the optimal solu-
tion I must, therefore, do three things. First, I must esta-
blish that the root ideas of the theory which he defends do
not entail the solution which he proposes. Second, I must
defend an emergent constraint which can be used to evaluate
the solutions which are compatible with his root ideas.
Finally, I must establish tthat there is an alternative solu-
a4
tion which satisfies the emergent constraint to a higher
degree than Nozick's solution.
In the first two sections of this chapter I have made
some general comments about Nozick's approach to theory
construction. I have discussed how Nozick's initial simpli-
fying assumptions are intimately connected to his task of
constructing a complete moral theory, including a theory of
the just state, by focusing on people's moral relations in
a pre-institutional state of nature. Furthermore, I have
explained what an emergent problem is and have given examples
of problems which Nozick must regard as emergent problems at
different stages in the development of his theory. Finally,
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I have explained what is involved in claiming that a solu-
tion to an emergent pzoblem is the optimal solution. In the
remaining sections of this chapter I hope to accomplish
three things. First, I will give a more precise account of
why Nozick must view the problem of non-aggressive risky
acts as an emergent problem by showing how it is related to
the libertarian side constraint against aggression, which
he defends. Second, I will explain the important contrasts
between the solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky
acts which Nozick defends and a solution which I believe is
certainly preferable. Finally, I will summarize the argument
which I develop in the remainder of this essay for the con-
clusion that Nozick's solution to the emergent problem of
non-aggressive risky acts is not the optimal solution.
1.3 The Libertarian Side Constraint Against Aqgression:
Nozick's most detailed discussion of the pro.blem of how
property rights limit liberty occurs in Chapter Four. Near
the beginning of his discussion he writes:
A line.. (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area
in moral space around an individual. Locke holds
that. this line is determined by an individual's
natural rights, which limit the actions of others.
Non-Lockeans view other considerations as setting
the position and contour of this line. In any case
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the following question arises: Are others forbidden
to perform actions that trqns._oress the boundary or
encroach upon the circumscribed area. or are they
permitted
. 
to perform such actions provided that they_
compensate the person whose boundary is crossed? 3 2
This quote should bring our attention to two important fea-
tures of Nozick's discussion. The first is that he clearly
assumes that the solution to the problem of how property
rights limit liberty presupposes solutions to the problems
of who owns what and what constitutes a crossing. I will,
for the most part, avoid asking how Nozick believes we can
arrive at solutions to these prior problems. When I discuss
his solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts I
will simply assume, as he does, that we have solutions, At
times, however, I will raise the question of whether it is
reasonable to believe that we can always solve these prior
problems by appealing to a person's natural rights. The
alternative position is that we must sometimes appeal to
established public rules which satisfy law bound principles.33
The reason why I will sometimes raise this question will
become apparent.
This quote also brings our attention to the fact that
Nozick believes that rights are absolute in the following
sense: it is never permissible to cross the boundary esta-
blished by a person's rights without his consent and to
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refuse to pay him compensation for the harm caused by the
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crossing. I will call the thesis which asserts that rights
are absolute in this sense "weak absoluteness." Nozick's
discussion of the problem of how property rights limit
liberty leaves almost no doubt that he believes that the
solution will reveal that rights are also absolute in the
much stronger sense given by the libertarian side constraint
against aggression.
Unfortunately, Nozick never explicitly says what prin-
ciples are included in the libertarian side constraint
against aggression, and he never offers a precise account
of what constitutes aggression. The following remarks,
which appear in Chapter Three, should give the reader an
idea of the position which Naozick wants to defendi
Political philosophy is concerned only with
certain ways that a person may not use others;
primarily physically aggressing against them.
A specific side constraint upon action towards
others expresses the fact that others may not be
used in the specific ways the side constraint
excludes, Side constraints express the inviola-
bility of others in the ways they specify. 35
This root idea, namely, that there are different
individuals with separate lives and so no one may
be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence
of moral side constraints, but it also, I believe,
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leads to a libertarian side constraint that
prohibits aggression against another.3 6
Anyone who rejects that particular jhe libertarian7
side constraint has three alternatives: (1) he
must reject all side constraints; (2) he must pro-
duce a different explanation of why there are
moral side constraints rather than simply a goal
directed maximizing structure, an explanation
which does not itself entail the libertarian side
constraint; or (3) he must accept the strongly put
root idea about the separateness of individuals and
yet claim that initiating aggression against another
is compatible with this root idea. Thus we. have
a promising sketch of an argument from moral form
to moral content: the form of morality includes
F (moral side constraints); the best explanation
of morality's being F is p (a strong statement of
the distinctness of individuals); and from P follows
a particular moral content, namely, the libertarian37
constraint.37
What is the relation between these brief descriptions of and
arguments for the libertarian side constraint against aggres-
sion and the later arguments, which appear in Chapter Four,
concerning which actions are forbidden and which are permitted
provided that compensation is paid? Nozick never tells us.
It seems fair to say, however, that the later arguments are
intended to supplement the earlier argument, the one from
moral form to moral content, for the libertarian side
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constraint. We should expect Chapter Four to throw addi-
tional light on what the libertarian side constraint requires
and why we should accept it.
In order to explain what theses Nozick includes in the
libertarian side constraint against aggression and to explain
how he defends those theses by appealing to his root ideas,
we must first have an account of what Nozick means by aggres-
sion. It will not do to say that aggression is the imper-
missible use of force, One reason is that any moral theorist,
from libertarian to utilitarian, could agree that imper-
missible uses of force are forbidden. The substantive issue
is which uses of force are impermissible. Another reason
is that there may be aggressive acts which do not involve
the use of force. Although a thief does not use force it is
reasonable to claim that he acts aggressively. One of my
aims will be to extract the account of aggression which is
implicit in Anarchy, State and Utopia. I will use this
account of aggression to state the principles which Nozick
certainly includes in the libertarian side constraint against
aggression and to explain how these principles are related
to Nozick's root ideas. We will be able to see why a person
who is committed to Nozick's root ideas will insist that all
aggressive acts which threaten to cross the boundary esta-
blished by another's property rights are forbidden. Now,
however, I will give a non-theoretical account of which
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principles Nozick appears to include in the libertarian side
constraint against aggression.
The clearest case of an aggressive act which crosses
another's boundary is an act which involves the forceful
taking of a person's property without his consent. A person
who accepts the libertarian side constraint against aggres-
sion certainly accepts the following principle:
P1. It is never permissible to use force to take
another's property without the other's consent.
This is a very powerful principle which takes us way beyond
weak absoluteness. It implies that it is not permissible to
forcefully take another's property even in cases where the
crossing will produce a great amount of good and the person
whose property will be taken is offered more than full compen-
sation for the harm which he will suffer as a result of the
taking. It implies that a forceful taking is not even per-
missible in a case where it is a necessary means to minimize
the number of aggressive acts which will take place in the
38future.3 Forceful takings include the obvious cases of
using force, or the threat of force, to get a person's
material property such as his money or his car. They also
include the use of force to get a person to provide labor
which he has not consented to provide and is not otherwise
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morally bound to provide.
The libertarian side constraint will also apply to
forceful crossings which are not takings. So, for instance,
in cases of battery there is a forceful crossing but nothing
which can be called a taking. The principle which Nozick
would appeal to in order to explain why battery is forbidden
would be the following principle which entails PI but is not
entailed by it:
P2. It is never permissible to forcefully cross
the boundary defined by another's rights without
his consent.
I suspect that Nozick would also say that there are times
when a person aggressively crosses the boundary defined by
another's rights even though he does not forcefully cross it.
He might, for instance, say that both the person who steals
and the person who defrauds act aggressively even though
they do not use force. What makes their acts aggressive is
the fact that each intends to make another worse off. Nozick
might explain why these acts are forbidden by appealing to
the following principle:
P3. It is never permissible to cross the boundary
defined by another's rights with the intent to
make the other worse off.
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We should note that this principle follows directly from a
commitment to weak absoluteness. Therefore, it is a weaker
principle than either of the previous principles which con-
stitute the libertarian side constraint. Those principles
forbid acts where the agent is willing to pay more than full
compensation to the person whose boundary he will cross and,
therefore, clearly does not intend to make that person worse
off.
We have isolated three types of acts which threaten to
cross the boundary defined by another's rights and which
Nozick would classify as aggressive. Furthermore, for each
type we have identified a principle which says that that
type of act is forbidden. It appears that Nozick also be-
lieves that there are some aggressive acts which do not
threaten to cross the boundary defined by another's rights
but which are, nonetheless, forbidden. His discussion of
blackmail suggests that he would classify any act which is
done for the sole purpose of making another worse off as an
aggressive act and would accept the following principle: 39
P4. It is never permissible to do an act, regard-
less of whether the act threatens the boundary
defined by another's right, when the sole purpose
for doing the act is to make another worse off.
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In fact, it is his discussion of blackmail which suggests
that he intends the libertarian side constraint against
aggression to apply to a wider class of acts than those
which he would classify as impermissible uses of force.
Finally, we come to the last clear aspect of the liber-
tarian side constraint against aggression: forbidding the
use of force for paternalist or perfectionist purposes.40
The person who uses force for these purposes intends to
benefit the person against whom he wields the force. There-
fore, we cannot get the conclusion that these uses are for-
bidden directly from P3. In order to get the conclusion we
must explicitly, posit a right to choose one's life plan and
the means for achieving it. Once we posit this right we
can get the conclusion that those uses of force are forbidden
by appealing to P2. Similarly, once we determine that people
have rights to use force, then those rights function like
property rights and are protected by P1 and P2.
Now that I have stated the principles which are in-
cluded in the libertarian side constraint against aggression
I want to a) explain how Nozick's commitment to the liber-
tarian side constraint leads him to take seriously the
anarchist's doubts about the possibility of providing a
justification of the state and b) elaborate on how the liber-
tarian side constraint is related to the solution to the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts. The anarchist believes
47
that there are two features of the state which make it im-
possible to provide a justification of the state. The first
is its prohibition on the private enforcement of rights.41
So long as we believe %hat each person has a right to en-
force some of his rights and we accept the libertarian side
constraint against aggression, then we will also have to
accept that prohibiting private enforcement of these rights
is forbidden. This is because prohibiting private enforce-
ment involves the use of force to cross the boundary esta-
blished by another's rights without his consent. It is
important to notice that this doubt about the possibility of
providing a justification of the state only depends .upon the
belief that piople have some rights to enforce their rights.
It is consistent with the claim that there are some rights
to use force which are possessed by justly selected officials
and by nobody else. Recall that a person who accepts the
libertarian side constraint assumes that we already have a
solution to the problem of who owns what. This person might
claim that we can solve this problem only by appealing to
established public rules which satisfy a traditional principle
of distributive justice. In this case he will almost cer-
tainly also claim that the only people who have the right to
enforce this rule, a rule which permits the forceful taking
of what some have legitimately acquired for the purpose of
satisfying the principle, are justly selected officials.
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Alternatively, he will claim that a central authority has
the right to prohibit the private enforcement of this rule.
It is only after the problem of who owns what has been
solved that the libertarian side constraint comes into play.
The person who accepts it will insist that each person has
the right to punish those who do the acts which it forbids
and, therefore, that a prohibition on this right to use
force is also forbidden. This discussion establishes that
a person who accepts the libertarian side constraint against
aggression may consistently claim both a) that there are
some rights to use force which are held by justly selected
officials and by nobody else and b) that it is impossible to
provide a justification of the state. The reason why he can
consistently claim both follows from the way I have defined
the libertarian side constraint against aggression: as a
thesis which is independent of the thesis that there are no
rights to use force which are held by justly selected offi-
cials and nobody else. Although we will see that Nozick
accepts both, he only needs the former to explain why he
takes the anarchist's doubts seriously.
The second feature of the state which the anarchist
objects to is its provision of protective services to all
of the people within its boundaries including those who do
not have the resources to pay for the protection which they
receive and those who would choose to do without the
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protective services.42  How can the state raise the money to
pay for these protective services? If it raises the money
through voluntary contributions, then there are no apparent
rights violations. The other methods of raising the money,
however, will appear to involve violations of the libertarian
side constraint. Let us assume that it raises the money for
providing protection to the needy by taxing the rich. This
taxation appears to be a forceful taking of the wealthy per-
son's property without his consent. Therefore, it appears
to be a violation of the libertarian side constraint. It
even appears to be a violation of weak absoluteness insofar
as the crossing is not accompanied by any compensation to the
person whose boundary is crossed. We might attempt to avoid
the conclusion that this use of force is a violation of the
libertarian side constraint by claiming that each person has
a legitimate claim on every other person to aid him in pre-
venting violations of his rights. These may include claims
to another's aid which do not depend upon the existence of
established public rules as well as claims to another's aid
in supporting established public rules which are designed
to prevent rights violations. If we believe that people
have these legitimate claims, then we will deny that en-
forcing them is a violation of the libertarian side constraint.
Instead we will say that enforcing them is forcing a person
to do what he has no right to refrain from doing. Nozick
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denies that a person has a legitimate claim to another's aid
in preventing violations of his rights.4 3  He takes the view
that we do not violate a person's rights when we refrain
from aiding him in protecting his rights. Therefore, he
concludes that these uses of force are violations of the
libertarian side constraint.
There is also the problem of how to raise money to
provide protection to those who are not needy but who do
not choose to pay for protective services. If the money is
raised by taxing others, then we have the same violations of
the libertarian side constraint as above. Do we also violate
the libertarian side constraint when we raise the money by
taxing those who choose not to buy protective services?
Does a person violate the libertarian side constraint when
he uses force to make a person move from a situation in which
he does not receive protective services and does not pay to
one in which he receives protective services and pays? If
this move involves forcefully preventing a person from en-
forcing his own rights, then we can certainly conclude that
there is a violation. Even if it does not involve this pro-
hibition it still involves a violation of the libertarian
side constraint. This is because it involves forcefully
taking some of what a person owns without his consent. We
can conclude that a person who accepts the libertarian side
constraint will object to the state's practice of providing
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protection to all of the people within its boundaries and
will share the anarchist's second doubt about the possibility
of providing a justification of the state.
We have seen how Nozick's commitment to the libertarian
side constraint is related to his belief that we must take
seriously the anarchist's doubts about the possibility of
providing a justification of the state. We can now see why
it forces him to reject a principle which he calls "the en-
forceable fairness principle." The reasons why he rejects
this principle enable us to clearly see why the libertarian
side constraint is both a very strong and a very limited
44thesis. The fairness principle states:
Whenever a group of people G voluntarily cooperate
by conforming their behaviour to a set of public
rules, then every person P, regardless of. whether
he is amember of G, has an obligation to follow
the rules provided that: a) the rules are intended
to apply to him, b) he has been informed of their
requirements, c) he receives the benefits of the
cooperation of others, and d) he is better off .in
the situation in which he receives the. benefits of
other's cooperation and cooperates than he would
have been in the situation in which he does not
receive the benefits and does not cooperate.
The enforceable fairness principle is the fairness principle
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with the rider that justly selected representatives of G are
permitted to enforce the obligations created by the fairness
principle. These obligations will be obligations to do (or
refrain from doing) actions which one had a right to refrain
from doing (or to do) prior to the establishment of the rule.
They may include: refraining from privately enforcing your
rights, permitting others to use your property without your
consent, paying for services which you never consented to
pay for, or refraining from doing a risky act.
The fairness principle and the libertarian side con-
straint both presuppose solutions to the problems of who
owns what and what constitutes a crossing. The fairness
principle, however, also presupposes solutions to the prob-
lems of how property rights limit liberty and when a person
is permitted to use force to respond to forbidden acts. In
fact, it presupposes information about what all of a person's
rights are. This is because we need this information to
determine whether condition d) of the fairness principle has
been satisfied. This condition requires us to compare a
person's well-being in the situation in which all are re-
quired to obey the rule with his well-being in the situation
in which none are required to obey the rule. We cannot say
very much about how well off he would have been in the latter
situation unless we know what rights people have in it. We
can conclude that the fairness principle is a principle
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which can only be used to change the boundaries established
by people's rights in ways which make none worse off. Once
we see this it is easy to see why a person who accepts the
libertarian side constraint must reject the enforceable fair-
ness principle. The proponent of the libertarian side con-
straint believes that no person is permitted to forcefully
cross the boundary established by another's rights without
the other's consent. In fact, he believes that no person is
permitted to cross without consent even when he guarantees
the other more than full compensation for the harm caused
by the crossing and the crossing is a necessary means for
minimizing the number of rights violations. The person who
accepts the enforceable fairness principle must give up each
of these beliefs. He must concede that some forceful
crossings of a person's boundary without his consent are
permitted. They will be just those crossings which are per-
mitted by established public rules which satisfy conditions
a) through d). Furthermore, in the cases where crossings
are permitted without consent the person whose boundary is
crossed is not even guaranteed full compensation for the harm
caused by that crossing. Condition d) only requires that
the person is better off than he would have been in the
situation in which there was no rule. It can be satisfied
even though the person is not compensated each time his
boundary is crossed without his consent. All that is
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required, is that he gains more from the times when he and
others are permitted to cross without consent and without
paying compensation than he loses from the times when others
'are permitted to cross his boundary without consent and with-
out paying compensation.
The relationship between the enforceable fairness
principle and the anarchist's doubts about the possibility
of providing a justification of the state is illuminating.
Nozick is aware that a person who accepts the enforceable
fairness principle can provide a justification of the state.
It is easy for this person to show that an established public
rule which prohibits private enforcement of rights, provides
each person with a right to protective services, and requires
payment from each for the cost of providing him with these
services, will satisfy conditions a) through d) of the en-
forceable fairness principle. The argument that d) will be
satisfied will appeal to the following liabilities of private
enforcement which Nozick recognizes: it is expensive, it is
time consuming, it often leads to constant feuds, and it
causes people to suffer fear of being victims of the unre-
liable procedures for determining guilt which others might
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use. A central authority which published a rule like the
one sketched above, used reliable procedures for determining
guilt, and charged a reasonable price for its protective
services could certainly say to each of the people who was
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subjected to the rule that he is better off in the situation
in which he obeys the rule and benefits from the cooperation
of others than he would have been in the situation in which
there was no rule at all. In order to stop this quick justi-
fication of the state Nozick must show that the principle to
which it appeals, the enforceable fairness principle, is un-
acceptable. One way for him to show this is by showing that
it is inconsistent with a commitment to the libertarian side
constraint. We will see that he has other reasons for re-
jecting the enforceable fairness principle. It appears to
conflict with his beliefs, which we will examine in the
next section,, that there are no rights to use force which
are held by justly selected officials and nobody else and
that no new rights emerge at the group level. It is impor-
tant to see, however, that a person who accepts the liber-
tarian side constraint against aggression does not have to
appeal to these additional beliefs to establish that the
enforceable fairness principle is unacceptable.. This
suggests that a commitment to the libertarian side constraint
is one thing and the commitment to those beliefs is quite
another.
The fact that a person who accepts the libertarian
side constraint can use it to support the anarchist's doubts
about the possibility of providing a justification of the
state and to reject the enforceable fairness principle shows
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that it is a strong thesis. Now we should see why it is a
limited thesis. First, it presupposes solutions to the prob-
lems of who owns what and what constitutes a crossing, No-
thing we have said establishes that a person who accepts the
libertarian side constraint cannot also accept solutions to
these problems which sometimes appeal to established public
rules which satisfy law bound principles. Furthermore,
nothing we have said suggests that we can never defend a law
bound principle as the appropriate principle for solving one
of these problems on the ground that it will give "the fair-
est solution." When Nozick rejects the enforceable fairness
principle he rejects a principle which says that once we have
established what boundaries are established by a person's
rights we cannot appeal to the enforceable fairness principle
to change those boundaries without the person's consent. It
is a completely different question whether we can appeal to
what we intuitively consider to be considerations of fairness
when we first establish what those boundaries are. Second,
the libertarian side constraint leaves us with the problem
of when it is permissible to forcefully prohibit non-aggres-
sive acts including non-aggressive risky acts. Again, we
should note that nothing we have said suggests that a person
who accepts the libertarian side constraint cannot appeal to
considerations of fairness to solve this problem. Further-
more, nothing we have said suggests that a person who accepts
57
the libertarian side constraint cannot appeal to law bound
Principles to solve this problem. With these facts in mind
I will now explain the significant contrasts between Nozick's
solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts and a
solution which I will argue is preferable.
I .4 The Natural Position:
One oF the significant features of Nozick's solution
to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts is that
it does not appeal to law bound principles. That is, he
believes that we can always solve the problem of whether or
not a person is permitted to perform a non-aggressive risky
act without appealing to an established public rule which
satisfies a law bound principle. We have defined a law
bound principle as a principle which a) specifies an end
result and b) is used to evaluate enforceable public rules
on the basis of how closely compliance with them achieves
that end result. We will say that a public rule satisfies a
law bound principle when compliance with it achieves the
specified end result, and that a public rule is intended to
satisfy a law bound principle when those who publish the rule
believe that it will satisfy the principle.
A person may believe that law bound principles are some-
times needed to solve the problems of who owns what, what
constitutes a crossing, and how property rights limit liberty.
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Most theories of distributive justice appeal to law bound
principles to solve the problem of who owns what. Examples
include:
A distribution of income and wealth is right if
and only if it maximizes utility.
A distribution of income and wealth is right if
and only if the share which each receives
makes an equal proportionate contribution to
the best life each is capable of achieving.
A person who accepts either of the above will almost cer-
tainly believe that only justly selected officials have the
right to publish and enforce the laws which are needed to
a
achieve the end result which it specifies.
A person may also believe that law bound principles
are sometimes needed to solve the problem of what consti-
tutes a crossing. We have already raised the question of
whether I cross the boundary established by your property
right in your sewer pipe when I plant a tree whose roots
destroy the pipe. If you believe that the appropriate way
to answer this question involves evaluating the hypothetical
consequences of hypothetical public rules which tell us what
constitutes a crossing, then you believe that we must some-
times appeal to law bound principles. You will believe that
it certainly is a crossing when the established public rule
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says that it is a crossing and the established public rule
is the rule which has "the best" consequences.
Finally, a person may believe that law bound principles
are sometimes needed to solve the problem of how property
rights limit liberty. A person who accepts the libertarian
side constraint against aggression believes that we can solve
some aspects of this problem without appealing to any law
bound principles in addition to those which might be needed
to solve the problems of who owns what and what constitutes
a crossing. That is, he believes that once we have solutions
to these problems we can a) say that a person is forbidden
to do an aggressive act which threatens to cross the boun-
dary established by another's rights, and b) determihe
which acts are aggressive without appealing to any additional
law bound principles. Another person might insist that
once we have solutions to the problems of who owns what and
what constitutes a crossing we should adopt the following
solution to the problem of how property rights limit liberty:
a person is permitted to cross the boundary established by
another's property rights without his consent provided that
his act is permitted by an established set of public rules
which a) requires him to compensate the person whose boundary
he crosses and b) causes greater social utility than any
alternative set of public rules which forbids the crossing
would cause. This person clearly believes that we must
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sometimes appeal to additional law bound principles to solve
the problem of how property rights limit liberty. The
question which we will eventually have to answer is whether
a person who accepts the libertarian side constraint against
aggression as the solution to one aspect of the problem of
how property rights limit liberty must say that the solutions
to all aspects of that problem, including the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts, must never appeal to additional law
bound principles.
A person who believes that there are law bound prin-
ciples must answer each of the following questions:
1) Which people are entitled to publish, interpret,
and enforce the public rules which are needed to
satisfy law bound principles?
2) How do we determine when a person is morally
bound to obey the requirements of a public rule
which is intended to satisfy a law bound principle?
3) How should we distribute the costs of publishing,
interpreting, and enforcing the public rules which
are needed?
I will say that a person accepts the natural position when
he believes both a) that there are law bound principles, and
b) that law bound principles create the need for the follow-
ing special principles:
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I. Special principles for evaluating pro-
cedures which select the people who alone
have the right to publish and interpret the
public rules which are needed to satisfy law
bound principles.46 We will call procedures
which satisfy these special principles "just
publication procedures."
2. Special principles for evaluating pro-
cedures which select the people who alone
have the right to enforce the public rules
which are needed to satisfy the law bound
principles. We will call procedures which
satisfy these principles "just enforcement
procedures."
3. Special principles which can be used to
determine when a person is morally bound to
obey the requirements of public rules which
are intended to satisfy law bound principles.
We will call these special principles "prin-
ciples of political obligation."
4. Special principles for evaluating policies
of distributing the costs of maintaining the
just procedures and the costs of publishing,
interpreting, and enforcing the laws which
are needed to satisfy law bound principles.
We will call policies which satisfy these
principles "just policies of distributing the
costs of maintaining just institutions."
5. Special principles for evaluating pro-
cedures for selecting the people who alone
have the right to enforce just policies for
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distributing the costs of maintaining just
institutions. We will also call procedures
which satisfy these principles "just collec-
tion procedures."
Finally, a person who accepts each of the special principles
listed above will also insist that there is a natural right
to just institutions: a right to the cooperation of others
in establishing and maintaining the just publication, en-
forcement, and collection procedures. It is this natural
right, along with its correlative natural duty, which assures
that just institutions will emerge from a pre-institutional
state of nature by morally permissible means.
A person who wants to defend the natural position must
first establish that the correct moral theory includes some
law bound principles. He can do this by showing that the so-
lutions to the problems of who owns what, what constitutes a
crossing, and how property rights limit liberty sometimes ap-
peal to law bound principles. In this essay I will examine
whether a person who accepts the libertarian side constraint
against aggression can defend a solution to the problem of
non-aggressive risky acts which appeals to law bound prin-
ciples. The reader will recall that the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts is one aspect of the problem of how
property rights limit liberty. Once a person establishes
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that there are law bound principles, then he must also esta-
blish that the solutions to the special problems created by
them must appeal to the special principles included in the
natural position. So, for instance, he might offer the
following argument for his claim that law bound principles
create the need for special principles for evaluating publi-
cation procedures:
1. Only one set of enforceable public rules is
needed to satisfy a law bound principle.
2. Distinct sets of enforceable public rules may
yield conflicting directives or lead to excessive
restriction of liberty,
therefore,
3. We need some mechanism for selecting the
people who alone have the right to publish the
enforceable public rules which are needed to
satisfy the law bound principles.
and 4. The mechanism will be acceptable to those
who are bound to obey the requirements of the
enforceable public rules only if it meets the
requirements of what they believe are acceptable
principles.
A similar argument can be given for why we need just proce-
dures for selecting the people who alone have the right to
interpret the laws which are intended to satisfy law bound
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principles.
Once we recognize that there are principles which can
only be satisfied through the establishment of public rules
we must face the problem of when people are bound to obey
the rules which are intended to satisfy those principles.
We cannot adopt the view that a person is bound to obey the
rules only when he has consented to obey them. This is be-
cause the public rules which satisfy law bound principles
sometimes establish what people's rights are in the follow-
ing strong sense: in the absence of the rule we cannot say
what a person's rights are. This would certainly seem to be
true for law bound principles which are used to solve the
problems of what constitutes a crossing and how property
rights limit people-s rights to perform non-aggressive risky
acts. Therefore, accepting the view that a person is bound
to obey public rules which satisfy law bound principles only
when he has consented to obey those rules amounts to accept-
ing the untenable view that a person is morally bound to re-
spect another's rights only when he has consented to respect
those rights.
What special principles should we adopt for determining
when people are morally bound to obey publiLc rules which are
intended to satisfy law bound principles? The answer would
be straightforward if we lived in a world in which people
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always agreed about which public rules should be used to
satisfy law bound principles. We could get by with one prin-
ciple: a person is always bound to obey the public rules
which satisfy law bound principles. In fact, however, there
is usually reasonable disagreement about which public rules
should be used. This fact provided part of the rationale
for why we need special principles for evaluating procedures
which select the people who alone have the right to publish
and interpret the public rules needed to satisfy law bound
principles. It also creates the need for principles which
enable people to determine when they are morally bound to
obey laws which they do not believe satisfy acceptable law
bound principles. Furthermore, we need principles which
enable people to determine when they are morally bound to
obey laws, even laws which they believe satisfy law bound
principles, which were not published by justly selected
officials. These are the traditional problems of political
obligation as they arise within a theory which accepts that
there are law bound principles and that law bound principles
create the need for just institutions. I will offer brief
arguments for each of the other special principles included
in the natural position in the next section.
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1.5 The Force Principle_, the Independence Principle, and
Nozick's Solution:
There is absolutely no evidence in Anarch. t State and
Utopia that Nozick accepts the natural position. Is it
because he would deny that there are any law bound principles?
Or, is it because he would accept some law bound principles
but deny that they create the need for the special principles
included in the natural position? The fact that he does not
accept it is of special interest because the natural position
is a weak thesis which appears to be neutral among conflict-
ing accounts of what principles characterize the just state.
Two people can disagree about which law bound principles are
correct but agree on their commitment to the natural posi-
.47tion.47 There does not appear to be any: ;reason why a person
who believes that the only just state is the night-watchman
state cannot also believe that the night-watchman state is
just only if it uses the just procedures which the natural
position insists upon. This person will insist that the
state is not permitted to use force in the pursuit of any
paternalist, perfectionist, or egalitarian goals. He may
believe, however, that law bound principles are sometimes
needed to solve the problems of what constitutes a crossing
and how property rights limit liberty and that these law
bound principles create the need for the special principles
included in the natural position. Why, then, does Nozick
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not accept the natural position? More specifically, why
does he defend a solution to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts which is incompatible with the natural position?
One reason why Nozick may not be willing to accept
the natural position can be traced to his commitment to an
abstract principle which I will call "the force principle"
or "F":
The Force Princiole: Any principle which is
used to establish that a person, including an
agent of the state, is permitted to use force
against another person must be a principle which
any person acting alone in the state of nature
may use to establish that he is permitted to use
force against another person.
A person who accepts F will insist that there are no rights
to use force which are held by justly selected officials
and by nobody else. A person who accepts the natural posi-
tion believes that there are two types of rights to use force
which are held by justly selected officials and by nobody
else: the right to enforce the public rules which satisfy
law bound principles, and the right to enforce the just
policies for distributing the costs of maintaining just in-
stitutions. Therefore, Nozick's commitment to-F explains
why he does not accept the natural position. A question
68
which we will have to examine is whether Nozick can defend
his commitment to F.48
The evidence that Nozick accepts F includes these
remarks:
The richts possessed by the state are already
possessed by each individual in a state of
49
nature,
No new rights or powers arise; each right of
the association is decomposable without resi-
due into those individual rights which are held
by distinct individuals acting alone in the
50
state of nature.50
... no new rights "emerge" at the group level,
individuals in combination cannot create
new rights which are not the sum of preexisting
51
ones,
Although these quotes appear to be about all types of rights,
the contexts from which they are taken only establish that
Nozick intends them to be about rights to use force. They
certainly establish that he accepts F. In fact, they suggest
that he accepts a thesis that is stronger than F in the
sense that it is even more radically opposed to law bound
principles and the natural position than is F.
The stronger thesis is the thesis that no new rights
emerge at the group level. In order to see that it is a
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stronger thesis we should ask the following question: Is
it consistent to claim both a) that there are law bound
principles, and b) that law bound principles create the need
for all of the special principles which are included in the
natural position except those which are inconsistent with F?
The natural position includes special principles for evalua-
ting procedures for selecting people who alone have the right
to a) publish the enforceable rules which are needed to
satisfy the law bound principles, b) enforce those rules,
and c) enforce the just policies for distributing the costs
of maintaining just institutions. It would appear that a
person could accept that we need special principles for a)
but deny that we need special principles for b). He might
accept our argument that there must be just publication pro-
cedures but deny that only justly selected officials have
the right to enforce. the published rules. Instead, he
might claim that the right to enforce them is held by each
person. This position is not inconsistent. Whether or not
it is a plausible position which anybody would ever defend
depends upon what law bound principles are under discussion.
It is not a plausible position for the law bound prin-
ciples which people usually defend as the principles of
distributive justice. Nozick concedes as much. 52  This
position may, however, be plausible for law bound principles
which are used to solve the problems of what constitutes a
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crossing and of how property rights limit liberty, Here it
is not completely implausible to view the right to enforce
the rules as an extension of the natural right to enforce
one's rights. A person who believes that we sometimes need
law bound principles to solve the problems of what constitutes
a crossing and of how property right limit liberty might,
therefore, cling to F and claim that each person has the
right to enforce the rules which are published by justly se-
lected officials. Nozick might make this claim if he were to
concede that there are some law bound principles which create
the need for just publication procedures. He might acknow-
ledge that a system in which all excercised their rights of
private enforcement would be very inconvenient and note that
people could use their natural right to make contracts to re-
move the inconvenience. He would insist, however, that no
person or group was permitted to prohibit another's enforce-
ment of his rights without his consent because the prohibition
would be a violation of the libertarian side constraint.
The person who accepts the natural position will take
a radically different view on who has the right to enforce
the rights which are created by the public rules which
satisfy law bound principles. He will say that the task
of protecting these rights is properly interpreted as a
joint task which gives each person to whom the rules apply
some claims on every other person to whom they apply. His
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reasons go beyond the recognized inconveniences of the system
of private enforcement. They also appeal to the facts that
the protection of his rights is something that each person
desires and that the protection of people's rights has the
features of a public good: it is impossible to provide
(some aspects of) the protection to some people without pro-
viding it to all. When some assume the costs of catching,
prosecuting, and punishing rights violators they will almost
certainly provide all of the people in the area with the
benefits of a safer environment through increased deterrence
of rights violations. The proponent of the natural position
will insist that the fairest way to provide these benefits
to all is to establish just enforcement and collection pro-
cedures which are used to select the people who alone have
the rights to catch, prosecute, and punish people and to
select the people who alone have the right to enforce just
policies for distributing the costs of providing these pro-
tective services, We have noted that Nozick would probably
reject this position in favor of preserving F and denying
that the protection of people's right is ever properly in-
terpreted as a joint task.
Nozick would find it much more difficult, however, to
preserve F and to deny that there are any joint tasks, when
he faces the problem of who has the right to enforce the
just policies for distributing the costs of publication and
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of maintaining the just publication procedures. It seems
just as implausible to claim that this right to use force is
held by each person acting alone in the state of nature as it
does to claim that each person acting alone in the state of
nature has the right to enforce the public rules which are
needed to satisfy a traditional principle of distributive
justice. It is not inconsistent to claim that this right
is held by each person acting alone in the state of nature --
it is simply implausible. The implausibilit-y can be traced
to the fact that the force is used to take some of what a
person has legitimately acquired for the purpose of making
him do his share in what is interpreted as a joint task.
It must be clear to the person against whom the force is
wielded that the person who wields it will use what he takes
for the purpose of accomplishing the task. The only reason-
able way to assure this is to give this emergent right to
use force to justly selected officials and nobody else.
The joint task we are discussing is the combined task
of a) publishing the public rules which are needed to satisfy
law bound principles and, at the same time, establish what
people's rights are and b) maintaining just publication pro-
cedures. Even a person who steadfastly holds, as Nozick and
the anarchist do, that the task of providing protection for
people's rights is not properly interpreted as a joint task,
will have difficulty explaining why the prior task of
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establishing what people's rights are is not properly inter-
preted as a joint task. Once we recognize that the task of
establishing what people's rights are is a joint task we must
face the problem of how to distribute the costs of accom-
plishing this task. Nozick cannot, without further argument,
say that the use of force for this purpose is unacceptable.
He cannot simply say that it involves forcefully taking some
of what a person has legitimately acquired and, therefore,
is a violation of the libertarian side constraint. The
libertarian side constraint forbids the use of force to
take what a person owns. It is a separate issue whether a
person owns all that he has legitimately acquired. The
answer depends in part on how we solve the problem of who
owns what. It also depends in part on whether we recognize
any joint tasks -- any states of affairs which people are
collectively responsible for producing. If we recognize
some joint tasks, then every person has a prior claim on
every other person for his cooperation in accomplishing the
task. The use of force to assure that person's cooperation
is not a violation of the libertarian side constraint.
Although this use of force takes some of what the person
has legitimately acquired it does not also take what he owns.
He can only claim to own what he has legitimately acquired
after he has done his share in accomplishing joint tasks.
Our discussion of why a person who accepts law bound
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principles which create the need for just publication pro-
cedures must eventually give up F puts us in a position to
clearly see why a person who claims that no new rights
emerge at the group level is even more radically opposed
to law bound principles and the natural position than is the
person who accepts F is. A person who claims that no new
rights emerge at the group level will have to either deny
that there are law bound principles or deny that law bound
principles create the need for special principles for
evaluating publication procedures. If he conceded that
there were law bound principles which created the need for
such special principles, then he would also have to concede
that new rights, including rights to use force, emerge at
the group level. We can show that he must make this con-
cession by showing that the rights which are established by
the public rules needed to enforce the law bound principles
and the rights to enforce these public rules are rights
which emerge at the group level. Clearly, they are not
rights which people have in a pre-institutional state of
nature. Furthermore, no person acting alone in the state
of nature has the right to publish the enforceable public
rules which are needed to satisfy -he law bound principles
which the proponent of the natural position accepts.
Finally, it is only after a) the group has established just
institutions and b) the justly selected officials have
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published rules which satisfy law bound principles, that the
new rights which are established by the public rules emerge.
A person who accepts F can try to make these emergent rights
compatible with F by insisting that the emergent rights to
use force are held by each person acting alone in the state
of nature. The person who claims that no new rights emerge
at the group level must straightaway deny that there are
law bound principles which give rise to rights of this type.
Therefore, we can conclude that a person who claims that no
new rights, emerge at the group level accepts a thesis which
is stronger than F.
A person who accepts the thesis that no new rights
to use force emerge at the group level does not, however,
have to claim that there are no law bound principles. He
might accept the following principle: each person has the
right to be free from risks of harm above a specified level;
in particular, he has the right to publish and enforce the
rules needed to coordinate the behaviour of others so that
they do not collectively subject him to a level of risk
above the specified level. This hypothetical law bound
principle is different from most in that a person who accepts
it can plausibly claim that each person acting alone in the
state of nature has the right to publish and enforce the
rules needed to satisfy it. It is not plausible to make
this claim about most law bound principles. Those which are
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needed to solve the problems of who owns what and what con-
stitutes a crossing are used to establish what each person's
rights are. There is no basis for any person to claim that
the rule which he publishes to satisfy the principe should
be the enforceable one. With regard to our hypothetical
principle, however, there is an obvious answe=ýto the ques-
tion of why the person who publishes the rule should have
the right to publish it: the rule is intended to protect
him and nobody else.
The hypothetical principle which we introduced above
is consistent with both F and the stronger thesis that no
new rights emerge at the group level. It turns out, however,
that Nozick rejects it as part of the soldtion to the problem
of non-aggressive risky acts. His rejection appears to
follow from his commitment to another abstract principle
which I will call "the-independence principle" or "I":
The Independence Principle: It is permissible
to use force (or the threat of force) to prevent
a person from doing an act or to punish him for
doing an act only when his act is serious enough
to warrant interference when it is considered as
an isolated act in a pre-institutional state of
nature.
We consider a person's act as an isolated act when we
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consider it independently of the acts of others who are act-
ing independently of him. Two people certainly act indepen-
dently of each other when neither knows what the other is do-
ing. They also act independently of each other when each has
a sufficient reason for doing his act which does not depend
upon how the other will act. Nozick's commitment to I would
also lead him to say that there are times when one person
acts independently of others who are acting independently of
him even though the first person's reason for acting is
dependent upon how how the others act. He is acting inde-
pendently provided that he did not voluntarily agree to co-
ordinate his behaviour with the others. We can conclude from
Nozick's rejection of the fairness principle that the free
rider acts independently of those whom he takes for a ride. 53
Two people are not acting independently of each other in
cases where they have not voluntarily agreed to coordinate
their behaviour.
It should be clear that our hypothetical principle is
inconsistent with a commitment to I. A person who accepts
our hypothetical principle will say that it is justifiable
for any person to publish an enforceable public rule which
will coordinate the risky activities of others so that they
do not collectively subject him to a risk above a specified
level, A consequence of this rule will be that some people
will be prohibited from doing non-aggressive risky acts
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which are not serious enough to warrant interference when
they are considered as isolated acts in a pre-institutional
state of nature., Clearly, some of the people whose acts
are prohibited can complain that their acts are not serious
enough to warrant interference when they are considered inde-
pendently of the acts of the others who are acting indepen-
dently of them. They will use their commitment to I to
establish that the public rule prohibits more acts than it
is justifiable to prohibit.
The evidence that Nozick accepts I as a constraint on
solutions to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts is
found in his discussion of the problem of cumulative risk 5 4
This problem arises when a) the result of many person's non-
aggressive risky acts is to subject a person to a risk which
is so great that it would be permissible to prohibit any sin-
gle person from subjecting-=him to a risk of that magnitude,
and b) none of the non-aggressive risky acts is serious
enough to warrant interference when it is considered as an
isolated act. Nozick offers a detailed discussion of one
aspect of the problem of cumulative risk. He asks us to
consider a pre-institutional situation in which a group of
people agree to give a central authority, or protective
association, the rights to a) be the final judge of when one
of them has violated the rights of another, b) determine
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what punishments are appropriate for different violations,
and c) impose the punishments which are appropriate.55 He
then asks us to imagine that there are a large number of
people, whom he calls "independents," who refuse to give the
56protective association these rights. Instead, the inde-
pendents insist on retaining their natural rights to inter-
pret and enforce their rights. Nozick then assumes that the
procedures which they use to determine who has violated
their rights are more likely to find an innocent person
guilty than the procedures which the protective association
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uses, This enables him to classify an independent's
exercise of his right to enforce his rights as a risky act.
Finally, he assumes that the cumulative effect of these
risky acts is a risk of such magnitude that it would be per-
missible to prohibit any person from imposing a risk of that
magnitude on any other person. This leads him to ask
whether a representative of the protective association, or
any member of the association acting on his own, is per-
mitted to prohibit independents from privately enforcing
their rights.
His answer reveals his commitment to I:
If theme were many independents who were all
liable to punish wrongly, the probabilities would
add up to create a dangerous situation for all.
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Then, others would be entitled to group together
and prohibit the totality of such activities.
But how would this prohibition work? Would they
prohibit each of the individually non-fear-
creating activities? Within a state of nature
by what procedure can they pick and-choose
which of the totality is to continue, and what
gives them the right to do this? No protective
association, however dominant, would have this
right. ,.. No person or group is entitled to pick
who in the totality will be allowed to continue.
All of the independents might group together and
decide this. They might, for example, use some
random procedure to allocate a number of (sellable?)
rights to continue private enforcement so as to
reduce the total 'danger to a point below the thresh-
old. The difficulty is that, if a large number
of independents do this, it will be in the interests
of an individual to abstain from this arrangement.
It will be in his interests to continue his risky
activities as he chooses, while the others mutually
limit theirs so as to bring the totality of acts
including his to below the danger level. For the
others probably would limit themselves some distance
away from the danger boundary, leaving him room
to squeeze in. Even were the others to rest adja-
cent to the line of danger so that his activities
would bring the totality across it, on which grounds
could his activities be picked as the ones to pro-
hibit? Similarly, it will be in the interests of
any individual to refrain from otherwise unanimous
agreements in the state of nature: for example,
the agreement to set up a state, Anything an
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individual can gain by such a unanimous agree-
ment he can gain through separate bilateral
agreements. Any contract which really needs almost
unanimity, any contract which is essentially joint,
will serve its purpose whether or not a particular
individual participates; so it will be in his in-
terests not to bind himself to participate.58
This quote leaves almost no doubt that Nozick accepts I as
a constraint on solutions to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts. In fact, it appears to establish that he accepts
the stronger position that there are no tasks which are
properly interpreted as joint tasks and, therefore, that he
accepts I as a more general constraint.
I am not going to claim that Nozick accepts I as a
general constraint on solutions to all problems concerning
when it is permissible for one person to use force against
another. There is ample evidence, however, that he uses it
as a constraint on solutions to problems besides the problem
of non-aggressive risky acts. It is implicit in his argu-
ments against the claims that people have enforceable rights
to such things as the satisfactions of their needs,59
equality of opportunity,60 and meaningful work.61 These
claims are most plausible as claims that people have en-
forceable rights to the cooperation of others in producing
these results. Therefore, a person who accepts one of these
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claims believes that we must sometimes determine whether it
is permissible to use force to interfere with another's act
by asking whether his act is in violation of an established
rule which coordinates people's behaviour so that they col-
lectively produce the result. Acts which are in violation
of the rule will often be acts which are not serious enough
to warrant interference when they are considered as isolated
acts in a pre-institutional situation. We can conclude
that a person who accepts one of these claims gives up I,
One of Nozick's arguments against these claims, however, is
that when we focus on situations in which there are no
established rules which coordinate people's behaviour to
produce these results, we do not find any rights to use
force to produce these results.62 Regardless of whether
Nozick is right about what we find, one explanation for why
he finds this type of argument convincing is that he accepts
I.
Furthermore, the assumption that Nozick accepts I can
be used to explain why he accepts a retributive theory of
punishment which includes the principle that the amount of
punishment a person deserves puts an upper limit on the
amount he may receive but does not include any principles of
comparative justice.63 A principle which said that the
amount of punishment we may impose on one person depends
upon the amount which we have imposed on another of equal
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desert would conflict with I. If we could establish that
Nozick accepts I as a general constraint, then we could
establish that he must reject all law bound principles which
can only be satisfied through the establishment of public
rules which coordinate people's behaviour so that they
collectively produce some end result. The problem with
claiming that he accepts I as a general constraint is that
he appears to give it up when he attempts to solve the
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emergent problem of non-abundance. Therefore, I will re-
frain from making the claim that he adopts it as a general
constraint. I will only claim that he adopts it as a con-
straint on solutions to the problem of non-aggressive risky
acts. Furthermore, I will note that he must either accept
it as a general constraint or explain why it is appropriate
as a constraint in some cases but not others. Failure to do
this leads to the charge that he has not combined local
theories in a coherent manner.
Although the long quote which we examined leaves little
doubt that Nozick accepts I as a constraint on solutions to
the problem of non-aggressive risky acts, it does not bring
attention to all of Nozick's reasons for accepting I. While
discussing the general problem of cumulative risk, as
opposed to the more specific problem of cumulative risks
which are created by independents who use risky procedures
to enforce their rights, Nozick writes:
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How is it to be decided which below-threshold
subsets of such totalities are to be permitted?
To tax each act would require a central or unified
taxation and decision-making apparatus. The same
could be said for social determination of which acts
were valuable enough, with the other acts forbidden
in order to shrink the totality to below the threshold.
For example, it might be decided that mining or running
trains is sufficiently valuable to be allowed, even
though each presents risks to the passerby no less
than compulsory Russian roulette with one bullet and
_ chambers (with n set appropriately), which is pro-
hibited because it is insufficiently valuable. There
are problems in a state of nature which has no central
or unified apparatus capable of making, or entitled
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to make, these decisions.
Nozick wants to bring our attention to two facts. The first
is that if we give up I as a constraint on solutions to the
problem of cumulative risk, then we will need some means
of evaluating the relative social worth of the different
non-aggressive risky acts which create the problem of cumu-
lative risk. The second is that there is no person in a
pre-institutional state of nature who is entitled to enforce
his judgments about the relative social worth of these acts.
Nozick appears to take these facts as grounds for retaining
I, The person who accepts the natural position has a
radically different response. First, he gives up I and
defends law bound principles which enable us to determine
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the relative social worth of different non-aggressive risky
acts. Second, he gives up F and defends the view that people
are collectively responsible for establishing and maintaining
just publication, enforcement, and collection procedures.
Nozick's commitment to F and I leads him to adopt
the following principle, which he calls "the principle of
compensation,"66 for solving the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts:
The Principle of Compensation: A person is
permitted to prohibit another's non-aggressive
risky act only if that act creates a risk of
sufficient magnitude that others fear being its
victims. A person who chooses to prohibit
another's non-aggressive risky act must, how-
ever, compensate the other for any disadvantages
which result from the prohibition,
We must explain what Nozick means when he claims that one
person is disadvantaged by another's prohibition of his non-
aggressive risky act. For our present purposes it is suffi-
cient to say that the prohibition prevents the person from
pursuing an activity which is essential to pursuing a normal
life and causes him to be "disadvantaged relative to the
normal situation."'67  Nozick regards the principle of com-
pensation as the appropriate resolution of a conflict between
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two types of rights: rights to property and rights to pursue
one's life plan in a non-aggressive manner. It should be
clear to the reader that the principle of compensation is
compatible with both F and I. Furthermore, the reader
should note that a person who accepts it as the only principle
which can be used to solve the problem of non-aggressive risky
acts must view the problem of cumulative risk as an incon-
venience of remaining in the state of nature. It provides
each person who finds himself in a pre-institutional state
of nature with a reason to establish a central authority
with the right to publish, interpret, and enforce the public
rules which are needed to solve the problem. Most people
will, in the pursuits of their self-interests, use their
natural rights to make contracts to establish a central
authority with these rights. There are no special principles
which can be used to evaluate the procedures which select
the central authority and there are no special principles
which can be used to evaluate the rules which it publishes.
Whatever procedures and principles people agree to are
acceptable. Furthermore, the rules which are published
are only enforceable against those who have agreed to them.
Those who have not agreed must be treated according to the
requirements of the principlen of compensation.
Can Nozick defend his solution to the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts? In order to do this he will have
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to defend his commitment to F, which is a commitment to the
view that all rights to use force are held by individuals
qua individuals, and his commitment to I, which is a commit-
ment to the view that all rights to use force are held
against individuals qua individuals. F and I represent the
extreme individualism which is an essential part of the
libertarian position. I am going to argue that even if we
grant Nozick his account of the root ideas of moral theory
which lead him to accept the libertarian side constraint
against aggression, we do not also have to grant him F and
I as constraints on solutions to the problem of non-aggres-
sive risky acts. Furthermore, I will argue that a solution
which appeals to the following principle and to the special
principles included in the natural position is certainly
preferable to his solution:
We must evaluate public rules which assign
rights to perform non-aggressive risky acts
on the basis of how well they achieve the
following results: 1) 'they assure that no
person is subjected to a risk of having his
boundary crossed which is above a specified
level, 2) they assure that each person whose
boundary is crossed by another's non-aggres-
sive risky act receives compensation for the
harm caused by the crossing, and 3) they assure
that each person who is disadvantaged by a
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prohibition of his non-aggressive activities
is compensated for the disadvantages. Further-
more, we are to evaluate rules which achieve
all of these results on the basis of how well
each achieves the further result of maximizing
utility.
The reader should understand my critique of Nozick's solution
in the light of Nazick's own critique of utilitarianism.
One of his objections to utilitarian theories is that they
prevent us from giving the right reasons for many of the
conclusions which we accept.68 This is because utilitarian
theories do not adequately represent what Nozick believes
are the root ideas of the correct moral theory. After
giving examples which show that a commitment to utilitarian-
ism involves a commitment to outrageous accounts of how to
solve certain moral problems, he writes:
Clearly, a utilitarian needs to supplement
his view to handle such issues; perhaps he
will find that the supplementary theory be-
comes the main one, relegating utilitarian
considerations to a corner. 6 9
It is one thing to relegate utilitarian or, more broadly,
consequentialist considerations to a corner and quite another
to claim that they are never relevant. Nozick's commitment
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to F and I is a commitment to the view that there are no
law bound principles and, therefore, that consequentialist
considerations are never relevant. I will argue against
Nozick that even afterowe accept his account of what the
root ideas of moral theory are, we will still be able to
defend law bound principles and the relevance of consequen-
tialist considerations to solving problems in at least
one corner of moral theory -- the corner which must generate
a solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts.
1.6 Summary of the Arqument:
In the next six chapters I am going to argue that
Nozick's solution to the emergent problem of non-aggressive
risky acts is not the optimal solution. In Chapters Two
and Three I will examine Nozick's defense of the libertarian
side constraint against aggression. I will warn the reader
that the discussion in these chapters will often be tedious.
This is due to the fact that I attempt to attribute a con-
sistent and theoretically interesting defense of the
libertarian side constraint to Nozick. In order to do this
I must pay very careful attention to the text in order to
explain away some apparent inconsistencies. The major
conclusion of these chapters is that the link between
Nozick's account of the root ideas of moral theory and the
libertarian side constraint against aggression is found in
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what he considers to be the important concepts of productive
exchange and unproductive exchange. I will show that the
princip-les which constitute the libertarian side constraint
against aggression can be used to resolve conflicts which
arise in situations of productive and unproductive exchange
and that we can explain why it is appropriate to use these
principles by appealing to Nozick's root ideas. The dis-
cussion in Chapters Two and Three will prepare the way for
a precise statement in Chapter Four of why Nozick must con-
sider the problem of non-aggressive risky acts to be an
emergent problem.
In Chapter Five I will consider whether Nozick can
offer any compelling reasons why we should accept F and I
as constraints on solutions to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts and I will argue that he cannot. In Chapter Six
I will consider Nozick's solution on its own merits and
argue that it has many counter-intuitive implications. In
Chapter Seven I will identify an emergent constraint and
argue that solutions which appeal to law bound principles
and the natural position satisfy this constraint to a higher
degree than Nozick's solution. This will enable me to con-
clude that Nozick's solution is not the optimal solution to
the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts.
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ASSAULT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE
2.1 Aims:
Assault is a paradigm case of an act which threatens to
cross the boundary established by another's natural rights.
In this section I will examine Nozick's account of why
assault is forbidden. I will argue for each of the following:
1. Nozick must concede that an argument which
I will call "the argument from compensated-for-
fear" is not, in spite of the importance which
he attaches to it, needed to justify the prohi-
bition on assault.
2. Nozick must justify the prohibition on assault
by Appealing to the principle, which I will call
"the principle of productive exchange," that it is
never permissible to use force to make one person
serve another productively.
3. The principle of productive exchange is a for-
mal interpretation of Nozick's root ideas that
each person is separate, inviolable, and not a
resource for any other person.
4. Nozick must draw a distinction between cases
where it is permissible to punish a person for doing
an act regardless of whether he was warned that he
would be punished for doing it and cases where it is
permissible to punish him only after he has been
warned,
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Nozick does not explicitly accept each of the positions
which I will attribute to him. I believe, however, that he
would, on reflection, accept each. My aim in this section is
not to criticize Nozick. It is to isolate those aspects of
the problem of how property rights limit liberty about which
he believes we have clear beliefs. We must examine Nozick's
solutions to these aspects of the problem before we can exa-
mine his solutions to the aspects of the problem which he
concedes are more difficult, including the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts. Throughoutut-this discussion we will
assume that we have solutions to the prior problems of who
owns what and what constitutes a crossing.
2.2 Initial Grounds for Prohibiting Assault:
Assault is the use of force to cross the boundary esta-
blished by another's right to his body without his consent.
Nozick's discussion of why it is permissible to prohibit
assault, rather than permit it provided that compensation is
paid, arises during a discussion of the more general problem
of why it is ever permissible to prohibit an act that "the
agent knows will or might well impinge across someone's boun-
dary."1  First, he notes that we must at least prohibit the
joint act of crossing another's boundary and refusing to pay
compensation for the crossing. This prohibition is necessary
to assure that the requirement of weak absoluteness is met.
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His commitment to this prohibition implies a commitment to
P3 which says that it is never permissible to cross the
boundary established by another's rights with the intent to
make another worse off. 3 A person who certainly intends to
act contrary to the requirements of this prohibition is the
person who crosses another's boundary with the intent to
make him worse off. The thief and the swindler act with this
intent. Second, he notes that we must also prohibit in those
cases where we have good reason to believe that the compensa-
tion will not be paid. These include cases where the injury
which results from the crossing is irreversible and non-
compensable and cases where the person who causes the injury
is too poor to, adequately compensate his victim. These
reasons do not support a prohibition on all assaults. Some
assaults create only a minimal risk of irreversible and
non-compensable injury and many people who desire to assault
others are in a position to adequately compensate their vic-
tims. How can we justify a prohibition on these remaining
assaults?
This brings us to Nozick's third reason. He claims
that to permit assault provided that full compensation is
paid to the victim would lead to an unfair and arbitrary
+. - 5distribution of the benefits of exchange. He offers the
following account of full compensation:
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Something fully compensates a person for a loss if
and only if it makes him no worse off than he other-
wise would have been; it compensates a person X for
a person Y's action A if X is no worse off receiving
it, Y having done A, than X would have been without
receiving it if Y had not done A.6
When one person assaults another he crosses the boundary
established by the other's right to his body. There is some
highest price m which he would pay for the'right to cross
and there is some lowest price n which the owner of the
right would accept as compensation for the crossing. Full
compensation for the crossing would be a. If the two are
given an opportunity to negotiate and if m is greater than
n, then they will arrive at a mutually beneficial price
which is between m and n. Nozick calls this price "market
compensation."7  He notes that to permit assaults provided
only that full compensation was paid would distribute the
benefits of exchange in a way which is maximally advantageous
to the buyer (the assaulter). He objects that this is un-
fair to the seller and that it is arbitrary.
Furthermore, he believes that permitting all border
crossings, including all assaults, provided only that full
compensation is paid would deprive all of the benefits of
the market system of exchange. He writes:
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Consider further how such a system L/ne that per-
mits all border crossings provided that full compen-
sation is paid7allocates goods. Anyone can seize
a good, thereby coming to "own" it, provided he com-
pensates its owner. If several people want a good,
the first to seize it gets it, until another takes it,
paying him full compensation. (Why should this sort
of middleman receive anything?) What amount would
compensate the original owner if several persons
wanted a particular good? An owner who knew of this
demand might well come to value his good by its mar-
ket price, and so be placed on a lower indifference
curve by receiving less. (Where markets exist, isn't
the market price the least price a seller would accept?
Would markets exist here?) 8
Nozick seems to be right when he claims that a system which
permitted all border crossings, including assaults, provided
that full compensation was paid would deprive all of the
benefits of the market system as the main system for deter-
mining prices. The relevance of this claim for the problem
of whether it is permissible to prohibit all assaults is
not, however, clear. First, we should note that a solution
to the problem of whether it is permissible to prohibit
assault which appeals to the consequences of adopting a
general system in which all assaults are prohibited does
not solve the problem of whether to prohibit a particular
assault by examining it as an isolated act in a
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pre-institutional situation. Instead, it solves the problem
by showing that the consequences of permitting all assaults
would be detrimental. Although this solution does not appeal
to an established public rule which satisfies a law bound
principle; it is inconsistent with I, nonetheless, Does
Nozick want to give up I, which he accepts as a constraint
on the solution to the problem of cumulative risk, as a con-
straint on the solution to the problem of when it is per-
missible to prohibit assault? I do not believe that he does.
Second, it is not clear that we must prohibit all acts which
"will or might well impinge across someone's boundary,"
including all assaults, in order to assure ourselves of the
benefits of the market system as the main system for deter-
mining prices. In fact, it would seem that a) all that is
necessary to preserve the market system as the main system
for determining prices is a general system which prohibits
most unconsented to crossings and b) we could certainly
improve upon the consequences of the general system which
prohibits all unconsented to crossings by permitting a select
group of unconsented to crossings, including some assaults.
In order to firmly establish these points, however, we must
examine the consequences of adopting alternative general
systems. Our examination will eventually lead us to the
conclusion that Nozick does not want to give up I by saying
that we must solve the problem of when it is permissible to
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prohibit an unconsented to crossing by comparing the conse-
quences of adopting a general system which prohibits the
crossing with the consequences of adopting a general system
which permits it.
2.3 Mutual Aid and the Relevance of Consequences:
In order to explain why Nozick does not want to give
up I we must discuss the following example:
John is at the beach with his daughter Mary. Sud-
denly he sees that she is in distress. The least
risky way to save her is to throw her a rope. He
notices that Sam, the fisherman, has a rope in his
boat. He tells Sam that his daughter is drowning
and that he needs the rope. Sam says that he can
use the rope for $4,000. He notes that Mary's
life is certainly worth more than $4,000 to John
and, therefore, that John should be grateful that
he is on the scene to make this offer. John says
that he has the right to take the rope provided
that he pays Sam full compensation for the use of
the rope and that if Sam makes any attempt to pre-
vent him from taking it end using it he will force-
fully, and rightfully, take it.
I will assume that it is a fixed point of libertarian thought
that Sam is right and that any use of force by John to take
the rope is a violation of the libertarian side constraint
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that prohibits aggression.10 5am can defend his position by
appealing to the principle which we have called Pl: it is
never permissible to use force to take another's property
without his consent. How can Nozick justify P1 and esta-
blish that Sam is right?
None of the reasons which Nozick has so far offered
for why we should prohibit an act, rather than permit it pro-
vided that compensation is paid, force the conclusion that
Sam is right. Why isn't John permitted to take the rope,
regardless of whether Sam consents, provided that he pays
Sam full compensation for his use of the rope? John's use
of the rope will not cause Sam to suffer an irreversible and
non-compensable injury. Furthermore, there is little doubt
that John can compensate Sam for his use of the rope. We
are, after all, talking about a rope which can be bought
for a nominal fee at any fishing equipment store. Is it
unfair to distribute the benefits of exchange in this case
so that they are maximally beneficial to John? It may be
slightly unfair for the benefits of exchange to go completely
to John. Using ordinary notions of fairness, however, it
would also be unfair to require John to pay market compen-
sation to a person who is willing to exploit his misfortune.
It would appear, therefore, that the argument from fairly
dividing the benefits of exchange does not support Sam's
position. At most it requires that John must pay Sam
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something more than full compensation for the use of his
11
rope.
Finally, we must ask whether a general system which
permits John to take the rope provided that he pays Sam full
compensation will threaten the market system as the principal
means for determining prices. It seems clear that it will
not. In fact, it seems clear that the public adoption of
the following general system, which we will call "MA" for
"Mutual Aid," will not create any threat to the market system
and will have better consequences than the general system
which prohibits all unconsented to crossings:
MA: A person has a right to cross the boundary
established by another's rights, regardless of
whether the other gives his consent, provided that
a) it is clear that his reason for crossing is' to
prevent a serious irreversible injury, b) he provides
the person whose boundary is crossed with full
compensation for any harm which results from the
crossing, and c) the amount of harm which results
from the crossing is negligible so that it is
reasonably certain that compensation can be paid.' 2
If MA is correct, then John has a right to take Sam's rope
regardless of whether Sam consents. Sam can complain only
if John fails to pay him full compensation for his use of
the rope. MA recognizes that Sam's right to his rope is
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absolute in the weak sense that it is never permissible to
cross* the boundary which it establishes without compensating
Sam for the crossing. It also recognizes, however, that in
the circumstances we have described John has a right, re-
gardless of Sam's consent, to use Sam's rope. Although
Nozick's initial list of rights does not include a right to
be given aid we have used an argument which Nozick appears
to accept to generate an emergent right to be given aid which
is consistent with the requirements of weak absoluteness,
and, therefore, with the claim that it is never permissible
to use force for redistribution purposes. The method we
have used to generate the right to aid is the following: A
Person has a right to cross the boundary established by
another's rights without his consent provided that a) he
compensates the other for the harm caused by the crossing
and b) the crossing is permitted by a general system whose
adoption leads to better consequences than the adoption of
any alternative system which prohibits the crossing or the
adoption of any alternative system which permits the
crossing but does not impose a duty of non-interference on
the person whose boundary is threatened. According to MA
John is not merely permitted to cross the boundary esta-
blished by Sam's right to his rope. MA says that John has
the right to cross that boundary. Therefore, Sam has a duty
not to interfere with the crossing, The only reasonable way
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to interpret the duty. of non-interference which is corre-
lated with the right to cross is as a duty to cooperate with
the crossing, Furthermore, if this right has the same pro-
perties as other rights which Nozick accepts, then it esta-
blishes a boundary around John which gives him claims when
it is crossed. In fact, it would appear that if Nozick says
that John has the right to take the rope, then he would also
have to say that any attempt by Sam to interfere with John's
exercise of this right would make Sam liable to punishment
for crossing John's boundary and liable to pay compensation
for any harm which results from the crossing. 13  Nozick does
not want these conclusions. He wants to deny that John has
a right to take the rope and to assert that any use of force
to take the rope from Sam amounts to a violation of the
libertarian Side constraint against aggression. How can
Nozick get these conclusions?
2.4 The Root Ideas and the Principle of Productive Exchange:
Perhaps Nozick can get these conclusions by appealing
to the root ideas of his theory. He offers the following
additional reason for why we should not permit all boundary
crossings provided that compensation is paid:
... a-system permitting boundary crossings, provided
compensation is paid, embodies the use of persons as
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means; knowing that they are being so used, and that
their plans and expectations are liable to being
thwarted arbitrarily is a cost to people;..14
The idea that it is never permissible to use another as a
means is only one of the root ideas which Nozick appeals to.
I will examine each of the root ideas which appear to be re-
levant to the dispute between Sam and John in order to do
three things. One is to consider whether they force the
conclusion that Sam is right. Another is to establish that
if they force the conclusion that Sam is right, then they
also force the conclusion that it is permissible to prohibit
assault. If he claims that they do not force the conclusion
that Sam is right, then he needs an additional argument,
since his argument from uncompensated-for-fear will not work,
for the conclusion that Sam is right. If he claims that they
force the conclusion that Sam is right, then he must concede
that his argument from uncompensated-for-fear, which he
appears to believe is a very important argument, is not
needed to justify the prohibition on assault. In either
case the argument from uncompensated-for-fear is not as
important as Nozick leads us to believe. This is as it
should be since the argument is, as we shall see, inconsis-
tent with his commitment to I.
The root ideas which appear to be relevant to the
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dispute between Sam and John and to the problem of whether
it is permissible to prohibit assault are the following:
1) No person may be sacrificed for the benefit of
any other person.
2) Each person must be treated as an end and never
merely as a means.
3) No person is a resource for any other person.
I do not claim, nor would Nozick, that it is transparently
clear what each of these means. We can, however, apply them
in an intuitive way to see if they help us to solve the
dispute between Sam andJohn. Furthermore, we will ask
whether they help us to solv'e the dispute between a would
be assaulter, whom we will call "Bob," and his would be
victim, whom we will call "Jim." I will argue that to
whatever extent they provide support to Sam's position, they
provide at least as much support to Jim's position which is
that it is not permissible for Bob to strike him without his
consent. Just as Sam can justify his position by appealing
to P1 of the libertarian side constraint, Jim can justify
his position by appealing to P2 which says that it is
never permissible to forcefully cross the boundary esta-
blished by another's rights without his consent. My aim
is to show that if Nozick's root ideas are sufficiently
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powerful to justify P1 and support Sam's position, then they
are also sufficiently powerful to justify P2 and support
Jim's position. If they are sufficiently powerful to support
Jim's position, however, then Nozick's appeal to the argu-
ment from uncompensated-for-fear to justify the prohibition
on assault is superfluous,
Can Sam. plausibly claim that he is being sacrificed to
John's interests when John takes his ro-pe,;-in spite of his
refusal to give it, and provides him with full compensation?
How can he say that he has been sacrificed when he is left
no worse off than he would have been if John had nothing at
all to do with him? It seems more plausible for Jim to
claim that he is being sacrificed to Bob's interests when,
in spite of his refusal to permit the assault, Bob assaults
him and provides him with full compensation. Even here,
however, there is a puzzle. How can Jim complain that he
has been sacrificed when he receives full compensation and
is left no worse off than he would have been if Bob had
nothing to do with him? For now, we need only note that
this first root idea supports Jim's position at least as
much as it supports Sam's.
Can Sam claim that John is using him merely as a means
when he takes his rope in spite of his refusal to give it?
Here we are inclined to turn the question back on Sam. Can't
1.05
John complain that Sam's refusal to give it far anything less
than $4,000 amounts to using John's misfortune as a means
to his ends? Doesn't the intuitive idea that it is never
permissible to use another merely as a means lead us to
accept a moral principle which says that it is not permissible
to exploit another's misfortune? Jim appears to have a much
sounder complaint than Sam. It would strike us as outrageous
for Bob to claim that permitting Jim to hold out for market
compensation, which is what we do when we prohibit assault,
amounts to permitting Jim to exploit Bob's desire to assault
him as a means to Jim's enrichment. Again we can confidently
say that Nozick's root idea provides at least as much support
for Jim's position as it does for Sam's.
Finally, can Sam claim that John is using him as a
resource when he takes his rope in spite of his refusal to
give John the rope? Can he complain that permitting John
to take the rope amounts to making John partial owner of
his body or his labor? There is something to Sam's complaint.
If John has the right to take the rope provided only that
he compensates Sam for the taking, then John is a partial
owner of Sam's labor and the fruits of his labor. This
partial ownership is, however, ' extremely innocuous. It in
no way interferes with Sam's long range planning of his
life or with his chances for successfully executing his long
range plan.5 Whatever complaint he has would be minor
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compared to the complaint that Jim would have were Bob per-
Tmitted to assault him without his consent. Jim might lose
his desire to plan if he knew that at any moment another
might, for whatever. reasons, assault him provided only that
he compensated him for the harm which resulted from that
assault. Again we can say that Nozick's root idea provides
at least as much suppoxt for Jim's position as it does for
Sam's. It follows, therefore, that if these root ideas force
the conclusion that Sam is right, then they must also force
the conclusion that Jim is =ight. If they force this conclu-
sion, however, then there is no need for an additional argu-
ment to justify the prohibition on assault: the argument
from the root ideas would be sufficient.
In fact, I do not believe that Nozick needs an addi-
tional argument to justify the prohibition on assault. More
specifically, I believe that he can, and should, resolve the
disputes between Sam and John and between Jim and Bob by
appealing to a principle which I will call "the principle
of productive exchange" or "PE." Furthermore, I believe:-
that it is reasonable to view the principle of productive
exchange as a formal interpretation of Nozick's root ideas
that each person is separate and inviolable and no person
is a resource for any other person.
Let us say that X serves Y productivelv if and only if
Y is better off as a result of his exchanqe with X than he
1 87
would have been if X did not exist at all or had nothina to16do w.ith him,16  The rinciple ofo orduetive exchene,. or PE,
says that it. is never permissible to use force to make one
person serve another productively, It presupposes that each
person has a right to refuse to serve another productively.
This right of refusal is an expression of the fact that each
person is separate and no person is a resource for any other
person. Furthermore, when a person P acts on his right of
refusal he leaves no person worse off than he would have
been in the situation in which P had nothing to do with him
or did not exist at all, On what grounds, therefore,: can
any person (who believes that. no person, including P, is a
resource for any other person) complain? Finally, the fact
that .no person can-'be forced to serve another productively
expresses the fact that each person is inviolable, The use
of' force to make one person serve another productively is,
for the libertarian, the paradigm case of aggression,
PE has straightforward implications for the disputes
between Sam and John and between: Jim and Bob. It should be
clear: that Sam serves •John productively when he exchanges
his rope for whatever John is willing to offer and that Jim
serves Bob productively when he exchanges the use of his- body
17for whatever Bob is willing to offer. Therefore, a person
who accepts PE will claim that it is not permissible to force
Sam to enter the exchange with John end it is not permissible
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to force Jim to enter the exchange with Bob. We appear to
be committed to the view that the use of force is permissible
in each case, however, when we say that John has the right
to take the rope provided that he pays Sam full compensation
for its use and that Bob has the right to inflict bodily
harm on Jim provided that he pays Jim full compensation for
the harm he inflicts. The only way to avoid this view is by
saying that although each of John and Bob have the right to
crose provided that he pays full compensation for the harm
caused by his crossing, neither has the right to enforce his
right. In the case of Bob's crossing, which necessarily
involves tE use of force, this does not even make sense.
In the case of John's crossing we would have an isolated
and unexplained case where Nozick retreats from the view that
a person has the right to enforce his rights.
We can conclude that PE gives us the conclusions that
Sam and Jim are right. Furthermore, it enables us to go
straight from Nozick's root ideas to these conclusions and
it is consistent with Nozick's apparent commitments to F and
I. We should, therefore, expect Nozick to welcome it. In
fact, however, he never explicitly states the principle.
Furthermore, he appears to believe that his root ideas do
not even force the conclusion that assault should be for-
bidden rather than permitted provided that full compensation
is paid. This is evidenced by his appeal to an additional
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argument, the argument from uncompensated-fo.r-fear, to
supplement the argument from his root ideas. I now turn
to his argument from uncompensated-for-fear. It is an argu-
ment which he appears to believe is very important but which
I believe is simply irrelevant to the problem of whether
each person has a natural right to prohibit assault.
2.5 The Arqument From Uncompenseted-for-Fear:
Nozick asks us to imagine a general system in which all
assaults are permitted provided that the victims receive full
compensation for the injuries which result from the as-
saults.1 8 The joint act of assaulting and failing to provide
compensation is prohibited. Nozick notes that it is an im-
portant fact about humans that there are some acts which
they fear even when they are guaranteed that they will be
fully compensated for the injuries which those acts cause.19
Assault is one of these acts. People who lived in a general
system which permitted assaults would be .extremely nervous
and jumpy and in constant fear that they may be assaulted
next. People may lose their desire to make long range plans
when they know that others may assault them and interrupt
those plans at any time. If a person makes plans which are
frustrated by another's assault, then he receives full com-
pensation. If he falls into apathy and gives up planning,
however, there is no person who caused this and who must
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compensate him. Nozick's claim that a general system which
prohibits assault is preferable to one which permits it
provided that compensation is paid appears to be sound.
The latter almost certainly leads to a tremendous amount of
uncompensated-for-fear which does not appear in the former.
Noazick then considers a general system which permits
assaults but requires each person who assaults to compensate
his victim for the injuries which the assault causes and
for the fear which he has suffered as a result of living in
the system. Nazick offers two objections to this system.
One is that it still leaves those who are not victims of
assaults with uncompensated-for-fear.20 The other is that
it is not fair to make an assaulter compensate his victim
for the fear which the system caused because his particular
21
assault did not cause that fear.2 Nozick is appealing to
a variation of I. The assaulter's act did, when it is con-
sidered by itself, amount to a violation of another's right.
Therefore, it is permissible to use force to make him com-
pensate his victim for the injuries which his act caused.
We cannot, however, make him pay for injuxies which his act,
when it is considered as an isolated act, did not cause.
Nozick concludes that the system which prohibits assault
is preferable to this system.
Nozick then turns to a system which permits assault
provided only that those who assault immediately compensate
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their victims and bribe them to keep quiet. 22  It might
appear that in this system, since people would not be aware
of how many assaults were taking place, there would be no
problem of uncompensated-for-fear. Nozick realizes that
appearances are deceptive:
The difficulty is that knowledge that one is living
under a system permitting this, would itself produce
apprehension. How can anyone estimate the statisti-
cal chances of something's happening to him when all
reports of it are squelched? Thus even in this highly
artificial case it is not merely the victim who is in-
jured by its happening in a system that is known to
allow it to happen. The widespread fear makes the
actual occurrence and countenancing of these acts not
merely a private matter between the injurer and the
injured party.23
Nozick concludes that this new system, which also creates a
significant amount of uncompensated-for-fear, is less desir-
able than the system which prohibits assault.
Nozick examines one final system. It is a system which
prohibits assault but which permits any individual to opt
out by making a public announcement that "he would do a
certain act at will, and not only would he compensate all
his victims, if any, but he would also compensate everyone
who felt fear as a result of his announcement, even though
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he had not actually done the act to them."24  Nozick notes
that the amount of compensation which would be required
would be so great as to be beyond the means of almost every-
25
one. This is a practical consideration, however. It
leaves open the possibility that some very rich person would
be permitted to assault others provided only that he paid
them full compensation. In addition to this practical con-
sideration Nozick offers two arguments against this system
which permits opting out:
First, persons might have free floating anxiety about
attack, not because they have heard some particular
announcement, but because they know the system permits
those attacks after announcement, and so worry that
they have not heard some., They cannot be compensated
for any they have not heard of, and they will not file
for compensation for the fear these caused. No parti-
cular announcement caused such fear without a specific
announcement as 'its subject, so who should compensate
for it? Thus our argument is repeated one level up;
but it must be admitted that at this level the fears
may be so attenuated and insubstantial as to be insuf-
ficient to justify prohibiting such announcements.
Secondly, in line with our earlier discussion of fair
exchange prices, one might require someone who makes
such an announcement to make not merely. full but
market compenasation.... Since fear looks very different
in hindsight than it does while being undergone or
anticipated, in thess cases it will be almost impossible
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to determine accurately what is the amount of
market compensation, except by actually going
through the negotiations. 26
The first argument notes that a public understanding that
people are, under the specified conditions, permitted to
opt out of the prohibition on assault will cause some people
to suffer fear which they will not be compensated for.
Nozick concedes, however, that this fear may be insufficient
to justify prohibiting a person from opting out when he is
willing to pay for the fear which hia opting out causes.
We are, therefore, still without an argument for why a very
rich person is not, in principle, permitted to opt out of
the prohibition on assault.
This brings us to Nozick's second argument which in
turn brings us back to his discussion of fair exchange
prices.2  There are two interpretations of his earlier
discussion of fair exchange prices. Each assumes that in
cases of productive exchange it is unfair for the benefits
of exchange to go completely to the buyer. According to the
weaker interpretation there is, in principle, no objection
to forcing one person to serve another productively provided
that the person whose boundary is forcefully crossed is paid
fair compensation, which will be more than full compensation,
for the harm caused by the crossing, According to this
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interpretation we cannot go straight from the fact that full
compensation for the crossing is unfair to the conclusion
that we must rely on the market (i.e., voluntary exchange)
to determine what is fair. So, for instance, a person who
adopts this interpretation has no principled objection to
the position that Sam must give John the ro-pe provided that
John pays him fair compensation for his use of the rope.
He also has no principled objection to the position that a
person is permitted to opt out of the prohibition on
assault provided that he pays fair compensation to those he
assaults. He can only object to permitting a person to opt
out on the practical ground that there is no reasonable
way to determine what constitutes fair compensation. I
cannot believe that Nozick wants to say that there is no
principled reason for prohibiting a person from opting out
of the system which prohibits assault.
According to the stronger interpretation there is a
principled reason for objecting to permitting a person to
opt out of the prohibition on assault. The stronger inter-
pretation gives up the search for the fair price and simply
asserts that the just price is the price, if any, which
people voluntarily agree upon. It accepts PE as an inter-
pretation of the root ideas that each person is separate,
inviolable, and not a resource for any other person. Per-
mitting a person to opt out of the prohibition on assault
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without the consent of his possible victims is inconsistent
with PE and, therefore, is forbidden. A person who accepts
PE can explain why assault is forbidden directly. He does
not have to appeal to the bad consequences which would result
from adopting the alternative policy of permitting assault
provided that fair compensation was paid. There are two
reasons why Nozick should avoid justifying the prohibition
on assault by appealing to the bad consequences associated
with adopting this alternative policy. One is that this
justification is inconsistent with I. When we decide whether
to prohibit a particular assault we do not examine the act
as an isolated act but, instead, examine it as part of a
general system. The other is that this justification of
the prohibition on assault will not lead to a parallel justi-
fication of Sam's position in his dispute with John. It will
not justify the position that John is forbidden to take
Sam's rope when Sam has refused to let him use it. Nozick
can get the conclusion that Sam is right by appealing to PE.
In the next section we will see that he cannot get it by
appealing to the uncompeneated-for-fear, or other bad con-
sequences, which people would suffer in a general system
which permits the crossings which are permitted by MA. Since
a) Nozick wants to defend the libertarian position that Sam
is right and b) he cannot defend it by appealing to the good
consequences of the general system which supports it, he
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will owe us an explanation of the relevance of his argument
for prohibiting assault which appeals to the bad consequences,
the uncompensated for fear, created by a general system
whicf permits assaults. It will become increasingly clear
that the only argument Nozick needs and wants for the
conclusion that assault is forbidden in a pre-institutional
state -of nature is the argument which appeals to PE and,
more basically, the root ideas.
2.6 More on Mutual Aid and the Relevance of Conseauences:
Let me retrace some of my steps. First, I argued that
if the root ideas of Nozick's theory force the conclusion
that Sam is right, then they also force the conclusion that
Jim is right. Alternatively, if they do not force the con-
clusion that Jim is right, then they do not force the con-
clusion that Sam is right. Second, I argued that it is
reasonable to view PE as a formal interpretation of some of
the root ideas of Nozick's theory and that by doing this
Nozick can get the conclusions that Sam and Jim are right
without giving up I. Third, I noted that Nozick appears to
reject PE. This follows from his apparent belief that the
root ideas do not force the conclusion that Jim is right
which in turn follows from his apparent belief that he needs
an additional argument, the argument from uncompensated-for-
fear, to establish that Jim is right. But if an additional
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argument is needed to establish that Jim is right, then an
additional argument is also needed to establish that Sam is
right. I am going ,to consider whether the argument from un-
compensated-for-fear, which Nozick uses to support Jim's
position, will provide any support for Sam's position. I
will do this by examining the consequences of the public
acceptance of MA:2 8  the consequences of adopting a general
system which permits the crossings which are permitted by MA.
Sam's position is right only if MA is wrong. We have already
noted that the public acceptance of MA will not threaten
the market system as the principle system for determining
prices. We will now consider whether its public acceptance
will lead to uncompensated for fear. If the answer is "no,"
then Nozick will not, unless he accepts PE, have any argu-
ment for Samts position. This will be extremely embarrassing
since Sam's position is the libertarian position.
Can Sam argue against MA on the ground that its public
acceptance will lead to a substantial amount of uncompensated
for fear? We can answer this question by comparing the
consequences of the public acceptance of MA with the conse-
quences of the public acceptance of PE which supports Sam's
position. It seems clear to me that the public acceptance
of MA will not lead to any significant amount of uncompensated
for fear. This would appear to be Nozick's own position.
While discussing the uncompensated-for-fear which a person
1A a.
would suffer in a system which permitted assault he writes:
Not every kind of border crossing creates such fear.
If told that my automobile may be' taken during the
next month, and I will be compensated fully after-
wards for the taking and for any inconvenience being
without the car causes me, I do not spend the month
nervous, apprehensive and fearful. 2 9
If we further believe that our automobile will only be taken
in cases where it is needed to prevent a serious irreversible
injury to somebody we will probably not suffer any fear at
all.
If Nazick's position is that we cannot choose,between
MA and PE by appealing to either the root ideas of his theory
or to the argument from uncompensated for fear, then how can
we choose between them? It would appear that what we must
do is examine the other advantages of each. But when we do
this MA is clearly preferable. Its public acceptance has
two very valuable consequences:
I. It increases each person's security by lowering
the probability that he will find himself in a situ-
ation in which he will suffer a serious irreversible
injury.
2, It leads to a common understanding that each
moral person in the society must show a minimal
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concern for every other person's well being.
It is obvious why the public acceptance of MA will have
the first consequence listed. It should also be clear that
it will have the second consequence. Part of being a moral
person is having a disposition to act according to the re-
quirements of the correct moral principles. If we assume
that MA is a correct moral principle, then we can conclude
that a moral person will be disposed to act according to its
requirements. These requirements include permitting another
to cross the boundary established by his rights in many cases
where the crossing is needed to prevent the person who wants
to cross or other persons from suffering serious injuries.
Sometimes another will be permitted to cross the boundary
established by the moral person's right to his material
property and sometimes he will be permitted to cross the
boundary established by the moral person's right to his
labor. The moral person's willingness to permit others to
cross in these cases amounts to a show of. concern for the
well being of those who are threatened with serious injury
and a common understanding that people can count on each
other to show this concern is certainly a good thing. Does
MA have any disadvantages when compared to PE? It has the
minimal disadvantage that it might sometimes commit you to
cooperate in aiding a person whom you would rather see
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suffer. It also has the minimal disadvantage that- the
perso:n whom you must aid might not be able to pay the com-
pensation to which you are entitled for your aid. These are
small prices to pay to increase the likelihood that you will
not be a victim of a serious irreversible injury. It would
appear that MA is clearly preferable to PE and, therefore,
that John has a right to use Sam's rope provided that he
pays Sam full compensation for his use.
Can Sam save his position by saying that we are only
supposed to examine the consequences of adopting competing.
general systems for the purpose of establishin .a oresumption
in favor of one? Once we have established a presumption we
are then supposed to ask whether it is permissible to pro-
hibit a person from opting out of its scheme of rights and
duties. This appears to be the approach which Nozick took
in his discussion of assault. First, he compared the con-
sequences of adopting the general system which prohibits
assault with the consequences of adopting the general system
which permits assault provided that compensation is paid.
He did not, however, consider the issue settled with the
conclusion that the system which prohibits is preferable.
He went on to consider a system which permitted any person
to opt out of the prohibition on assault provided that he
compensated all those who suffered injuries as a result of
his announcement that he would opt out.
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Will this approach help Sam? There appear to be good
reasons for prohibiting Sam from making and acting on the
following announcement:
Nobody is permitted to cross the boundary defined by
my rights without my explicit consent. It does not
matter that a consequence of my refusal is that some
people will suffer serious irreversible injuries.
Nor does it matter that the people who want to cross
recognize a duty toapay me full compensation for what-
ever harms I suffer as a result of their crossings.
To show my good faith in this matter I explicitly
give up my right, as defined by MA, to cross another's
boundary to prevent a serious irreversible injury to
myself.
The presumption establishes that MA is the benchmark since
it is the optimal system. But if we consider MA to be the
benchmark, then it is clear that a person who makes the
above announcement makes others worse off. He may even
cause others to suffer uncompensated-for-fear. This is
because people may suffer fear when they realize that their
chances of... suffering serious irreversible injuries have
increased. Should we make him compensate every person who
suffers this fear? Even if we make him compensate those
who suffer fear as a result of his announcement, there is
still the problem of those who suffer fear because they know
that they live in a system which permits such announcements
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and can never be sure that they have heard each one. Who
will compensate them? Once we accept MA as the benchmark,
there appear to be compelling reasons for prohibiting people
from opting out of its requirements.
Nozick might attempt to distinguish the problem of
permitting people to. opt out of MA from the problem of per-
mitting people to opt out of the general system which pro-
hibits assault by saying:
Note that not every act that produces lower
utility for others generally may be forbidden; it
must cross the boundaries of another's rights for
the question of prohibition to even arise. 3 0
He might want to say that a person who opts out of MA does
not threaten to cross the boundary defined by anothex's
rights while the person who opts out of the prohibition on
assault does, Similarly, he might want to say that the
fear created by a person who opts out of MA is not associated
with an increased likelihood that some person's boundary will
be crossed while the fear created by a person who opts out
of the prohibition on assault is associated with an increased
likelihood that some person's boundary will be crossed.
This attempt at distinguishing the cases will only work,
however, if Nozick has already established that MA is un-
acceptable. This is because it presupposes, contrary to
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what MA implies, that a person who opts out of MA does not
threaten to cross the boundary established by any other
person's rights. MA asserts that a person sometimes has
the right to cross the boundary established by another's
rights without his consent. In these cases it is a viola-
tion of that person's right to cross to interfere with his
crossing. A person who opts out of MA expresses his inten-
tion to interfere with these crossings. Therefore, he
threatens to cross the boundary established by another's
rights in the same way that a person who opts out of the
general system which prohibits assault threatens to cross
the boundary established by another's rights.
Nozick can, of course, go straight to the argument that
we must permit the person to opt out of MA since his opting
out does not leave any other person worse off than he would
have been in the situation in which the person who opted
out did not exist at all or had nothing to do with him.
There are two things to note about this argument. One is
that it is not outrageous to claim that a person is better
off living in a society in which all n members accept MA
than living in a society of n ·e 4 members in which only n
members accept MA. 31 The other is that to invoke the argument
is to concede that PE is acceptable. To concede this, how-
ever, is to concede that the argument from uncompensated-for-
fear is not necessary to get the conclusions that Jim and
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Sam are right. I have been arguing that Nozick should, on
reflection, be willing to make this concession. He should
concede that the argument from uncompensated-for-fear is not
relevant to establishing what Sam's and Jim's rights are in
a pre-institutional state ..of nature., We will, see, however,
that it may be relevant to the explanation of why Jim and
Sam would use their natural right to make contracts to
change the boundaries established by their other natural
rights in some ways rather than others.
2.7 The Relevance of the Argument from Uncompensated-for-
Fear';
Nozick has some second thoughts about the argument
from uncompensated for fear. He writes:
Is our argument too utilitarian? If fear isn't pro-
duced by a particular person, how does it justify
prohibiting him from doing an action provided he pays
compensation? Our argument goes against the natural
assumption that only the effects and consequences of
an action are relevant to deciding whether it may
be prohibited. It focuses also on the effects and
consequences of its not being prohibited. Once
stated, it is obvious that this must be done, but
it would be worthwhile to investigate how far reaching
and significant are the implications of' this divergence
from the natural assumption.32
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The argument is too utilitarian for Nozick if it turns out
to be incompatible with I. I requires that we view each
problem of when it is permissible for one person to use force
against another as a problem between two isolated persons in
a pre-institutional state of nature. To the extent that
the argument from uncompensated-for-fear appeals to the
uncompensated-for-fear created by alternative general systems
it certainly appears to be incompatible with I. It does not
rest the conclusion that Bob is forbidden to assault Jim
on the fact that permitting Bob to assault Jim would cause
Jim uncompensated-for-fear. The fear it causes Jim can, in
principle, be handled by charging Bob. Instead, it rests
its conclusion on the fact that the general system which
permits assault leads to fear which cannot, in principle,
be handled. This is because there is no person who caused
this fear and, therefore, no person who can be held liable
to pay for it.
What happens when we consider the problem of assault
as a problem between two persons acting alone in the state
of nature? We must answer the following question:
Is it'permissible for A, when he considers B's
essault as an isolated act in a pre-institutional
state of nature, to prohibit B from assaulting him?
12-6
If the answer to this question is "yes," then Nozick can
claim that any pe-rson acting alone in the state of nature is
permitted to publish and enforce a rule which prohibits any
assault which does not receive the prior consent of its
victim. This is not, however, because the alternative public
rule, the one which permits assaults provided that compen-
sation is paid, will lead to uncompensated-for-fear. It
is, instead, because Naozick adopts the view that if it is
permissible for one person acting alone in the state of
nature to punish a person for doing an act, then it is per-
missible for any person acting alone in the state of nature
to punish that person.33
Is the argument from uncompensated for fear necessary
to explain why A is permitted to prohibit B from assaulting
him? Let us consider a case where B approaches A and
announces that he will assault A at will and provide him
with full compensation for the injuries which result from
each assault. A will almost certainly insist that full
compensation for the injuries which result from each assault
does not amount to full compensation because it does not
cover compensation for the fear which A will suffer knowing
that his plans will be interrupted at any time. He might go
on to say that once we take account of this fear it is clear
that B is in no position to pay the amount of compensation
which he is entitled to, This will be true even ift B
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promises, and A believes that his promise is sincere, that
B will never impose an irreversible and noncompensable in-
jury on A such as death. It would appear, therefore, that
considerations of uncompenseated-for-ear turn the case of
assault into a case where it is permissible to prohibit a
border crossing because the person who wants to cross is not
in a position to compensate his victim. Does this show
that considerations of uncompensated-for-fear are necessary
to justify the prohibition on assault? I do not believe that
it does.
Let us change the case so that A and B have never met
and, therefore, have never discussed the question of what
people's rights are in assault situations. Let us further
assume that B simply approaches A in his sleep and pummels
him. The next morning he offers to pay A full compensation.
He explains that he always wanted to pummel a defenseless
person and could not resist the golden opportunity he had the
previous night. His offer of compensation is high and his
promise to never again assault A is unquestionably sincere.
Is A permitted to punish B for his assault? I am certain
that Nozick would say that he is. Whatever reasons he gives
cannot, however, be reasons which appeal to the uncompensated-
for-fear which A suffered. A suffered a terrible beating
but he did not suffer any fear prior to B's attack and does
not suffer any fear that B will attack him again. B is, after
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all, an honest person who reported his attack and offered
to pay compensation.
Perhaps Nozick wants to say that A must be entitled to
punish B so that he can warn others that they are not
permitted to assault him without his consent. Unless he
makes an example of B he will be less certain that others
will refrain from assaulting him and, therefore, will suffer
uncompensated-for-fear. To say this, however, is to give up
I. It is to make a decision about when it is permissible to
use force against B by appealing to information about how
other people, who are acting independently of B, will act.34
Finally, we should note that it will not do for Nozick
to say that uncompensated-for-fear enters because other
people will went to punish B to provide themselves with pro-
tection from actions like B's. Other people have the right
to punish B if and only if A has the right. Once we deter-
mine that A has the right, then there is an easy explanation
for why other people have an interest in seeing that B is
punished. We can understand why others might choose to
punish B even if A chooses to forgive him. It is because
they want some assurance that B and others like him will not
satisfy their one time desire to pummel a defenseless person.
These considerations only enter, however, after we have
determined that A has the right to punish B. We can make
this point more forcefully by going backf to the dispute
.129
between Sam and John. If Sam has the right to punish John
for forcefully taking the rope without consent, then any
person acting alone in the state of nature has the right to
punish John. Others may not, however, have any desire to
exercise this right since John's act is not considered
threatening to them. They are, after all, good people who
permit others to use their property in cases where it is
needed to prevent a serious injury and they are guaranteed
full compensation for its use. They may even believe that
Sam's refusal to give John the rope was such a heinous act
that they will boycott his business should he dare to punish
John. These considerations should make it clear that it is
one thing to ask whether people have the right to punish and
another to ask whether they have compelling reasons for
exercising that right. Considerations of uncompensated-for-
fear will help Nozick answer the latter question but will
not help him answer the former. Furthermore, they will
enable him to explain why people will use their natural
right to make contracts to change some of the boundaries
established by their natural rights but not others. People
might believe that the (partial) solution to the problem of
how property.rights limit liberty which is given by PE leaves
them with extremely inconvenient rights. Each might believe
that he will improve his situation if he contracts into a
mutual aid society in which each member agrees to permit
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just those crossings which are permitted by MA.35  By doing
this each will decrease the likelihood that he will suffer
serious irreversible injury without creating any uncompen-.
sated-for-fear. People will be extremely hesitant, however,
to use their natural right to make contracts to change their
boundaries in ways which will subject them to uncompensated-
for-fear. This is because few benefits are worth the major
cost associated with the creation of uncompensated-for-fear;
the loss ofwill to plan ohes's life due to the fear that
others may arbitrarily interfere with your attempt to carry
out your plans.
2,8 Additionl Evidence that Nozick Accepts the Principle
of ProducEive Exchange:
I have suggested that Nozick wants the conclusion that
Jim and Sam are right and I have argued that he can get both
conclusions, without giving up I, by appealing to PE. I
have also shown that Nozick's appeal to the argument from
uncompensated-for-fear suggests that he rejects I, PE, and
the conclusion that Sam is right. What is Nozick's position?
I have already given evidence that he accepts I. Now I will
give evidence that he accepts PE and the conclusion that
Sam is right. The availability of this evidence makes me
more comfortable in attributing these positions to him and
in concluding that he would concede that his argument from
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uncompensated-far-fear is irrelevant to his project of
establishing what people's pre-institutional rights to
liberty are.
More specifically, we will see that he accepts the
following, stronger, version of PE:
It is never permissible to use force to make
one person serve another person productively
Furthermore, whenever a) one person desires to
cross the boundary established by another's
rights and b) an exchange in which he bought
the right to cross would be an exchange in
which he was served productively, then he must
attempt to obtain the consent of the person
whose boundary he desires to cross unless it
will be impossible or very costly to locate
the person whose consent is needed. A person
whb fails to make this attempt and crosses
without obtaining consent is liable to punish-
ment for his crossing.
The following provides evidence that he accepts this principle:
Any border crossing act which permissibly may be
done provided that compensation is paid after-
wards will be one to which prior consent is im-
possible or very costly to negotiate (which
includes, ignoring some complications, accidental
acts, unintentional acts, acts done by mistake,
36
and so on). But not vice versa.
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One might object that this does not commit him to PE and
to the conclusion that Sam is right because one of the costs
which John faces in negotiating with Sam is the increased
likelihood that his daughter will drown. It seems clear,
however, that Nozick would not count this as a relevant cost,.
Consider the following discussion of when the costs of
negotiation are too great:
Shouldn't those who have not gotten their victim's
prior consent (usually by purchase) be punished?
The complication is that some factor may prevent
obtaining this prior consent or make it impossible
to do so. (Some factor other than the victim's
refusing to aqree.) It might be known who the
victim will be, and exactly what will happen to
him, but it might be temporarily impossible to
communicate with him. Or it might be known that
some person or other will be the victim of an act,
but it might be impossible to find out which per-
son. In each of these cases, no agreement gaining
the victim's permission to do the act can be nego-
tiated in advance. In some other cases it might
be very costly,.though not impossible, to negotiate
an agreement. The known victim can be communicated
with, but only by first performing a brain operation
on him or finding him in an African jungle, or
getting him to cut short his six-month sojourn in
a monastery where he has taken a vow of silence end
abstinence from business affairs, and so on; all
very costly.3,
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The reasons which Nozick gives for concluding that it would
be too costly to negotiate an agreement are quite different
from the reason which is available to John. Furthermore,
Nozick explicitly says that the reason must be "Some factor
other than the victim's refusing to agree." It is now
beginning to appear that Nozick accepts PE and the conclu-
sion that Sam is right.
For those who are still sceptical we can turn to
Chapter Seven where Nozick discusses the general problem of
when a person is morally bound to give something that he
owns for the purpose of saving another's life. He writes:
The fact that someone owns the total supply of
something necessary for others to stay alive does
not entail that his (or anyone's) appropriation
of anything left some people (immediately or later)
in a situation worse than the baseline. A medical
researcher who synthesizes a new substance which
effectively treats a certain disease and who refuses
to sell except on his own terms does not worsen
the situation of others by depriving them of what-
ever he has appropriated.38
The medical researcher has the right to sell on his own terms.
If you cannot meet his terms, then you must accept the conse-
quence. In this~ case the consequences are that people must
suffer the consequences of having a certain disease.
T-34
Similarly, Sam has the right to sell on his own terms. If
John cannot meet his terms, then John must suffer the conse-
quences. In this case the death of his daughter. This
additional evidence seems to indicate that Nozick believes
that PE is acceptable and that Sam is right.
Finally, consider the following quote which arises
during a discussion in which Nozick objects "to speaking
of everyone's having a right .o various things such as
equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing
this right:" 3 9
Other people's rights and entitlements to gg5-
,ticular thins (that pencil, their body, and so
on) and how they choose to exercise these
rights and entitlements fix the external environ-
ment of any given individual and the means which
will be available to him. If his goal requires
the use of means which others have rights over,
he must enlist their voluntary cooperation.
Even to exercise his right to determine how
something he owns is to be usedLmay require
other means he must acquire a right to, for
example, food to keep him alive; he must put
together, with the cooperation of otherst a
feasible package.40
If John's goal of saving his daughter's life requires the
use of means which Sam has rights over, then John must enlist
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Sam's voluntary cooperation. Just as Nozick is willing to
say that some will die because they cannot enlist other's
voluntary cooperation in giving them food, it seems clear
that he will be willing to say that John's daughter will have
to die because Sam will not voluntarily give aver his rope.
All of this evidence at least establishes that the burden
of proof is on the person who denies that Nozick accepts
PE and the conclusion that Sam is right.
2,9 The Principle of Productive Exchanqe. Publicity, and
Punishment:
The modified version of PE which I have attributed to
Nozick only applies to the problem of how property rights
limit liberty when we make the following simplifying assump-
tions:
1. the act is certain, or reasonably certain, to
cross the boundaries established by another's rights.
2. the exchange to buy the right to do the act
would be an exchange in which the seller serves the
buyer productively.
3. it .is neither impossible nor very costly to
determine whether the person whose boundaries are
threatened by the act will give his consent to
the performance of the act.
Nozick's commitment to PE is a commitment to the beliefs that
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(I) it is wrong for the person to do the act without the
consent of the person whose boundary is threatened, (2) it
is permissible for the person whose boundary is threatened
41
to use force to prevent the performance of the act, and (3)
the use of force to do the act constitutes aggression and
is a violation of the libertarian side constraint, It is a
violation of P1 when it involves forcefully taking another's
property and a violation of P2 when it involves a forceful
crossing which is not a taking. Furthermore, I believe that
it is best to interpret Nozick as believing that PE follows
directly from his root ideas that each person is separate
and inviolable and no person is a resource for any other
person. The question still remains, however, concerning
how we are to solve the problems which emerge when we drop
one or more of the simplifying assumptions listed above. In
the remainder of this section I will explain what I believe
must be Nozick's position on how to solve the problems which
emerge when we drop assumption 3) above. Nozick's solutions
to the problems which emerge when we drop assumptions 1) and
2) will be discussed in detail later.42
We are interested in cases where i) an act is certain
to cross the boundary established by another's rights, ii)
an exchange to buy the right to do the act would be one in
which the seller served the buyer productively, and iii) it
is impossible or very costly to locate the person whose
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boundary is threatened. A case which might fall into this
category which is not as bizarre as the cases which Nazick
offers, is the following:
John is in the same predicament as before. This
time, however, Sam is nowhere near his boat.' If
John attempts to find Sam it is certain that his
daughter will drown. He takes the rope and saves
her. He locates Sam later that day and offers to
pay him full compensation for the use of the rope.
Is Sam permitted to punish John? I believe that Nozick would
say "no." It would simply be too counterintuitive, especially
when we recall Nozick's belief that if Sam is permitted to
punish John then any person is permitted to punish him, to
claim that Sam is permitted to punish John. Does Nozick
want to say that any sadist or any enemy of John can use
his commendable act as an opportunity to injure John?43
Since Nozick rejects the views that the right to punish and
the right to grant mercy reside solely in the victim, he
would have to say that they do.44
If Sam is extremely concerned about others using his
property without his consent he can put a large sign on his
boat which reads "NO PERSON IS PERMITTED TO USE THE CONTENTS
OF THIS BOAT WITHOUT THE EXPLICIT CONSENT OF SAM." By affix-
ing this sign to his property Sam defeats the presumption
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that any person is entitled to use his property, provided,
that he compensates Sam for its use, in cases where a serious
harm may be prevented by using the property and consent is
very difficult to obtain. In the absence of the sign John
is permitted to use Sam's rope when Sam's consent is diffi-
cult to obtain. He is liable to punishment, however, should
he use the rope and then attempt to avoid paying Sam compen-
sation for its use.
The conclusion which I want to draw is that Nozick
must accept a distinction between (1) acts which are for-
bidden and punishable even though those who are liable to
punishment for doing them were never warned that they would
be punished for doing them and (2) acts which are forbidden
and punishable only when those who are liable to punishment
were warned that they would be punished for doing them.
Assault would fall into the first category while John's act
of taking the rope when Sam was nowhere near his boat would
fall into the second. The boundaries of this distinction may
not always be clear. Those who are bothered by the vagueness
of this distinction can remove it by simply affixing signs
to their property specifying exactly when others may use it
without their explicit consent.
It may appear to the reader that I am misrepresenting
Nozick's position. I appear to be saying that any person
is, provided that he puts a warning on each piece of his
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property, permitted to punish any person who uses his pro-
party without his consent. Therefore, I appear to be com-
mitting him to the view, which he explicitly rejects, that
it is always permissible to prohibit. He tells us that we
must sometimes permit acts which threaten to cross our boun-
daries when the following conditions are satisfied: 4 5
I. It will be impossible or very costly to find
the person whose boundary will be crossed to deter-
mine whether he will give his consent.
2. The benefits of permitting the crossings far
outweigh, either in terms of harm prevented or
good produced, the costs of providing full com-
pensation to those whose boundaries are crossed.
3, Permitting the actions will not lead to un-
compensated for fear.
4. The compensation to those whose boundaries are
crossed is more than full compensation.
In order to see that the position which I have committed
Nozick to is consistent with his belief that it is not always
Permissible to prohibit we must recall the simplifying assump-
tions. I am only committing Nozick to the view that it is
always permissible to prohibit, by the method of affixing
signs to one's property, in cases where 1) an act is certain
to cross the boundary defined by another's rights and 2) the
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exchange to buy the right to do the act would be an exchange
in which the seller serves the buyer productively. When we
drop assumptions 1) and 2) , Nozick no longer believes that it
is always permissible to prohibit an act which threatens to
cross another's boundary. We will discuss his solutions
to the problems which emerge when we drop 1) and 2) in the
remaining chapters.
We have just noted that a person who accepts PE will
almost certainly acknowledge that the right to punish some-
times depends upon having made a prior announcement that an
act is prohibited and that any person who does it will be
punished. It is important for the reader to see that this
is consistent with Nozick's claim that the establishment of
public rules which conflict with the requirements of PE and
are accompanied by a warning that those who disobey them
will be punished can never create a right to punish. Recall
our discussion in which we noted that people who believed
that the boundaries established by their natural rights were
inconvenient could use their natural right to make contracts
to remove the inconveniences.46 We noted that they might
voluntarily join a mutual aid society in which all accept
the duties which MA, or some similar public rule, imposes,
The mutual aid society will provide its members with added
security and a sense of community which they did not have
when they conducted their relations according to the
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requirements of PE. The members of the society may not,
however, impose its requirements on those who are not members.
They may sometimes provide non-members with the benefits to
9
which members are entitled in order to show them the benefits
of membership. The provision of these benefits will not,
however, give them the right to impose the duties of mem-
bership on others. Members of the society may not provide
these benefits to non-members and then appeal to the enforce-
able fairness principle to establish that non-members are
bound to obey the requirements of the public rules which
members have voluntarily agreed to obey. Nozick would insist
that no new rights to use force emerge at the group level,
that the enforceable fairness principle is unacceptable, and
that the members of the mutual aid society must respect the
boundaries established by the pre-institutional rights of
non-members. Each of these is consistent with the claim that
in some pre-institutional situations the right to punish a
person for doing A depends upon a prior warning that he will
be punished should he do A.
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UNPRODUCTIVE EXCH:ANGES AND BLACKMAIL
3.1 Aims:
In our discussion of the disputes between Sam and John
and Jim and Bob we considered two possible assignments of
entitlements:
1. The person whose boundary is threatened by the
performance of A has the right to prohibit the per-
formance of A. If a person wants to perform A he
must pay market compensation for the consent of
the person whose boundary is threatened.
2. A person who wants to perform A has the right
to perform A provided that he pays the other full
compensation for the harm which A causes the other.
If the other wants to be free from the consequences
of A, even though he is guaranteed full compensation
should A be performed, then he must pay market com-
pensation for this freedom.
Nozick's commitment to PE commits him to the entitlements
described in 1). We should note, however, that either assign-
ment of entitlements in the disputes between Sam and John
and between Jim and Bob would satisfy the following condition:
No person can complain, when the other acts within
his rights, that he is made worse off than he would
have been in the situation in which the other did
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not exist at all or had nothing to do with him.
This shows that PE is an extremely powerful principle. It
implies that it is never permissible to force one person to
serve another productively even when he is quaranteed more
than full compensation for serving him productively.
PE only applies, however, in cases where an exchange to
buy the right to do A is an exchange in which the seller
serves the buyer productively. There are two other cases
which will be of interest to us. One is the case where
either assignment of entitlements sketched above will leave
at least one party with the complaint that he is worse off
than he would have been in the situation in which the other
did not exist at all. We will see, in Chapter Four, that the
problem of non-aggressive risky acts is a difficult problem
for Nozick because each of the natural assignments of
entitlements leaves at least one person: worse off than he
would have been in the situation in which the other did not
exist at all. The natural assignments are: 1) the risk
creator is entitled to perform the act provided that he
compensates the risk bearer when his act actually crosses
the boundary established by the risk bearer's.,rights and 2)
the risk bearer is entitled to prohibit the act. Now,
however, we will turn to the case where one assignment of
entitlements leaves one person with the complaint that he
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is worse off than he would have been in the situation in
which the other did not exist at all while the other assign-
ment leaves no person with this complaint. Shouldn't we
adopt the assignment which leaves no person with this com-
plaint? My aim in this chapter is to examine Nozick's answer
to this question. The key to his answer is found in his
discussion of blackmail to which I will now turn.
3,2 The Principle of Unproductive Exchange and an Apparent
Inconsistency:
We will, following Nozick, say that A blackmails B
when i) A offers to withhold information which B wants with-
held and ii) A's sole motive for threatening to reveal the
information is to get B to pay him not to reveal it. If A
is permitted to blackmail B, then B can complain that he
would have been better off in the situation in which' A did
2
not exist at all or had nothing to do with him. If, however,
we permit B to prohibit A's revealing the information, then
A has no complaint. He is not made worse off than he would
have been in the situation in which B did not exist at all
or had nothing to do with him because his sole motive for
threatening to reveal the information is, by hypothesis, to
get B to pay him not to reveal it. It might appear, there-
fore, that Nozick should permit B to prohibit A from revealing
the information. There is one problem with this, A's act
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of revealing the information does not threaten to cross the
boundary established by any one of B's natural rights. 3
Therefore, Nozick can claim that it is permissible to prohibit
blackmail only if he is willing to give up his earlier claim:
Note that not every act which produces lower
utility for others generally may be forbidden; it
must cross the boundary of others' rights for the
4question of prohibition to arise.
It appears that Nozick is willing to retreat from his earlier
position to the position that in special cases it is permisa
sible to prohibit acts which do not threaten to cross the
boundary established by another's rights. He writes:
Our earlier discussion of dividing the benefits
of voluntary exchange, thus, should be narrowed
so as to apply only to those exchanges where both
parties do benefit in the sense of being rsci-
pients of productive activities. Where one of
the parties does not so benefit and is unpro-
ductively "served," it is fair that he merely
barely compensates the other, if any compensation
is due the other party at all.
When B prohibits A's revealing the information, an act which
does not threaten to cross B's boundary, B crosses A's
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boundary. In this case, unlike cases of productive exchange,
B is permitted to cross, regardless of whether A consents,
provided that he compensates A for the crossing. It is
the blackmailer's borders which are crossed and, therefore,
it is the blackmailer who is entitled to compensation.
In order to state the principle which Nozick apparently
appeals to we must explain when one person serves another
unproductively:
X serves -Y unproductively when a) Y is not better
off as a result of his voluntary exchange with X
than he would have been in the situation in which
X did not exist at all or had nothing to do with
him, b) the exchange is one in which Y buys X's
abstention from doing an act, and c) X's sole
motive for threatening to do the act is get Y to
pay him not to do it.6
The blackmailer serves his client unproductively and those who
operate a protection racket serve their clients unproductively.
Nozick can explain why it is permissible to prohibit a person
from operating a protection racket by appealing to PE. The
acts which an operator of a protection racket threatens to
do are acts which others may prohibit by appealing to PE and,
7
therefore, are acts which he has no right to do. When
others prohibit his operation of the protection racket they
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do not have to pay him compensation since they have not
crossed his boundary. In order to explain why it is per-
missible to prohibit blackmail, however, Nozick must appeal
to a new principle which we will call "the principle of
unproductive exchange" or "UP:" It says:
The Principle of Unproductive Exchane:. It is
permissible for Y to prohibit X's doing A when
X's doing A does not threaten to cross Y's boun-
dary provided that (1) Y would be served un-
productively in an exchange in which he pays X
not to do A, and (2) Y properly compensates X,
It should be obvious to the reader that UP is compatible with
F and I. It should also be clear that UP must be supple-
mented by an account of what counts as proper compensation.
Nazick believes that in some cases full compensation is
required while in others no compensation is required at all.
We have noted that one reason why Nozick's position
on blackmail is problematic is that it is inconsistent with
his earlier claim that the question of prohibition only
arises in cases where an act threatens to cross another's
boundary. Noazick makes his position .consistent by dropping
the earlier claim and appealing to UP, There are, however,
other problems with his position.
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3,3 Nozick's Applicatioqn ,f the Principle of Unoroductive
Exchange:
Before we examine whether UP is a reasonable principle
we should note that Nozick appears to believe that it is some-
times permissible to prohibit revealing information in cases
where UP will not justify a prohibition. He writes:
... someone writing a book, whose research comes
across information about another person which would
help sales if included in the book, may charge
another who desires that this information be kept
secret (including the person who is the subject
of the information) for refraining from including
the information in the book. He may charge an
amount of money equal to the expected difference
in royalties between the book containing this
information and the book without it, he may not
charge the best price that he could get from the
purchaser of the silence. 9
As Nozick describes the case it is not true that the person's
motive in publishing the new information is to get the other
to pay him not to do it. An exchange to pay him not to
publish could not, therefore, be an unproductive exchange.
Nozick appears to believe, however, that it is permissible to
prohibit his publication of the information provided that he
is paid full compensation for the losses which he suffers as
a result of withholding the information. The apparent
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difference between this case and one where a person's sole mo-
tive in threatening to reveal the information is to sell. his
silence is the amount of compensation that is appropriate.
Does Nozick really want to claim that any person is per-
mitted to prohibit the publication of any information by any
other person, no matter what the other's reasons for publish-
ing the information are, provided that he pays the other full
compensation for the harm he will suffer as. a result of the
prohibition? Let us assume that the author in Nozick's exam-
ple came across information that a famous corporation presi-
dent reached the presidency through blackmailing others and
masterminding a great fraud which catapulted the corporation
to its commanding market position. Is Nozick's position that
this wealthy chap is permitted to approach the author and say
"I prohibit your publication of that information. Here is an
amount of money which will more than compensate you for what
you will lose by not publishing it?" It is outrageous to say
that the author must accept the money and shut up. It would
also be outrageous to say a) he is permitted to refuse all of-
fers and publish but b) if he accepts any offer it must be for
no more than full compensation. What happens if he is willing
to remain silent only on the condition that he receives more
than full compensation and somebody is willing to pay his
price? It is not like Nozick to keep people from reaching
mutually beneficial agreements which do not cross others'
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boundaries.10
Nozick's position on what the author may charge is
problematic for another reason, Unless there is something
special about speech, and Nozick never argues that there is,1
there does not appear to be any difference between the author
and the next door neighbor in the following example:
If your next door neighbor plans to .rect a
structure on his land, which he has a right to
do, you might be better off if he didn't exist
at. all. .(No one else would erect that monstrosity.)
Yet purchasing his abstention would be a produc-
tive exchange.12
Nozick believes that in this case you must pay your neighbor
market compensation, unless his sole motive in threatening to
erect the monstrosity is get you to pay him not to erect it.
On what grounds can Nozick say that market compensation is
appropriate here while full compensation is appropriate for
the right to prevent the author from publishing the damaging
information? Nozick cannot simply say that the neighbor
has the right to erect the monstrosity while the author does
not have the right to publish the information. The fact
that the author is entitled to full compensation when the
publication of his newly discovered information is prohibited
indicates that he also has the right to publish the
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information., The question is why we must pay market com-
pensation to cross a person's boundary in one case and only
full compensation in the other. Nozick never answers this
question. Furthermore, he offers no basis for his apparent
belief that the buyer in the exchange to prevent the erection
of the monstrosity is served productively while the buyer in
the exchange to prevent the publication is not. In each
case the buyer can complain that he is worse off than he
would have been in the situation in which the seller did
not exist at all. Nor can he say that each buyer is served
unproductively. Neither the neighbor nor the author
threatens to do his act for the purpose of getting somebody
to pay him not to do it.
3.4 The Concept of Semi-Productive Exchanae and One Aspect
of the Problem of What Constitutes a Crossin :
What Nozick needs are new categories of exchange and
new principles which are correlated with them. We will say
that a semi-productive exchange is one in which one person
serves another semi-productively and we will adopt the
following account of "X serves Y semi-productively:"
X serves Y semi-productively when a) Y is not
better off as a result of his voluntary exchange
with X than he would have been in the situation
in which X did not exist at all or had nothing
152
to do with him, b) the exchange is one .in which
Y buys X's abstention from doing an act, but c)
X's motive for doing the act is not to sell Y
his abstention. 1 3
The exchange to pay your neighbor not to build the monstrosity
and the exchange to pay the author not to publish would both
be semi-productive exchanges. Furthermore, an exchange in
which a risk bearer pays a risk creator to refrain from per-
forming a risky act would also be a semi-productive exchange,
provided that the risk creator's motive in performing the
risky act was not simply to sell the risk bearer his absten-
tion. We will eventually examine Nozick's accoun of what
peoples' entitlements are in risky situations. Now, however,
I want to bring the reader's attention to an aspect of the
problem of what constitutes a crossing which is related to
the concept of semi-productive exchange and which Nozick
never discusses.
Nozick believes that a person who intentionally throws
a rock through my window or intentionally tramples my lawn
violates my property rights. He also believes that a person
who accidentally does either also violates my property
rights. In each case the person does something which lowers
the value of my property and in each case the person must,
since these are cases where the boundaries established by
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my property rights are crossed, compensate me for the harm
which he caused. Why isn't it equally clear that the person
who builds the monstrosity for the sole purpose of lowering
the value of my property also crosses the boundary established
by my property rights? Why isn't it equally clear that the
person who builds the monstrosity because he believes that
it is beautiful, but who nonetheless lowers the value of my
property, also crosses the boundary established by my pro-
perty rights? A complete development of Nozick's theory
must include answers to these questions. That is, it must
include an account of which acts which lower the value of
my property also cross the boundary established by my pro-
perty rights. This account will be relevant to his solution
to the problem of what constitutes a crossing, a problem
which we have so far avoided discussing.14  I bring atten-
tion to this problem here because of its obvious connection
with the concepts of unproductive and semi-productive exchange.
Furthermore, it. would appear that his explanation for how we
should distinguish between acts which constitute a crossing
and acts which don't must not appeal to the beneficial con-
sequences of living in a system which treats them differently.
This is because an explanation of this distinction which
appeals to those consequences would be incompatible with I.
Therefore, it would be an incoherent explanation unless
Nozick could explain why it is .sometimes appropriate to solve
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the problem of what constitutes a crossing by giving. up I
but it is never appropriate to solve the problem of how pro-
perty rights limit liberty by giving up I.
Finally, once he explains the basis for this distinction
he will still have the problem of how the boundaries esta-
blished by property rights limit liberty; the problem of
how to assign entitlements in cases when people desire to
do acts which threaten these boundaries. He must defend
his view that different entitlements are appropriate for
different acts. Some acts are permitted provided that those
who do them compensate those whose boundaries they cross.
Others are forbidden so that those who want to perform them
must pay market compensation for the right to perform them.
Still others are permitted but those whose boundaries they
threaten have the right to prohibit them provided that they
compensate those whose liberty they restrict. 15 Again,
Nozick's explanations for treating different acts differently
must not appeal to the beneficial consequences of living in
a system which treats them differently.
Nozick does not, as far as I can tell, offer a systema-
tic account of how to solve these problems. All are related
to the concept of semi-productive exchange because all are
problems about how to assign entitlements, when the following
conditions are satisfied= (1) at least one of the parties
can complain that he is worse off than he would have been in
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the situation in which the other did not exist at_all or had
nothing to do with him and (2) the exchange in which one
pays the other to refrain from doing the act which makes him
worse off is a semi-productive exchange. Some very %mportant
social problems, in addition to the problem of assigning
entitlements in risky situations, are associated with the
concept of semi-productive exchange. In the next chapter
we will see that Noazick's solutions to these problems leave
much to be desired, Now, however, I turn to a case where
Nozick should have no trouble assigning entitlements.
3,5 The Natural Extension of the Principle of Unproductive
Exhange:
If it is permissible to prohibit the publca.tion of
information by a person whose sole motive for threatening
to publish it is to sell you his abstention, then it shduld
also be permissible to prohibit the publication of informa-
tion by a person whose sole motive is to injure you. Similar-
ly, if it is permissible to prohibit the building of a mon-
strosity by a person whose sole motive in threatening to
build it is to sell you his abstention, then it should also be
permissible to prohibit the building of a monstrosity by a
person whose sole motive is- to injure you by lowering your
property values. Neither of these persons wants to be bought
off. The first wants to delight in the spectacle of your
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embarrassment while the second wants the pleasure of seeing
you suffer a financial loss. An exchange in which you pay
either to refrain from doing his act would, however, be a
semi-productive, rather than an unproductive, exchange.
Therefore, Nozick cannot appeal to UP to justify the prohi-
bition of either. He must adopt a new principle which implies
that it is .permissible to prohibit- each of these acts provided
that C ou.properlv compensate the person whose act is prohi-
bited. This new principle would appear to be the natural
extension of UP. Just as Nozick believes that a person whose
act may be prohibited by appeal to UP must receive proper
compensation, we would also expect him to believe that a
person whose act may be prohibited by appeal to this new
principle must also receive proper compensation.
There is a problem, however, in determining what is to
count as proper compensation in these cases. Is this a case
where no compensation is due the other party? Or, are
these people entitled to compensation for the pleasure they
lose because. their desire to injure others is frustrated?
Nozick discusses one case which is like the cases under con-
sideration. He raises the following question: How much may
a person charge for refraining to reveal information when
he discovers information which another person wants to keep
secret? He gives the following answer:
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He may charge an amount of money equal to his
expected difference in royalties between the book
containing this information and the book without
it; he may not charge the best price he could get
16from the purchaser of his silence.
In the note in the text, however, he adds: "A writer or
other person, who delights in revealing secrets, may charge
differently."17  The obvious implication of this remark is
that the.person who delights in revealing secrets is entitled
to additional compensation for his lost pleasure. It seems
incredible to me that a person who appeals to the idea that
it is never permissible to use another merely as a means can.
say that this person, who is using another merely as a means
to his ends, must be compensated for the loss of pleasure
which he suffers when his revelations about the other are
prohibited. It will not do for Nozick to respond that poli-
tical philosophy is only concerned with cases where one
person uses another as a means by physically aggressing
against him,1 8  This is because it is Nozick who insists
that it is permissible to prohibit blackmail. It is not
clear whether Nozick wants to say that the blackmailer,
who clearly uses another as a means, is an aggressor. It
is clear, however, that blackmail is not an example of
physical aggression, If Nozick wants to keep UP, then he
should, I believe, do two things. First, he should accept
1 58
the additional principle P4 which I initially included as
part of the libertarian site constraint. P4 says that it is
never permissible to do an act, regardless of whether the act
threatens the boundary established by any person's right,
when the sole purpose for doing the act is to make another
person worse off. It seems incoherent for a person who
accepts the rootidea that it is never permissible to use
another merely as a means to accept UP without also accepting
P4. The blackmailer uses another's misfortune as a means to
his ends. Although we may deplore his use of blackmail as
a means to those ends, we cannot automatically conclude that
his ends are bad. A person who violates P4, however, views
another's misfortune as an end in itself. His purpose in
acting is to bring about that misfortune, We can confidently
conclude that his end is always bad. Nothing seems to stand
in the way of the conclusion that if it is always permissible
to prohibit blackmail, then it is always permissible to pro-
hibit acts which violate P4. The second thing Nozick should
do is give up his apparent belief that the person who
delights in revealing secrets is entitled to compensation
for his lost pleasure when another prohibits his revelations
by appealing to the principle which is the natural extension
of UP. This belief should be unacceptable to any person who
takes seriously the root idea that it is never permissible
to use another merely as a means.
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3.6 The Inconveniences of the Principle o f Unproductive
Exchancre:
I have suggested that Nozick's position on blackmail
rests on his commitment to UP. Is UP a reasonable principle?
Consider the following examples:
1. Smith owns a store. There is not enough business
in town to support two stores of its type. Jones
threatens to open a store of that type for the sole
purpose of getting Smith to pay him not to open it.
2. Jones hates Smith and his sole motive for opening
up the store is to drive Smith out of business and
into financial ruin.
3. Jack is very fond of Mary. Jim, the campus Romeo,
threatens to take her out for the solb purpose of
getting Jack to pay him, by doing his physics problems,
for not taking her out.
4. Jim hates Jack and his sole motive for taking
her out is to cause Jack great anxiety.
5. Otto tells his neighbor Archie, who hates blacks,
that he intends to sell his house to blacks for the
sole purpose of getting Archie to pay him not to
sell to blacks.
6. Otto's sole motive in selling his house to a
black family is to cause Archie great anxiety.
Nozick's commitment to UP forces him to say that it is permis-
sible for Smith to prohibit in case 1), for Jack to prohibit
in case 3), and for Archie to prohibit in case 5).
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Furthermore, if I am correct that it is implausible to claim
both a) that it is permissible to prohibit acts when a per-
son's sole motive in threatening to do the act is to sell you
his abstention and b) that it is not permissible to prohibit
the same acts when the person's sole motive in doing the act
is to injure you, then Nozick must also say that Smith may
prohibit in case 2), Jack may prohibit in case 4), and Archie
may prohibit in case 6). Does Nozick want these conclusions?
Nozick leaves no doubt that he wants to retain his
position that it is permissible to prohibit blackmail. He
makes a point of. contrasting it with the standard libertarian
position on blackmail:
Contrast our view of blackmail with the following
which sees it as on a par with any other economic
transaction: "Blackmail would not be illegal in
a free society. For blackmail is the receipt of
money for the service of not publicizing informa-
tion about the other person. No violence or threat
of violence to person or property is involved."19
Nozick may be able to retain his position on blackmail with-
out committing himself to principles which are as powerful
as UP and the principle which appears to be the natural ex-
tention of UP, He may, however, prefer to keep these
principles and argue that people in the state of nature would
161
a - - - a-.. .~,_,,~~, ~ : ~ i~  ~ i~.~ ~ _~; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _._.~..,,... ..- l.;. .. . .1.. .., ;.
give up their right to enforce such powerful principles
because each fears that others will improperly apply it
against him. This fear is reasonable since a person can
apply them only by making a, judgment about another's motives.
People can avoid this fear by using their natural right of
contract to agree to a less powerful, but more practical,
principle which includes a prohibition on blackmail. Clearly,
a more complete development of Nozick's theory would include
discussions of these matters.
3.7 Aqqression and the Libertarian Side Constr int:
Does the blackmailer act aggressively? It seems to me
appropriate to say that a person who threatens to do an act
for the sole purpose of selling another his abstention end a
person who does an act for the sole purpose of making another
worse off both act aggressively even when their acts do not
threaten to cross the boundary defined by another's rights.
The fact that Nozick claims both a) that he accepts the liber-
tarian side constraint against aggression and b) that it is
permissible to use force to prohibit blackmail suggests that
he believes that the blackmailer acts aggressively. If the
blackmailer acts aggressively, then it seems only reasonable
to say that the person who does an act for the sole purpose
of making another worse off also acts aggressively. Further-
more, in each of these cases we can say of the person's act
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that a) its prohibition leaves the person no worse off than
he would have been in the situation in which his intended
victim did not exist at all and b) it is an example of an
act that uses another merely as a means. We can begin to
see some connection between Nozick's concept of unproductive
exchange, his root idea that it is never permissible to use
another merely as a means, and the concept of aggression
which he must have in mind when he talks about the libertaz-
ian side constraint that prohibits aggression.
Even if Nazick says that the blackmailer and the person
who does an act for the sole purpose of making another worse
off act aggressively he does not have to go straight to
the conclusion that it is permissible to prohibit their acts.
He can, instead, adopt the view that it is only permissible
to prohibit aggressive acts which threaten the boundary esta-
blished by another's rights. I believe that the common
ground among libertarians is a commitment to PE and, there-
fore, to P1, P2 and P3. Nozick appears to want to add UP
and P4 to this list. None of the criticisms which follow
depend upon how libertarians should resolve this internal
conflict. In the remainder of the book we will examine
what principles are appropriate for assigning entitlements
in cases of semi-productive exchange.20 All libertarians
can agree that the principles which apply in cases of pro-
ductive and unproductive exchange do not apply to these
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cases. The principles which are appropriate will include
the principles which enable us to solve the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts. The problem of non-aggressive risky
acts is an emergent pxoblem for Nazick just because he
cannot appeal to the principles which he uses to assign
entitlements in situations of productive and unproductive
exchange to solve it.
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ARE RISKY ACTS SPECIAL?
4,1 Aims:
In this section I am going to consider whether Nozick
needs special principles for solving the problem of how to
assign entitlements in cases where people desire to do acts
which subject others to risks of having their boundaries
crossed. I will be especially interested in answering two
questions, The first is whether Nozick can appeal to any
theoretically interesting reasons for treating some risky
acts differently from others. The second is whether Nozick
can appeal to any theoretically interesting reasons for
treating risky acts differently from acts which are certain
to cross the boundary established by another's rights. By
the end of this chapter the reader should have a clear under-
standing of why it is appropriate to say that Nozick views
the problem of non-aggressive risky acts as an emergent
problem.
4 2 Aqqressive Risky Acts and Non-Avqressive Risk. Acts:
The problem of assigning entitlements in risky situa-
tions is a difficult problem for Nozick because each of the
natural assignments appears to leave at.least one person with
the complaint that he is worse off than he would have been in
1 T5
the situation in which the other did not exist at all or had
nothing to do with him. The natural assignments are:
1. The risk bearer is entitled to prohibit.
The risk creator must get the risk bearer's
consent to do the act and must pay market com-
pensation for the consent.
2. The risk creator is permitted to do the act
provided that he compensates the risk bearer in
case his act actually crosses the risk bearer's
boundary. The risk bearer must pay the risk
creator for-the right to be free from the risk.
In the first case the risk creator can complain because the
risk bearer may, acting within his rights, prohibit him from
doing the act. The risk creator would certainly be better
off in the situation in which the risk bearer did not exist.,
In the second case each appears to have a complaint. The
risk creator can complain because he must pay the risk bearer
for any injuries which he suffers in case his boundary is
actually crossed. If the risk bearer did not exist there
would be one less cost associated with the performance of his
risky act. 1 The risk bearer can complain because he must
live in a world of increased risk. Although he is entitled
to be compensated in case his boundary is actually crossed,
he is not entitled to compensation for the fear he suffers
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because of the increased risk.
There are two reasons which might incline us to adopt
the first assignment of entitlements. One is that it
appears to give only one person, the risk creator, a ground
for complaint. The risk bearer has no complaint so long as
we view the risk creator's act as an isolated act and abstract
from the fact that the risk bearer will sometimes also be a
risk creator. NOzick's commitment to I forces him to view
it this way. The other is that a prohibition of the risky
act does not appear to threaten the boundary defined by the
risk creator's rights. In fact, however, Nozick appears to
adopt the view that people sometimes have the right to per-
form risky acts. He writes:
We have rejected the view that the p=ohibition
of risky activities is illegitimate, that through
prior agreements and open negotiations people must
be induced to agree voluntarily to refrain from the
activities. But we should not construe our case
merely as compensation for crossin i a border that.
protects .nother's risky action, with the requi=re
ment of prior negotiation obviated by the special
nature of the case (it doesn't involve any produc-
tive exchange).2
Where does the right to perform risky actions come from? It
appears to come from a presumption in favor of liberty which
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is part of theanatural right to pursue one's life plan in a
non-aggressive manner and is at the root of Nozick's theory.
Consider the following:
Does someone violate another's rights by per-
forming an action without sufficient means or
liability insurance to cover its risks? May he be
forbidden to do this or be punished for doing it?
Since an enormous number of actions do increase
risk to others, a society which prohibited such
uncovered actions would ill fit a picture of a
free society as one embodying a presumption in
favor of liberty, under which people could perform
actions so long as they don't harm others in spe-
cified ways.3
We should note two things about the presumption in favor of
liberty. One is that it undermines our inclination to favor
the first assignment of entitlements and, therefore, leaves
us puzzled about how to assign entitlements in risky situa-
tions. The other is that it would be implausible for Nazick
to claim that it creates a right to perform any risky act.
I will now explain why it would be implausible.
Consider each of the following cases:
1. The risk creator's sole motive for doing the
act is to get the risk bearer to pay him not to do it.
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2. The risk creator's sole motive for doing the
act is to make the risk bearer suffer fear that
he might be its victim.
9
In each of these cases it seems appropriate to say both that
the risk creator uses the risk bearer merely as a means and
that the risk creator acts aggressively.. We would expect
Nozick to claim that whenever a risk creator uses a risk
bearer merely as a means to his ends, then a) the risk bearer
has the right to prohibit, and b) the prohibition does not
create a claim to compensation on the part of the risk
creator.
In fact, Nozick appears to adopt a different view.
Consider the following:
If using the more dangerous process is the only
way that person can earn a living (and if playing
Russian roulette on another with a gun of 100,000
chambers is the only way M1 person can have any
enjoyment at all -- I grant that these are extra-
vagant assumptions), then perhaps the person should
be compensated for the prohibition.4
Nozick's claim that the person who plays Russian roulette may
be entitled to compensation is puzzling. He should welcome
the conclusion that it is permissible to prohibit his game
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without payment of compensation. Doesn't his game clearly
involve the use of another as a means? How can Nozick claim
both a) that Sam is permitted to prohibit the taking of his
rope by John without paying John any compensation even though
John's purpose in taking the rope is to save his daughter's
life, and b) the potential victim of the game of Russian
roulette is no permitted to prohibit the game without
paying compensation even though the person's purpose in
playing the game is merely to enjoy himself? How can the
fact that one act is certain to cross another's boundary
while the other only creates a risk of crossing another's
boundary make such a big difference? I do not believe that
Nozick can answer this question. Therefore, I offer the
following principle as a friendly amendment to Nozick's
theory:
It is permissible for any person P to prohibit
any person Q from doing any act A which threatens
to cross P's boundary when P's prohibition of A
leaves Q no worse off than he would have been in
the situation in which P did not exist at all.
Furthermore, P's permission to prohibit is not
contingent on payment of any compensation to Q.
This principle appears to be a natural extension of Nozick's
position when we take account of our earlier discussion of
170
how to assign entitlements in cases of unproductive exchange. 5
The problem of how to assign entitlements to perform risky
acts in cases of semi-productive exchange is an entirely
different problem. We will see that Nozick solves it by
appealing to a different principle.
4.3 Risky Acts Are Not Special:
Should the distinction between acts which are certain
to cross another's boundary and acts which only create a
risk of crossing another's boundary be an important distinc-
tion for Nozick? I have already suggested that it is natural
to divide risky acts into two categories:
1. those whose prohibition leaves the risk creator
no worse off than he would have been in the situation
in which the risk bearer did not exist at all.
2. those whose prohibition leaves the risk creator
worse off than he would have been in the situation
in which the risk bearer did not exist at all.
Since actions in the first category involve the use of another
merely as a means, Nozick should classify them as aggressive
actions and welcome the conclusion that it is permissible to
prohibit them without payment of compensation to the risk
creator. The difficult problem for Nazick is the problem of
when it is permissible to prohibit the non-aggressive risky
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acts which fall into the second category. A prohibition of
one of these acts crosses the boundary established by the risk
creater's right to perform risky acts and leaves the risk
creator worse off than he would have been in the situation in
which the risk bearer did not exist at all or had nothing to
do with him.
It also appears natural to divide acts that are certain
to cross another's boundary into two categories:
1. those whose prohibition leaves the person who
wants to perform the action no worse off than he
would have been in the situation in which the person
whose -boundary he threatens did not exist at all.
2. those i-:whose prohibition leaves the person who
wants to perform the action worse off than he would
have been in the situation in which the person whose
boundary he threatens did not exist at all.
John's taking of Sam's rope and Bob's assault of Jim fall
into the first category. Does Nozick want the conclusion
that the entitlements which resolve the disputes between
Sam and John and Jim and Bob should apply in any case where
a) a person wants to perform an action that is certain to
cross the boundary defined by another's rights and b) the
person can easily find out whether the person whose boundary
is threatened will give his consent to the crossing? Or,
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does Nozick want the conclusion that we need a new assign-
ment of entitlements when the action falls into the second
category? Recall that neither PE nor UP applies to actions
in the second category.
Consider the following:
1. There are termites on Luke's property which
pose a threat to his house. The only way to prevent
the deterioration of his house is to use a chemical
which has the side effect that it will kill all
tomato plants within 100 feet. Luke's neighbor,
Matthew, grows tomatoes which are certain to be
destroyed by Luke's use of the chemical. Further-
more, Matthew is the only distributor of the
chemical. Is Luke permitted to take the chemical
from Matthew, regardless of whether Matthew con-
sents, provided that he compensates Matthew for
the amount of chemical he uses and for the des-
truction of his tomato plants?
2. The same as above, except that Luke can purchase
the chemical at his local hardware store. Is Luke
permitted to use the chemical, regardless of whether
Matthew consents, provided that he compensates
Matthew for the destruction of his tomato plants?
3. Luke discovers that there are termites on his
property which will, if he does nothing, begin to
destroy his house. The cheapest way for him to pro-
tect his house is by injecting a chemical in the
ground around his house. This chemical will not
kill the termites. It will only prevent them from
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destroying his house. A side effect of his use of
this chemical is that the termites will move on to
the next house which happens to be Matthew's. The
termites will destroy Matthew's house unless he
pays to protect it. Is Luke permitted to use the
chemical, regardless of whether Matthew consents,
without payment of any compensation?
Nozick would, I believe, say that the first case is indis-
tingqishable from the Sam and John case. In an exchange in
which Luke pays Matthew to give him some of the chemical
Matthew serves Luke productively. Therefore, PE applies
and Luke is not permitted to take the chemical without
Matthew's consent.
What would Nazick say in the second and third cases?
In each case either of the two natural assignments of entitle-
ments will leave at least one person with the complaint that
he is worse off than he would have been in the situation in
which the other did not exist at all or had nothing to do
with him. The only difference between these cases and cases
of non-aggressive risky acts is that these involve acts
which are certain to cross another's boundary. If neither
of the natural assignments is appropriate in cases of non-
aggressive risky acts, then how can it be appropriate in
these cases? Nozick might want to say that in case 3) Luke
is permitted to use the chemical, regardless of whether
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Matthew consents, and does not have to pay Matthew any com-
6
pensation for the costs he imposes on him. He might try to
justify this conclusion by saying that Luke's use of the che-
mical does not cross the boundary established by Matthew's
rights to his land and his home. This will work, however,
only if we are given an explanation of why Luke'Is use of the
chemical, which certainly lowers the value of Matthew's pz-o
perty, does not also cross the boundary established by his
property rights. Furthermore, this explanation must be com-
patible with I. Although Nozick never discusses a case like
3), he does discuss a case like 2). His discussion leaves
the impression that he would say that it is appropriate to
make Luke pay market compensation for the right to use the
chemical. I will now turn to his discussion.
The evidence that Nozick believes that it is appropriate
to make Luke pay market compensation comes in a footnote. He
writes:
One may be tempted to delimit partially the area
where full compensation is permissible by distin-
guishing between using something as a resource in
a productive process and damaging something as a
side effect in a process. Paying only full com-
pensation would be viewed as permissible in the
latter case, and market compensation as desirable
in the former, because of the issue of dividing
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the benefits of economic exchange. This approach
won'.t do, for-dumpino arounds for effects are also
priceable and marketable resources.
Nozick appears to be saying that a person whose non-aggressive
act incidentally, but certainly, will cross the boundary
established by another's rights must pay market compensation
for the right to do that act. If he cannot negotiate a
price with the person whose boundary he threatens, then he
must refrain from performing the act. This position is
surprising because it appears to ignore the fact, which is
essential to his position on when it is permissible to pro-
hibit a non-aggressive risky act, that the person whose act
is prohibited can complain that he is made worse off than he
would have been in the situation in which the other did not
exist at all or had nothing to do with him. The only support
which Nozick provides for his position is that "dumping
grounds for effects are also priceable and marketable re-
sources." Will this do?
It seems clear that it won't. There does not appear
to be any market which we prevent from smerging when we adopt
an alternative assignment of entitlements which permits Luke
to use the chemical provided that he compensates Matthew for
the destruction of his tomato plants. Furthermore, it would
appear that markets for dumping grounds would emerge even
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when we adopt the view that a person who must decide where
to build and operate a factory is permitted to build and
operate on any land which he has legitimately acquired pro-
vided that he pays full compensation to those upon whom his
factory dumps its effects. The assignment of entitlements
will not make him indifferent about where to build. How much
full compensation costs will be depends upon how many people
it dumps its effects on and who those people are. People
with different tastes and different amounts of money will
require different amounts to make them indifferent between
receiving that amount and being a dumping g=ound .and not rae-
ceiving anything and not being a dumping ground, Since pay-
ment of full compensation will only be one cost of operating
a factory, since it would be extremely risky to build a fac-
tory without some reasonable estimate of what those costs
would be, and since it would be extremely expensive to find
.out what those costs would be, the rational strategy for our
factory builder to adopt would be:
First, pick the sites which are the cheapest for
reasons which have nothing to do with the costs
of paying full compensation to those upon whom
the factory will dump its effects, This will
involve checking whether the site is near a source
of the type of labor which will be needed, whether
it is near existing transportation facilities,
177
and whether it is near a supply of the natural
resources which will be needed. Then, make bids
to the people in each of those areas for the right
to dump the factory's effects upon them. Finally,
choose the site which is, all things considered,
the cheapest site for operating the factory.
We must recall that a person is liable to punishment when
he does the joint act of crossing the borders defined by
another's rights and failing to pay compensation. It follows
that it would be extremely irrational to open a factory
without first ascertaining the costs of paying full compen-
sation to those upon whom the factory dumps its effects.
Although Luke risks neither bankruptcy nor punishment, since
he can reasonably estimate the value of Jake's tomato plants,
the factory owner who simply goes ahead and builds appears to
risk both. For these reasons it is reasonable to say that
most people who end up as dumping grounds for effects will
receive market compensation and that markets for dumping
grounds will emerge.
We must stop and wonder, however, whether it is legi-
timate for Nozick to defend a particular assignment of entitle-
ments in case 2) on the ground that it is the only assignment
which will lead to the emergence of a market. Isn't this
approach clearly incompatible with I? When Nozick discusses
the problem of how to assign entitlements when a person does
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a non-aggressive risky act he is insistent that we must
evaluate each risky act as an isolated act. How can he argue
that it is reasonable to adopt I as a constraint when we
solve that problem but not when we solve the problem of
assigning entitlements when a person does a non-aggressive
act which is certain to cross another's boundary? I am not
suggesting that he should adopt I as a constraint in the
latter case. In fact, it will become clear that I believe
that he should reject it as a constraint in both cases,
4,4 The Emergent Problem of Non-Aqqressive Acts:
I have, I believe, established that the distinction
between acts that are certain to cross another's boundary and
acts which only create a risk of crossing another's boundary
is not the distinction which Nozick wants for solving the
problem of how to assign entitlements in cases of semi-
productive exchange where the person has a legitimate pur-
pose for doing his act. The important distinction appears
to be between the following types of acts:
1. those which threaten (i.e., are certain to
cross or create a risk of crossing) the boundary
established by another's rights whdre the agent
uses the crossing of the boundary as a means to
his ends or as his end.
2. those which threaten to cross the boundary
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defined by another's rights where the crossing
is merely incidental to the agent's pursuit of
a legitimate end.
PE applies to acts of the first type which are certain to
cross the boundaries established by another's rights. It
would appear that a principle similar to PE should apply to
acts of the first type which only create a risk of crossing
the other's boundaries. Additional principles are needed
for acts of the second type. In order to determine which
type a particular act is we must examine the relation between
the person's reasons for doing the act and the crossing.
We must ask whether he was using the crossing as a means to
his end or whether the crossing was merely incidental to his
pursuit of his end. It is appropriate that Nozick, who
appeals to the root idea that it is never permissible to use
another merely as a means, should be forced to ask this
question. Any future development of his theory must cer-
tainly tell us more about how to distinguish between crossings
which are means to a person's ends and crossings which are
merely incidental to the pursuit of a person's ends.
Even if we grant Nozick his apparent belief that PE
and UP are acceptable principles for solving the problems
to which each applies, he must still solve the problem of
when it is permissible to prohibit an act which threatens
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anothe='s boundary when one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
1. the act is a non-aggressive act.
20. the crossing will be an incidental side effect
of the agent's pursuit of a legitimate end,
3. the prohibition of the act will leave the
agent worse off than he would have been in a
situation in which the person whose boundary is
threatened did not exist at all or had nothing
to do with him.,
This type of problem is emergent relative to the supposedly
clear beliefs we have in cases where PE and UP apply. Fur-
thermore, we can confidently say that Nozick does not offer
any compelling theoretical reason for his apparent belief
that we should adopt one solution when the act is certain to
cross another's boundary and a different solution when the
act only creates a risk of crossing another's boundary.
Nozick's apparent belief becomes all the more puzzling when
we note just how different the solutions he-proposes are
from each other.
With regard to non-aggressive acts which are certain
to cross boundaries he appears to adopt the view, as seen
in his discussion of dumping grounds, that the person who
wants to do. the act must pay market compensation for the
181
right to do it. This position is extremely non-libertarian.
Where has the presumption in favor of liberty gone? With
regard to non-aggressive acts which only create a risk of
crossing another's boundary we shall see that he essentially
adopts the view that it is permissible to prohibit only when
a) the risk is so great that it will create uncompensated-
for-fear and b) the person whose act is prohibited is com-
pensated for any disadvantages which he suffers as a result
of the prohibition. This position is extremely libertarian. 1 0
It pays great deference to the presumption in favor of
liberty.
In the remaining three sections I am going to examine
Nozick's solution to the problem of how to assign entitlements
in cases of non-aggressive risky acts. Unlike the problem of
how to assign entitlements in cases of non-aggressive acts
which are certain to cross another's boundary, he discusses
this problem at length., Since his solution in cases of non-
aggressive acts which are certain to cross is presented in a
footnote and is apparently inconsistent with other things he
says, it is best to assume that he owes us a solution. I
will not simply assume, even though the assumption is
reasonable, that the solution which applies in cases of risk
should also apply in cases of certainty. In the next section
I will consider whether Nozick can offer any compelling
reasons why we should adopt F and I as constraints on
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solutions to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky
acts - the problem of how to assign entitlements to perform
non-aggressive risky acts.
,•
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ARE F AND. I DEFENSIBLE CONSTRAINTS?
5,1 Aims:
I will examine five arguments which Nozick might offer
to defend the view that we should solve the emergent problem
of non-aggressive risky acts in a way which is compatible
with F and I. They are:
1. The individualist anarchist, whose doubts about
the possibility of providing a justification of the
state we are trying to answer, will only accept a
solution which is compatible with F and I.1
2, It. is only by appealing to principles which are
compatible with F and I that we will be able to
provide an invisible hand explanation of the state.
3. It is only by appealing to principles which are
compatible with F and I that we will be able to
provide a fundamental explanation of the political
realm.
4. The root ideas of the correct moral theory,
which are firmly grounded in our clear beliefs
about people's entitlements in situations of pro-
ductive exchange and unproductive exchange, commit
us to principles which are-s:compatible with F and I.
5, A moral theory which includes only principles
which are compatible with F and I is, other things
equal, preferable to a moral theory which includes
principles which are not compatible with F and I
as well as principles which are. Since principles
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which are not compatible with F and I have no
advantages over principles which are we must, on
grounds of simplicity, accept principles which are.
I do not claim that Nozick actually offers each of the above
arguments. Unfortunately, Nozick never offers a systematic
defense of his use of F and I. All we can do, therefore,
is explain how F and I are related to other theses which
play a prominent role in the book and examine whether these
other theses provide any support for his commitment to F
and I. Finally, in the last section of the chapter I will
bring the reader's attention to the fact that Nozick appears
to give up F and I as constraints on solutions to the
emergent problem of non-abundance. This will raise the
question of whether it is coherent for Nozick to insist on
F and I as constraints one, solutions to one problem but not
another.
5,2 The Need to Answer the Anarchist:
We have already seen that the anarchist has doubts
about the possibility of providing a justification of the
state which Nozick accepts. Nozick might want to say that
since the anarchist only accepts principles which are com-
patible with F and I we can only answer his doubts to his
satisfaction by appealing to principles which are compatible
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with F and I and which can be used to justify the state.
We might, therefore, want to prove to the anarchist that
even he must accept some principles for solving the problem
of when any person acting alone in the state of nature is
entitled to prohibit another person from performing a risky
act or using a risky procedure. We might then try to show
him that these principles can also be used to justify a
prohibition on the use of procedures for determining
whether or not one person has violated another person's
rights which subject innocent people to too high a risk of
being found guilty. A person's rights are violated when
he is punished for doing an act which he did not do. This
will be part of an argument to show him that, contrary to
his initial doubts, the state can offer a justification of
its prohibition on his private enforcement of his rights
which he must accept. This argument will be of purely aca-
demic interest, however, unless it is preceded by an argu-
ment that the moral theory which the anarchist appeals to
is the correct moral theory. Just as Nozick is not inter-
ested in whether act utilitarian or perfectionist principles
can be used to provide a justification of the state because
those principles are unacceptable, we are not interested
in whether the anarchist's principles can be used to provide
a justification of the state if those principles are not
acceptable. Therefore, we ask the anarchist, as we have
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already asked Nozick,. to justify his belief that the correct
moral theory must accept F and I as constraints on the
solution to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky
acts.
Furthermore, the reader should recall that there is
no necessary connection between the anarchist's commitment
to F and I and his, doubts about the possibility of providing
a justification of the state. We can imaegine an anarchist
who concedes that the correct solution to the emergent
problem of non-aggressive risky acts is inconsistent with
both F and I because it sometimes appeals to established
public rules which satisfy law bound principles. We can
even imagine that he further believes that once we accept
law bound principles we must also accept the natural position.
That is, he believes that law bound principles create the
need for the special principles included in the natural
position including principles which are used to~ evaluate
publication, enforcement, and collection procedures. Still,
he may have doubts about the possibility of providing a
justification of the state because he believes that there
are some principles which any person acting alone in the
state of nature is entitled to enforce. He does not have
to believe, as a person who accepts F does, that all enforce-
able principles are principles which any person acting alone
in the state of nature is entitled to enforce, So long as
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he believes that there are some principles which any person
acting alone in the state of nature is entitled to enforce,
he has reason to wonder how any state can justify a prohibi-
tion on the private enforcement of these principles. An
argument that any person acting alone in the state of nature
is entitled to enforce PE is sufficient to throw doubt on
the possibility of providing a justification of the state!
5.3 Invisible Hand ExDlanati.ons;
We are now in a position to see that even a person
who rejects both F and I can still explain how a state would
naturally arise from a state of nature by morally permissible
means without anybody intending it. Nozick,::calls this type
of explanation an "invisible-hand explanation" and believes
that there is something especially satisfying about it:
There is a certain lovely quality to explana-
tions of this sort. They show how some overall
pattern or design, which one would have thought
had to be produced by an individual's or group's
successful attempt to realize the pattern, instead
was produced and maintained by a process that in
no way had the overall pattern or design "in mind."
After Adam Smith, we shall call such explanations
invisible hand explanations. 2
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Regardless of whether. we adopt Nozick's enthusiasm for invi-
sible hand explanations we should note that it is one thing
to provide an invisible hand explanation of the political
realm and quite another to provide an invisible hand explana-
tion of the state.
A person who rejects both F and I in favor of law
bound principles and the natural position cannot provide an
invisible hand explanation of the political realm. On his
view people who found themselves in the state of nature and
who acted on the correct moral principles would certainly
intend to establish a political realm. They would act on
the natural duty to establish and maintain just publication,
enforcement, and collection procedures. On this view it
is trivial to explain how a political realm, or central
authority, would emerge from the state of nature by morally
permissible means. The central authority which emerged,
however, would not be a state. Its justly selected officials
would alone have the rights to publish and enforce the laws
that are needed to satisfy the law bound principles. They
would not, however, have any special right to enforce the
principles which any person acting alone in the state of
nature is entitled to enforce. Therefore, the establishment
of a political realm with just publication, enforcement,
and collection procedures does not amount to the establish-
ment of a state. We can still give an invisible hand
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explanation of the state if we can explain how this central
authority can justify each of the following as an incidental
side effect of its legitimate pursuit of some other aim:
I. a prohibition on the private enforcement of
those principles which any person acting alone in
the state of nature is entitled to enforce.
2.- the provision of free protective, services to
those people, in the area who do not -. have the means
to pay for the protective services which the central
authority provides to all in the area.
Unless the central authority can justify each of the above
3it will fall short of being a state. Furthermore, if it
justifies each as the side effect of its pursuit of a legi-
timate aim, then it will become a state by an invisible hand
4process.4  That is, it will become a state without anybody
intending it to become a state. Therefore, we can conclude
that Nozick cannot justify his commitment to F and I on the
ground:rthat this commitment is necessary to keep open the
possibility of providing an invisible hand explanation of
the state. A person who rejects both F and I in favor of
law bound principles and the natural position may also be
able to provide an invisible hand explanation of the state.
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5,4 Fundamental Explanations of the Political Realm:
One reason why Nozick believes that an invisible hand
explanation of a realm is so satisfying is that it is' often
also a fundamental explanation of a realm. We ~should not
only aspire to provide an invisible hand explanation of the
state, we should also aspire to provide a fundamental ex-
planation of the political realm. Consider the following:
The possible ways of understanding the political
realm are as follows: (1) to fully explain it in
terms of the non-political; (2) to view it as emerg-
ing from the non-political but not reducible to it,
a mode of organization of non-political factors
understandable only in terms of novel political
principles; ar (3) to view it as a completely
autonomous realm. Since only the first promises
full understanding of the whole political realm,
it. stands as the most desirable theoratical alter-
native, to be abandoned only if known to be impossible.
Let us call this most desirable and complete kind of
explanation of a realm a fundamental explanation of
the realm. 5
Fundamental explanations of a realm are explanations
of a realm in other terms; they make no use of any
of the notions of the realm. Only via such explan-
ations can we understand everything about a realm;
the less our explanations use notions constituting
what is to be explained, the more (ceteris paribus)
we understand. 6
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It is important to note that Nozick is only interested in
moral explanations of the political realm. He does not,
as far as I can tell, make any distinction between providing
an explanation of the political realm and providing a justi-
fication of the political realm; explaining how it would
arise from the state of nature by morally permissible means.
Providing a justification of the political realm and pro-
viding an explanation o.f the political realm are the same
thing. We can go from a justification. (explanation) of
the political realm to a justification (explanation) of the
state by taking the additional step of explaining how any
political realm which emerges by morally permissible means
will become a state by morally permissible means.
It milht now appear that Nozick has a good argument
for his commitment to F and I. A person who accepts law
bound principles which are incompatible with F and I will
have to face the difficult problems of who is entitled to
publish and enforce the laws which are needed to satisfy
those principles. He will, almost certainly, accept the
natural position. Once he adopts the natural position,
however, he will no longer be able to provide a fundamental
explanation of the political realm. This is because some
of the principles which are included in the natural position
are themselves political principles. The principles which
enable us to say which publication, enforcement, and
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collection procedures are just procedures are certainly
political principles, When these are supplemented by a
natural duty to establish just procedures it becomes clear
that a person who accepts the natural position cannot provide
a fundamental explanation of the political realm. His ex-
planation clearly makes use of "the notions of the realm."
The conclusion we should draw is that if we want to gain
full understanding of the political realm, then we should
retain our commitment to F and I and avoid law bound princi-
ples and the natural position.
This argument goes much too quickly. Let us return
to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts. For
the purpose of constructing an acceptable moral theory, jg
sole issue is what the owtimal solution to that emergent
problem is. It is no argument for (or against) a solution
that it can (or cannot) be used to provide a fundamental
explanation of the political realm. If we can argue that
a) the optimal solution must appeal to law bound principles
which are not compatible with F and I and b) these principles
create the need for the special political principles which
are included in the natural position, then how can Nozick
claim that our understanding of the political realm is
deficient? Where is it deficient? What understanding do
we lack?
Since Nozick never gives an example of either a type
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(2) or a type (3) explanation of the political realm I
cannot say whether the explanation I have described, which
appeals to the special principles included in the natural
position, falls under either of these types. It should be
clear, however, that an argument for this type of explana-
tion need not, as Nozick suggests it must, include an argu-
ment that it is impossible to provide a fundamental explana-
tion of the political realm. Moral theories are available
which enable us to provide fundamental explanations of the
political realm. Nozick must concede this point. The act-
utilitarian explanation of the political realm is a funda-
mental explanation since it explains the political realm
without appealing to any special political principles.
Nozick would not, however, accept the act utilitarian theory,
even if he became convinced that it was the only theory
which could be used to provide a fundamental explanation.
This is because the act utilitarian explanation appeals to
an unacceptable moral theory. Similarly, we can reject any
other fundamental explanation which appeals to an unaccep-
table moral theory. This consideration merely brings us
back to the point that the real issue, and the only issue,
is what the optimal solution to the emergent problem of
non-aggressive risky acts is.
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5,5 The Root Ideas:
We now turn to the question of whether there are reasons
internal to moral theory which Nozick can use to justify his
commitment to F and I. Can we appeal to the root ideas of
Nozick's moral theory to get an answer? These root ideas
include a) no person may be sacrificed for the benefit of
any other person, b) it is never permissible to use another
person merely as a means, c) no person is a resource for
any other person, and d) each person is individually respon-
sible for choosing his life plan. These root ideas can,
perhaps, be used to explain how we should assign entitlements
in cases of productive exchange and in cases of unproductive
exchange. Furthermore, they may even explain why it is
appropriate to assign entitlements in these cases in a way
which is compatible with F and I. These root ideas do not,
however, force any conclusion about how to assign entitle-
ments in most cases where any choice of entitlements will
leave at least one party with the complaint that he is worse
off than he would have been in the situation in which the
other did not exist at all or had nothing to do with him.
If we accept F and I as constraints on how to assign entitle-
ments in these cases, then we must view each act as an
isolated conflict between two people in the stats of nature.
With regard to non-aggressive risky acts we must abstract
from the fact that the person who is a risk creator in a
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particular situation will also be a risk bearer in another
similar situation. Nozick does not, so far as I can taell,
ever argue that a commitment to any of the four root ideas
listed above forces us to make this abstraction.
There is, however, a fifth root idea. It is the pre-
sumption in favor of liberty. This presumption may appear
to favor solutions which are compatible with F and I. By
examining each non-aggressive risky act as an isolated act
we will,'almost certainly have to conclude that very few are
serious enough to prohibit. So, for instance, we will not
be able to prohibit an act on the ground that it is a
member of a group of acts whose cumulative effect is to
produce a risk that is so serious that it would be permissible
to prohibit any single act which created that risk. We
cannot, however, go straight from the fact that the presump-
tion in favor of liberty provides a reason to favor solutions
which are compatible with F and I to the conclusion that we
must adopt F and I as constraints on solutions. We need an
additional argument that none of the other root ideas provides
a reason for favoring a competing solution. Nozick does not,
as far as I can tell, offer this additional argument. Fur-
thermore, this argument is almost certain to fail. A
solution which permits the largest number of risky acts will
have its costs as well as its benefits. Its main benefit
is that it will give each person the largest number of
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options to pursue his ends. Its main costs are that it
increases the likelihood that each person will be a victim
of another's risky act and, therefore, that it increases the
amount of fear that each person will suffer. The root idea
that no person is a resource for any other person would
appear to provide a reason for favoring a competing solution
which provides each person with more protection against being
a victim of another's risky act. Furthermore, the pxesump-
tion in favor of liberty itself would appear to provide"
a reason for favoring a competing solution which creates
less fear. To the extent that fear of having our plans
interrupted without our consent lessens the value of our
liberty, we would expect the presumption in favor of liberty
to require a compromise between the advantages of having
options kept open and the disadvantages of being interfered
with arbitrarily. We canr conclude that Nozick's root ideas
do not provide him with a compelling reason for accepting
F and I as constraints on solutions to the emergent problem
of non-aggressive risky acts.
5 6 Simplicit:
We now come t-o the last argument which is an argument
from simplicity. This argument will only work if Nozick can
establish that his solution, which is compatible with F and
I, has all of the desirable properties of the best solution
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which is not compatible with F and I. Once we see that the
root ideas of Nozick's theory do not force us to accept F
and I as constraints then we must look for an emergent con-
straint which will enable us to pick out the optimal solution
form all of the solutions which are compatible with those
root ideas. It may, of course, turn out that the optimal
solution is a solution which is compatible with F and I.
Its claim to being the optimal solution will not, however,
be that it is compatible with F and I. It will be that it
best satisfies the emergent constraint.
The emergent constraint should identify a property
which can be used to rank competing solations and which will
be acceptable to people who a) accept Nozick's account of
the root ideas, b) concede that these root ideas do not
force a conclusion on how to solve the emergent problem,
and c) are willing to adopt an impartial point of view for
solving the emergent problem. I suggest that the following
constraint is a reasonable constraint:
People who accept the principles which that
solution appeals to will generally agree that the
conflicts which those principles are intended to
resolve are resolved in an impartial manner rather
than in a manner which rewflects the relative power
of each of the parties to the conflict.
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I will eventually axgue that Nozick's solution to the emer-
gent problem of non-aggressive risky acts falls far short
of satisfying this apparently innocuous .constraint. Further-
more, I will argue that it should be rejected in favor of a
solution which rejects F and I in favor of law bound prin-
ciples and the natural position.
5.7 A Qiuestion About the Coherence of Nozick'"s Theory:
I have examined the arguments which Nozick might give
to justify his commitment to F and I as constraints on solu-
tions to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts.
I have, I believe, established that none of these arguments
forces the conclusion that he must adopt F and I. Now I
will show that Nozick's commitment to F and I as constraints
on solutions to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts is
especially puzzling since he does not appear to accept them
as constraints on solutions to the emergent problem of
non-abundance. Unless Nozick can explain why they are
appropriate as constraints on solutions to one problem but
not the other, he is open to the charge that his theory is
incoherent.
We have already noted that Nezick believes that we
have extremely clear beliefs about how to evaluate distri-
butions of natural resources and the benefits which result
from their uses in conditions of abundance.0 He believes
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that in conditions of abundance we have clear beliefs that
the system which permits bequesathable property rights in
natural resources is justifiable., Furthermore, we have
clear beliefs that in these conditions a person is entitled
to all that, he has legitimately acquired and that we can
determine what he has legitimately acquired without appealing
to an established set of public rules which satisfies a law
bound principle. He is confident that in conditions of
abundance we can evaluate distributions of natural resources
and the benefits which result from their uses without
appealing to principles which are incompatible with F and I.
The emergent problem of noa-abundance is the problem
of how to evaluate distributions of natural resources and
the benefits which result from their uses in conditions in
which natural resources are no longer abundant. Then,
Nozick realizes, the appropriations of bequeathable property
rights in natural resources by some people will eventually
make other people worse off by depriving them of the oppor-
tunity to appropriate bequeathable property rights in
resources of that kind or, more weekly, by making them un-
free to use resources of that kind freely. He insists,
without argument, that a person does not have a complaint
when another's appropriation makes him worse off by de-
priving him of the opportunity to appropriate. 11  He concedes,
however, that a person does have a complaint when another's
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appropriation makes him unfree to use resources freely. Con-
sequently, he concedes that a justification of a system
which permits the appropriation of bequeathable property
rights in non-abundant natural resources must establish that
the workings of the system provide all those who are bound
to obey its requirements with benefits which compensate them
for their loss of liberty to use natural resources freely.
He believes that we have satisfied the Lockean proviso that
there be "enough and as good left in common for others" when
we show that the workings of the system which permits appro-
priations of bequeathable property rights provides. these
compensating benefits to all.12 On. his view we can -answer
a person who lives in twentieth century America and complains
of injustice on the ground that he is no longer at liberty
to use beaches, forests, or farmland freely by showing him
that he is better off in his present situation than he
would have been in a pre-institutional state of nature
prior to the workings of the system of private property. 1 3
My purpose is not to criticize Nozick's solution to
the emergent problem of non-abundance. I will grant him
his assumptions a) that a person does not have a complaint
which gives rise to a claim for compensation when he is
deprived of the opportunity to appropriate bequeathable
property rights in non-abundant natural resources; b) that
it is appropriate to count as compensation for a person's
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loss of liberty to use natural resources freely the benefits
which redound to all as a result of the workings of the sys-
tem of private property; and c) that we can justify the
system which permits bequeathable property rights in non-
abundant natural resources without comparing its consequences
with the consequences of alternative systems which can be
used to solve the emergent problem of non-abundance. All
that I want to show is that even when we grant Nozick all of
these .),assumptions, which certainly help him avoid solutions
which appeal to traditional law bound principles of distri-
butive justice, which are incompatible with F and I, he still
appears to accept a solution which is incompatible with F
and I. Consider the following quote:
If my appropriating all of a certain substance
violates the Lockean proviso, then so does my
appropriating some and purchasing all the rest
from others who obtained it without otherwise
violating the Lockean proviso. If the proviso
excludes someone's appropriating- all of the
drinkable water in the world, it also excludes
his purchasing it all. (More weakly, and mess-
ily, it may exclude charging certain prices for
some of his supply.) This proviso (almost) never
will come into effect; the more someone acquires
of a scarce substance which others want, the
higher the price of the rest will go, end the
more difficult it will be for him to acquire
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it all. But still, we can imagine, at least, that
something like this occurs: someone makes simul-
taneous secret bids to the separate owners of a
substance, each of whom sells assuming that he can
easily purchase from other owners, or some natural
catastrophe destroys all of the supply of something
except that in one person's possession. The total
supply could not be permissibly appropriated by one
person at the beginning. His later acquisition
does not show that the original appropriation vio-
lated the proviso.... Rather, it is the combination
of the original appropriation plus all the later
transfers and actions which violates the Lockean
proviso.14
I believe that this quote establishes two important points.
First, it establishes that Nozick believes that the task of
satisfying the Lockean proviso is a joint task which people
are collectively responsible for satisfying. Even though
he believes that the system of private property works in
ways which almost certainly preclude the possibility of
innocent violations of the Lockean proviso, he recognizes
that such violations are possible. Second, this quote can
be used to establish that Nozick is willing to give up both
F and I when he faces the problem of how to rectify innocent
violations of the Lockean proviso. I will discuss I first.
It would appear that each person in Nozick's example
who sells his water can claim that his act of selling water
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is not serious enough to warrant interference when it is
considered as an isolated act. Nozick must hold the position,
however, that it is permissible to use force to void at
least some of the sales which led to the violation of the
Lockean proviso, Can't any one of the person's whose sale
is voided complain that this use of force is inconsistent
with a commitment to I?
Perhaps Nozick can save I by noting that the seller
will not complain if we void his contract since he does not
want to live in a world in which he must pay monopoly prices
for water. He wants his contract voided and his water back.
It is only the buyer who would complain and the buyer cannot
appeal to I for a complaint. This is because each of his
contracts was not independent of his other contracts. We
can, however, easily change the example to overcome this
objection. We can assume that he sent out secret bids which
covered 90 percent of the supply and that he was willed, much
to his surprise, the remaining 10 percent. Or we can assume
that the remaining 10 percent was destroyed as a result of
a natural catastrophe. In either case his secret bids were
not serious enough to warrant interference, when considered
independently of the actions of others who were acting
independently of him.
It is even clearer that this example shows that Nozick
has to give up F. Who is entitled to use force to rectify
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this violation of the Lockean proviso? Is it plausible to
claim that any person acting alone in a state of nature is
entitled to use force to rectify this violation? What is
he entitled to do? Is he entitled to void all of the con-
tracts? It would appear that the buyer can complain if
more than one contract is voided on the ground that it is
only necessary to void one in order to return to a situation
in which the proviso is satisfied. If more than one is
voided he can complain that another is using force to void
a contract which is not serious enough to void when it is
considered independently of the acts of others who are acting
independently of him. But which one is he entitled to void?
Each person wants his contract voided because he would like
to be one of the two people in the world with a supply of
drinkable water. Is any person acting alone in the state of
nature entitled to decide which one to void? If these con-
siderations do not convince the reader that Nozick must give
up F, then he should reconsider the following:
More weakly, and messily, it §/wning all the
drinkable water in the worlA7 may exclude his
charging certain prices for some of his supply.1 5
Certainly, Nozick does not want to say that any person acting
alone in the state of nature is entitled to fix prices on
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what some people can charge others for the natural resources
which they have legitimately acquired.
The conclusion which I wish to draw from our discussion
in this section is that we can say that Nozick cannot, with-
out further explanation, have it both ways. He cannot say
that F and I are constraints on how to solve the problem of
cumulative risk but are not constraints on how to solve the
emergent problem of non-abundance. He cannot say that the
problem of cumulative risk is merely an inconvenience of
remaining in the state of nature while the problem of unin-
tended violations of the Lockean proviso is not. I am not
suggesting that Nozick should adopt the view that the latter
problem is also a mere inconvenience of remaining in the
state of nature and, therefore, that it will provide people
in the state of nature with a reason to establish a central
authority with the right, through their consent, to publish
and enforce laws which will assure that there are no viola-
tions. My own view, as I have made clear, is that he should
change his view on cumulative risk. I am only suggesting
that he owes us an explanation for treating the two cases
differently.
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THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATION
6.j Aims:
In this section I will examine the principle which
Nozick appeals to in order to solve the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts. I hope to establish that the solution
which we get by appealing, to this principle is defective on
two counts. First, it assigns entitlements to perform and
to prohibit non-aggressive risky acts which people would
regard as inconvenient. Second, it provides counter-inteui-
tive solutions to many aspects of the problem of non-aggres-
sive risky acts. After I have established that his principle
has these shortcomings, I will examine Nozick's beliefs
about the relevance of considerations of fairness to the
solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts. I
hope to establish that any theory which is committed to F
and I as constraints on solutions cannot assign an appro-
priate weight to considerations of fairness.
6.2 The Principle of Compensation:
The heart of Nozick's solution to the problem of non-
aggressive risky acts is contained in the following:
What about those cases where only the first con-
dition of unproductive exchange is satisfied, not
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the second: X is no better off as a result of
the exchange than if Y didn't exist at all, but
Y does have some, motive other than selling
abstention. If from.Y's abstention from an
activity X gains only a lessened probability of
having his own border crossed (a crossing whose
intentional performance is prohibited), then Y
need be compensated only for the disadvantages
imposed on him by the prohibition of only those
activities serious enough to justify prohibition
in this manner.,
In order to apply this principle, which Nazick calls "the
principle of compensation," we must be told which acts are
"serious enough to justify prohibition in this manner."
Nozick certainly wants to say that an act is serious enough
when it has the following property:
The failure to prohibit the act, when the act is
considered independently of the acts of other
people who are acting independently of the agent,
will cause uncompensated-for-fear in those people
whose boundaries it threatens. 2
It is because an epileptic's act of driving a car has this
property that we are permitted to prohibit his driving. 3
It is because a factory owner's use of a very risky manu-
facturing process has this-.property that we are also
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permitted to prohibit his use of that process.4  Nozick also
wants to say that we can identify which acts are serious
enough to justify prohibition by appealing to the following
principle:
If someone knows that doing act A would violate
Qts rights unless condition C obtained, he may
not do A unless he has ascertained that C obtains
through being in the best possible position for
5
ascertaining this.
Nozick uses this principle to explain why it is sometimes
justifiable to prohibit the use of a risky procedure to
determine whether people are liable to punishment for vio-
lating the law of nature even when one person's use of thqt
procedure does not cause uncompensated for fear. Any proce-
dure for determining guilt will subject innocent people to
some risk of being found guilty and, therefore, to some risk
of having their rights violated. When a person uses a pro-
cedure which is too risky compared to the best procedures
available, then it is permissible to prohibit his use of it
provided that he is compensated for any disadvantages which
he suffers as a result of the prohibition. Nozick is vague
about how to determine what the best available procedure is
and whether a particular procedure is too risky.6  He appears
to believe, however, that a procedure may be too risky
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compared to the best procedure even when a person's use of it,
instead of the best procedure, does not cause uncompensated
for ..Far,
Nozick' never explains how a person in the state of
nature is supposed to apply the principle of compensation.
It would appear to me, however, that its application usually
involves three steps:
1. You must explain to the person who-wants to
perform the risky act that it is an act which you
are permitted to prohibit.
2. You prohibit him' from doing the act. That is,
you warn him that he will be subjected to punishment,
rega.dless of whether his act actually crosses any
person's boundary, if he does the act.
3. You offer him an amount of goods which will com-
pensate him for any disadvantages which he suffers
as a result of the prohibition.
If you do all of these things, then you are entitled to
punish him for doing the risky act. It does not matter, so
long as the compensation which you offer is adequate,
whether he accepts the compensation. In the absence of a
public warning that he will be punished for doing his non-
aggressive risky act you are only entitled to punish him
for failing to compensate those whose boundaries are actually
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crossed as a result of his performance of the risky act.
Nozick does not, and he is aware that he does not,
ever defend the principle of compensation. He writes:
With some justice, I think, I could claim that
it is all right as a beginning to leave a principle
in a somewhat fuzzy state; the primary question is
whether something like it will do. 9
He does, however, offer the following to explain its
plausibility:
One might view compensation for disadvantages as a
compromise arrived at because one cannot decide
between two attractive but incompatible positions:
(1) no payment, because dangerous persons may be
restrained and so there is a right to restrain
them; (2) full compensation, because the person
might live unrestrained without actually harming
anyone, and so there is no right to restrain him.
But prohibition with compensation is not a "split
the difference" compromise between two equally
attractive alternative positions, one of which is
correct but we don't know which. Rather, it
seems to me to be the correct position that fits
the (moral) vector resultant of the opposing
weighty considerations, each of which must be
taken into account somehow.10
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Since Nozick offers no argument for the principle of com-
pensation we can only evaluate it by asking whether it has
acceptable implications and is consistent with other posi-
tions which Nozick accepts.
6.3 The Conceot of Being Distdvantaped Relative to the
Normal Situation:
In order to explain why the principle is problematic
we must begin by examining the. concept of disadvantage which
he uses when he states the principle. Nozick concedes that
he does not have a theory of disadvantage, He writes:
One might use a theary of disadvantage, if one had
it, in order to formulate a "Principle of Compen-
sation:" these who are disadvantaged by being for-
bidden to do actions that only ~jgfl harm others
must be compensated for these disadvantages foisted
upon them in order to provide security for others.11
The following quotes should give the reader some idea of
what Nozick has in mind when he uses the concept of dis-
advantage:
Some types of actions are generally done, play
an important role in people's lives, and are not
forbidden to a person without seriously disad-
vantaging him. 1 2
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The idea is to .focus on important activities done
by almost all, though some do them more dangerously
than others.1 3
Furthermore, he gives the following examples to contrast
prohibitions which merely make another worse off with pro-
hibitions which disadvantage:
1. We do not disadvantage a manufacturer when we
prohibit him from using a very efficient but very
risky means of manufacturing and, consequently,
cause him to suffer a decrease in profits. We
only disadvantage him when the prohibition leaves
him no other way to earn a living.14
2. We do not disadvantage a person when we prohibit
him from driving a car in an automobile dependent
society unless the prohibition forces him to work
in the cash market to accumulate the resources to
hire a chauffeur or take taxis.
3. We do not disadvantage a person when we prohibit
him from "playing Russian roulette on another with a
gun of 100,000 chambers" unless that is his only
way of having any enjoyment.'6
The second example brings out the point that whether or not
a person is disadvantaged by a prohibition may depend on
how wealthy he is. This raises the question, which we will
examine later, whether the principle of compensation is
unfair to the wealthy.
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Whether or not a person is disadvantaged by a prohibi-
tion depends upon comparative considerations. We must com-
pare his situation with the prohibition and without compen-
sation with "the normal situation." If his situation prior
to the prohibition is at or above the normal situation and
his situation after the prohibition is below the normal
situation, then the compensation must bring him back to the
normal situation. It does not have to bring him back to
his situation prior to the prohibition. What happens,
however, when his situation prior to the prohibition is
below the normal situation and his reason for doing the risky
act is to reach the normal situation? What compensation is
he entitled to when this risky act is prohibited? A com-
plete development of Nozick's theory must include an answer
to this question. More basically, it must include an account
of what the normal situation is. Is it the normal situation
in his society? Is the normal situation some measure of the
average well being in his society? Does it change for the
worse when there is a mass immigration (emigration) of poor
(rich) people into the society?1 8
It is clear that people who do not have access to a
theory of disadvantage will often disagree on how to apply
the principle of compensation. Even if they agree on a)
which risky acts are serious enough to prohibit, b) when a
person is disadvantaged by a prohibition, and c) what counts
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as adequate compensation for the disadvantage, there would
still be serious disagreements about how to apply the prin-
ciple. Recall that Nozick's statement of the principle
includes the following remark:
If from Y's abstention from an activity X gains
only a lessened probability of having his own
border crossed (a crossing whose intentional per-
formance is prohibited), then Y need be compensated
only for the disadvantages imposed upon him by the
prohibition of only those activities which are
serious enough to justify prohibition in this
manner,.1
What is appropriate compensation when X gains more from the
prohibition than a lessened probability of having his own
border crossed? Is he permitted to prohibit only if he
shares the additional benefits which he gains with Y? Does
the answer depend on whether his main reason for prohibiting
was to gain the lessened probability of having his border
crossed rather than the additional benefits? Nozick makes
no attempt to answer these questions. They are, however,
important questions for him. He believes that those who
voluntarily a) give up their rights to enforce their rights,
b) agree to permit a central authority (what Nozick calls
"a protective association") to have the sole right to enforce
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their rights for them, and c) choose to prohibit the use of
risky procedures by those who do not give up their rights to
privately enforce their rights, must compensate those whose
actions they prohibit for any disadvantages which result
from their prohibitions. If their sole motive for prohibiting
is to lessen the likelihood that their borders will be
crossed, then it is relatively easy to determine what appro-
priate compensation is. We can remove the disadvantage
which a person suffers from a prohibition on his use of risky
procedures to enforce his rights by enforcing them for him.
We simply provide the person with free protection. 20 What
happens, however, when those who prohibit have an ulterior
motive for prohibiting? They may, for instance, prohibit
to attract new industry which is reluctant to locate in an
area which permits private enforcement of rights. Are those
whom they prohibit entitled to additional compensation in
this case? It appears that Nozick must say that they are.
He never tells us, however, what appropriate compensation
would be.
6 4 Resolving Conflicts Between the Rich and the Poor:
The principle of compensation would appear to be unfair
to the poor. It permits the prohibition of risky acts only
when those who are disadvantaged by the prohibition are com-
pensated for their disadvantages. Since the poor have fewer
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resources than the rich it would appear that they must
suffer greater risks. In many cases they will not be able
to invoke the principle of compensation to prohibit risky
acts and free themselves from risks because they will not
have the resources to compensate those whose risky acts they
wish to prohibit. In similar cases the rich will be able
to invoke the principle of compensation because they do have
the resources to pay the required compensation. Nozick
appears to be bothered by the charge that the principle of
compensation is unfair to the poor. This comes out in his
discussion of whether a subsistence farming community could
preventively restrain anyone. He writes:
Yes they may; but only if the restrainers give over
enough in an attempt to compensate, so as to make
about equivalent their own lessened positions
(lessened by their giving up goods and placing
them into the compensation pool) and the position
(with compensation) of- those restrained. The
restrained are still somewhat disadvantaged, but
no more than everyone else. A society is impoo-
verished with regard to a preventive restraint if
those restraining cannot compensate those restrained
for the disadvantages they impose without themselves
moving into a position that is disadvantaged; that
is, without themselves moving into a position
which would have been disadvantaged had only some
persons been moved into it. Impoverished societies
must carry out compensation for disadvantages
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until the positions of those restrained and those
unrestrained are made equivalent. 2 1
There are two preliminary things to note about this long
passage. First, Nozick appears to be saying that the right
to preventively restrain is possessed by a society. If he
is to remain consistent, then he must say that this right is
possessed by any member of that society when he is acting
alone in the state of nature.22 Second, we should note that
this quote arises during a discussion of the problem of pre-
ventive restraint. He distinguishes between two types of
cases where preventive restraint may seem appropriate. In
one type "people are viewed merely as mechanisms now set
into operation which will (or may) perform some wrong
action."23  In these cases we believe that the person is in-
capable of making a decision against acting wrongly and that
it is, therefore, appropriate to view his risky "acts" as
we view any other risky act. In the other type "the evil
(it is feared) the person may do really does hinge upon
decisions for wrong JFul behavioux which he has not yet
made."24  In these cases Nozick believes that deference to
considerations of individual responsibility make preventive
restraint unacceptable. Restraining people who are considered
to be deranged falls into the first category while restraining
ordinary peoplethrough gun control laws or curfews falls
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into the ..second. Since Nozick's modification of the principle
of compensation is certainly intended to apply to the first
type of case, which is considered to be merely another type
of risky act, we can fairly assume that he intends the
modification to apply to all risky acts.
It follows that a person who prohibits another's risky
act is only obligated to compensate the other for the dis-
advantages which result from the prohibition up to the point
where further compensation will leave him more disadvantaged
than the person whose act he prohibits. This implies that a
person who is extremely disadvantaged is permitted to prohibit,
without any costs to himself, any risky act which is serious
enough to prohibit. Is this fair to rich people who might
be made radically worse off by prohibitions on their risky
activities and who will not receive any compensation at all?
Suppose that some people who are extremely disadvantaged
move into an area where there is a factory whose operation
subjects them to such great risks of harm to their health
that they suffer uncompen sated-for-fear. It would appear
that they can give the factory owner the following ultimatum:
Either close down your factory or change your
methods of operation so that we are not subjected
to a level of risk which causes us to suffer un-
compensated-for- fear.
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The factory owner realizes that it is not economically
feasible for him to change to less risky procedures. What
obligations do those who prohibit have to the factory owner?
It seems clear that he will not, even though he is made radi-
cally worse off by the prohibition, be disadvantaged by it.
With his expert entrepeneurial skills he will certainly
be able to find a job elsewhere. Even if he is disadvantaged
by the prohibition it is unlikely that he will end up more
disadvantaged than those who prohibit. It would appear,
therefore, that those who prohibit have no obligations to
him. He must, as a moral person, simply take this change
of fortune in stride.25
What if the factory owner wanted to buy the right to
subject these disadvantaged people to these risks? There
would be tremendous transaction costs associated with such
an attempt and any new person who moved into the area would
still have the right to prohibit without any costs to himself,
There is a temptation here to say that the fact that the
factory was there first must make some difference, I do not,
however, see how Nozick can say this. Any justification
faor adopting a policy which gives weight to the fact that
one party was there first would appeal to the beneficial con-
sequences of adopting that'policy and would certainly be
incompatible with I.26 It certainly appears that the dis-
advantaged people do have the right to prohibit the continued
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operation of the factory and that it would be in their
interests to exercise that right.
The principle of compensation, which at first appears
to be unfair to the poor, turns out to be unfair to the rich,
There is further evidence that it resolves conflicts between
the rich and poor in an unsatisfactory : manner. Our intui-
tive belief is that the amount of risk a person is permitted
to impose on others without their consent is not a function
of his wealth. A commitment to the principle of compensation
forces us to change this belief. Let us focus on a risky
activity, such as the use of a very efficient but very risky
manufacturing process, which is serious enough to justify
prohibition. According to Nozick it is permissible to pro-
hibit its use by a rich person without paying him compensation
because the prohibition will not disadvantage him. Now let
us assume that there is a group of disadvantaged people who,
through charitable donations from others, have accumulated
enough money to open a factory. Their aim in opening the
factory is to escape their disadvantaged position and their
success in doing this depends on their use of this very
efficient but risky process. Those who will be subjected to
the risks which their use of the process creates are permitted
to prohibit their use only if they compensate them for the
disadvantages which result from the prohibition. In this
case the compensation would involve paying them enough
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money so that they are no longer disadvantaged! This would
be extremely expensive. It is, therefore, almost certain
that these disadvantaged people will be permitted to operate
their factory until they are no longer disadvantaged. At
that time others will prohibit their continued use of the
risky process and force.them to adopt the less risky processes
which their rich competitors use. Until that time, however,
others will simply have to bear the risks eand. the uncompen-
sated-.for-fear which goes with it.
Nozick defends the view that the state is not permitted
to use force to make the well off help the needy (many of
whom, we can assume, are also disadvantaged.) It turns out,
however, that his commitment to the principle of compensation
leads him to the view that the well off may, after all, have
to "help" some of the needy. They will be the unwilling
victims of the non-aggressive risky activities which the
disadvantaged needy must be permitted to pursue in their
attempts to escape their disadvantaged positions.
The point of this example, as was the point of the
previous one, is that the problem of how to assign entitle-
ments in cases of non-aggressive risky acts is an important
social problem. People are not indifferent to the solution
insofar as their lives and jobs may be at issue. Further-
more, Nozick's solution, which appeals to the principle
of compensation, assigns people inconvenient entitlements
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which lead to unreasonable resolutions of the conflicts
between risk creators and risk bearers. Nozick might con-
cede that people's natural entitlements in risky situations
are inconvenient. He appears to admit as much, as we shall
now see, when he discusses the problem of cumulative risk.
6.5 The Problem of Cumulative Risk:
Nozick introduces the problem of cumulative risk in the
following quote:
One action alone would not cause fear at all due
to the threshold, and one action less would probably
not diminish the fear, Our earlier considerations
about fear provide a case for the prohibition of this
totality of activities. But since parts of this
totality could occur without ill consequence, it
would be unnecessarily stringent to ban each and
every component act.
How is it to be decided which below threshold
subsets of such totalities are to be permitted?
To tax each would require a central or unified
taxation and decision-making apparatus. The same
could be said for social determination of which
acts were valuable enough to permit, with the
other acts forbidden in order to shrink the to-
tality to below the threshold. For example, it
might be decided that mining or running trains
is sufficiently valuable to be allowed, even
though each presents risks to the passerby no
less than compulsory Russian roulette with one
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bullet and n chambers (with n set appropriately),
which is prohibited because it is insufficiently
valuable. There are problems in a state of nature
which has no central or unified appartus capable
of making, or entitled to make, these decisions.27
Nozick could, at this point, say a) that we need emergent
law bound principles, b) that these principles include a
principle which enables us to evaluate the social value of
each risky act, and c) that these law bound principles create
the need for the special principles which are included in
the natural position. Instead, he says that the problem of
cumulative risk is merely an inconvenience of remaining in
the state of nature.28 It provides people in the state
of nature with a reason to establish a central authority
which is given, through their consent, the right to publish
and enforce the laws which are needed to remove the incon-
venience. These laws can only be enforced against those
who consent to them. The non-aggressive risky acts of those
who do not consent to these laws must be treated according
to the requirements of the principle of compensation which
views each person's non-aggressive act as an isolated act in
a pre-institutional state of nature. Will this voluntary
approach to the problem of cumulative risk succeed in removing
the inconvenience? There are reasons to believe that it
won' t.
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Assume that two protective associations are located
across a lake from each other and that the prevailing winds
dump the pollutants which the factories in one association's
territory produce on to the territory of the other associa-
tion and create a health hazard. Further assume that the
cumulative effect of this dumping creates uncompensated-for-
fear in the members of the other association but that no
single factory dumps enough pollutants to justify prohibiting
its continued operation. Since no single factory owner's
dumping causes this fear we cannot use the principle of
compensation to prohibit his dumping. Furtharmore, we cannot
charge him for the fear created by the dumping because his
dumping does not. create the fear. Rather, it is the totality
of dumpings (or, perhaps, the system which permits the
totality) which creates the fear. In this case there does
not appear to be anything that the protective association
can legitimately do, without the express consent of the
factory owners, to protect its members from this uncompensated-
for-fear. It can, of course, require the polluters to pay
for any actual damage which they cause. That is, however,
all that it can do.
This example brings out the important point that we
are inclined to view the other protective association as an
individuasl. We are inclined to say that it must coordinate
the behaviour of its members so that their collective
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behaviour does not subject the members of another protective
association to risks which cause uncompensated-for-fear.
Nozick cannot say this. Each of the members of the protec-
tive association is, in the.: relevant sense, acting indepen-
dently of the other members. Therefore, it is permissible
to prohibit any act of any one of them.. only .whesnit is, when
considered by itself, serious enough to prohibit.
These considerations raise the following puzzle for
Nozick. Assume that some person owns a group of factories
which creates a risk to the people who live near them which
causes those people to suffer uncompensated-for-fear. Nozick
would, I believe, say that it is appropriate to consider the
operation of the factories as the single activity of the per-
son who owns them. If this is so, then the people in the
area can tell him that he must either reduce the level of risk
which his factories create or shut them down. When he is
given this ultimatum he decides that the most feasible thing
for him to do is to sell his factories. He sells each to a
different person who continues to operate the factory. Al-
though the people in the area are subjected to the same level
of risk as before, they are no longer able to protect them-
selves from the risk and the uncompensated-for-fear to which
it leads. This is because none of the new factory owners
operates a factory which creates a risk which is, when con-
sidered by itself, serious enough to prohibit. I do not see
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how Naozick can avoid the conclusion that mere change in owner-
ship will cause this change in the lives of those who live
near the factory.
66.6 The Enforceable Fairness Principle:
I have, I believe, established that when we appeal to
the principle of compensation to assign entitlements to do
non-aggressive risky acts we end up with assignments which
are inconvenient and which lead to counter-intuitive solu-
tions to important social problems, including the problem of
cumulative risk. At this point in the development of his
theory Nozick might have appealed to the enforceable fairness
principle to solve these problems. It can be used to solve
them because it can justify unconsented to changes in the
boundaries established by people's natural rights when the
changes make everybody better off. We have already noted
that Nozick's commitment to the libertarian side constraint
forces him to reject the enforceable fairness principle. 29
In this section I am going to look more closely at Nozick's
reasons for,rejecting it. I want to consider whether there
is some way to modify the enforceable fairness principle so
that it will become acceptable to a: person who accepts the
libertarian side constraint. The discussion is intended to
reinforce my position that much of Nozick's theory depends
upon a dogmatic commitment to F and I.
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We have already, noted that Nozick interprets the fair-
ness principle as the following principle:
Whenever a group of people G voluntarily cooperates
by conforming their behaviour to a public set of
rules, then every person P, regardless of whether
he is a member of G, has an obligation to follow the
rules provided that; a) the rules are intended to
apply to him, b) he has been informed of the re-
quirements of the rules, c) he receives the benefits
of the cooperation of others, and d) he is better
off in the situation in which he receives the bene-
fits of others and cooperates than he would have
beern in the s ituation in which he does not receive
the benefits and does not cooperate.
The fairness principle is a principle about what obligations
people have. By itself it is compatible with both F and I.
When it is supplemented by a principle which says that an
agent of G is permitted to enforce the obligations which
arise under the principle, then it is incompatible with F and
I. Nozick gives counter-examples to the fairness principle
and expresses his scepticism about the possibility of adding
a fifth condition which will make the principle acceptable. 30
Furthermore, he is certain that there is no way to modify
the principle so that it gives rise to enforceable obliga-
31tions.
Nozick objects to the enforceable fairness principle
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because it is incompatible with F and I and because he inter-
prets it as simply a macro version of the unacceptable prin-
ciple that it is permissible to give a person a benefit for
_ which he has not consented to pay and then to force him to
pay for it. He makes little effort to add a fifth condition
in order to make the fairness principle a reasonable prin-
ciple which gives rise to enforceable obligations. He simply
asserts:
Perhaps a modified principle of fairness can be
stated which would be free from these and similar
difficulties. What seems certain is that any such
principle, if possible, would be so complex and
involuted that one could not combine it with a
special principle legitimating enforcement within
a state of nature of the obligations that have
arisen under it. Hence, even if the principle
could be formulated so that it was no longer open
to objection, it would not serve to obviate the
need for other person's consenting to cooperate and
limit their own activities.32
If there is any argument here it is that since people in the
state of nature would not agree on what obligations are
created by the modified principle there cannot be a special
principle legitimating enforcement of those obligations.
This argument loses all force when we recall the amount of
- .
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disagreement that is bound to occur when people attempt to
apply the principle of compensation to determine what their
33
obligations are.3 Nozick insists, however, that the obliga-
tions which it creates are enforceable within the state of
nature.
How can we modify the principle of fairness so that it
can be used to solve the problem of cumulative risk? The
addition of the following condition will be a step in the
right direction:
a) the aim of the rule is to provide each person
with increased assurance that the boundary esta-
blished by his natural rights will not be crossed.34
This fifth condition puts radical limits on when the princi-
ple of fairness can be used to create enforceable obligations.
Roughly speaking, it appeals to the distinction between pro-
viding a person with a benefit and preventing a person from
suffering a harm, and says that the principle gives `rise to
enforceable obligations only when the cooperative behaviour
is needed to prevent people from suffering harm. It provides
the following solution to the problem of cumulative risk.
Some people in the state of nature will almost certainly be
bothered by the inconvenience of living in a system which
permits so many risky acts that people suffer uncompensated-
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for-fear, Consequently, they will publish an enforceable
rule which coordinates people's behaviour so that the level
of risk in the area is kept below the threshold level which
causes uncompensated-for-fear. They are much more likely to
take this initiative when they know that they are permitted
to enforce their rule against people who do not consent to it.
If they are not permitted to enforce the rule against the
non-consenters, then they have no guarantee that their rule
will keep the level of risk below the threshold level which
causes uncompensated-for-fear. The modified version of the
enforceable fairness principle helps to provide them with
this guarantee.
There are two things we should note about this modified
version of the fairness principle. The first is that it no
longer seems appropriate to consider it to be merely a macro
version of the unacceptable principle that it is sometimes
permissible to give a person something for which he has not
consented to pay and then force him to pay for it. The
following examples which Nozick offers as counter-examples
to the fairness principle no longer seem appropriate as
counter-examples:
On the face of it, enforcing the principle of
fairness is objectionable. You may not decide to
give me something, for example a book, and then
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grab money from me to pay for it, even if I have
nothing better to spend the money on. You have,
if anything, even less reason to demand payment if
your activity that gives me the book also benefits
you; suppose that your best way of getting exercise
is by throwing books into people.'1s houses, or that
some other activity of yours thrusts books into
people's houses as an unavoidable side effect. 3 5
Does a person who accepts the modified version of the enforce-
able fairness principle have to claim that it is permissible
to use force to make the person pay for the book? The answer
is certainly "no." He miAht, however, make the more plausible
claim that in each of the following cases it is permissible
to use force to make a person pay you for the costs which
you incurred in preventing him from suffering a harm even
though he never consented to pay those costs:36
1. You find a person lying unconscious in the street.
You hire an ambulance to take him to a hospital where
the doctors save his life.
2. Your neighbor's windows are blown out in a
storm while he is on vacation in a place where
he cannot be reached. You board up his windows
to prevent further damage, including damage caused
by looters, to his home.
Nozick never discusses this type of case. An exchange in
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which one person pays another to prevent him from suffering
this harm would be an exchange in which the seller serves
the bujer productively. For example, an exchange in which
you pay me to shadow you so that I am always in a position
to prevent you from suffering serious harm in case you
become unconscious would be one in which I serve you pro-
ductively. A commitment to PE implies that I cannot be
forced to enter either of these exchanges. Therefore, it
implies that I cannot be held liable for failing to come .to
your aid in the absence of a prior agreement to do so. In
the cases listed, however, we are assuming that there has
been no agreement, that I am now in a position to help you
by crossing the boundaries established by your rights, and
that I went to help you. In the one case I must cross the
boundary established by your right to your body and in the
other the boundary established by your property right in
your home. In these cases PE does not apply because consent
is impossible to obtain. In cases where consent is impossible
to obtain Nozick says that it is permissible to cross another's
boundary provided that you pay him at least full compensa-
tion for the harm which results from the crossing. In the
above cases, however, the crossings do not cause harm to the
person whose boundary is crossed. In fact, the purpose of
the crossing is to prevent the person whose boundary is
crossed from suffering additional harm. The present issue
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is whether the person who takes the initiative to prevent
the harm has a right to compensation for the costs he incurs
in preventing it. Nozick never speaks directly to this
issue. The closest he comes is his discussion of the person
who gives you a book and then grabs money from you as a pay-
ment. In this case, unlike the cases I gave, the person who
provides the benefit has no basis for his belief that you
want to be benefitted in that way and, furthermore, has
available an easy way to find out whether you do. He can
simply ask you. As Nozick gives his example you must be
close enough for him to ask you since you are close enough for
hitfi to grab your money.
A person who wants to defend a modified version of the
enforceable fairness principle will borrow two features
from the above cases. One is that the principle should only
apply in cases where some people assume costs to prevent
others from suffering what they regard as harms. We do not
want a principle which permits some to impose their values
on others. The other is that it should only apply when there
are good reasons for discounting the relevance of whether
the people who gain protection voluntarily agree to pay for
the costs of providing that protection. In the two cases
above it was impossible to get the consent of the person who
was protected. In the case of the modified version of the
enforceable fairness principle there are the following
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reasons for discounting the relevance of voluntary consent:
1. There will be very high transaction costs asso-
ciated with any attempt to get the consent of each
person who will receive the protection.
2, It is sometimes impossible actually to give each
person who will receive protection the choice between
I) receiving the increased protection and cooperating
in the public system of rules which will provide that
protection and 2) not receiving the protection and
not cooperating. This is because it is impossible
to provide the protection to some without providing
it to all and, therefore, each person has a self-
interested reason to withhold his consent.,
I do not pretend that this modified version of the edforce-
able fairness principle is consistent with the libertarian
side constraint against aggression as we have stated it.
In fact, this modified version of the enforceable fairness
principle is clearly inconsistent with the libertarian side
constraint insofar as it sometimes justifies crossings with-
out consent in cases where consent is neither impossible nor
very costly to obtain, A person who accepts this version
of the enforceable fairness principle will not permit people
to opt out of the requirements of the public rules which it
justifies even in the following situation: the people who
wish to opt out are willing to pay whatever costs are in-
volved in identifying themselves as people who choose to opt
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out and to be treated according to the requirements of their
natural rights.37 We should note, however, how this. modified
version of the fairness principle is related to the evidence
which Nozick uses to establish the libertarian side con-
straint..
Nozick gets his evidence for the libertarian side con-
straint by examining his beliefs about how to resolve two
person conflicts which arise in a pre-institutional situation.
His best evidence comes from examining conflicts which arise
when one person desires to cross the boundary established by
another's property right and a) it is neither impossible nor
very costly to determine whether the person whose boundary
is threatened will give his consent to the crossing, and b)
an- exchange in which the person who desires to cross buys
the right to cross would be an exchange in which he is
served productively. His best evidence does not come from
examining our beliefs about how to resolve conflicts which
arise when one person does something which prevents another.
from suffering harm in a case where it was impossible or
very costly to get the consent of the person who was threat-
ened with harm and then asks to be compensated for the costs
he incurred in preventing the harm. I do not believe that
any of Nozick's root ideas can be used to force a conclusion
on how to resolve this latter type of conflict. It is im-
plausible to claim that the person who asks to be compensated
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for the costs he incurred in preventing the harm is using the
other merely as a means, or is using him as a resource, or is
sacrificing him for the benefit of some other person. He
prevented this person from. suffering what the other would
agree was harm and is merely asking for compensation for
the costs he incurred. He is not asking to be made better
off than he was prior to discovering the other's predicament.
If I am correct in claiming that Nozick's root ideas
cannot be used to force a conclusion on how to resolve this
latter type of conflict, then Nozick faces a dilemma when he
is confronted with the issue of whether or not to accept our
modified version of the enforceable fairness principle, On
the one hand, he can resolve this latter type of conflict
by saying that the person who wants to prevent the other from
suffering harm is not only permitted to cross the other's
boundary without the other's consent to prevent the harm,
but also has the right to cross the other's boundary to take
compensation for the costs he incurred in preventing the
harm. He can then use his belief about how to resolve this
type of conflict to argue that we should sometimes discount
the relevance of whether a person has actually given his
consent to a crossing to the problem of whether the crossing
is permitted. This approach will tend to support the modified
version of the enforceable fairness principle. On the other
hand, he can extend the domain of the principle that it is
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never permissible to forcefully cross the boundary esta-
blished by another's rights without his consent, which he
insists is the appropriate principle for resolving all two-
person conflicts which arise in a pre-institutional state
of nature, so that the principle is also used to resolve
all conflicts which arise between an individual and a group
in an institutional situation. This approach will under-
mine the modified version of the enforceable fairness prin-
ciple. His account of our clearest beliefs does not provide
clear guidance as to which approach we should adopt. There-
fore, it does not provide conclusive grounds for rejecting
the modified version of the enforceable fairness principle.
It is only when he makes his commitment to F and I that he
has conclusive grounds.
Finally, I want to bring attention to two facts about
the modified version of the enforceable fairness principle.
The first thing to note is that there are reasons for
claiming that it is unfair for those who receive the bene-
fits of others' cooperation to refuse to assume the burdens
of cooperation. To make this point let us focus on the
problem of cumulative risk. Those who cooperate provide all
of the,,people in the area with a less risky environment.
They have two complaints that it is unfair when others do
not cooperate. One is that when others do not cooperate
they increase the costs which those who cooperate must pay,
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in terms of increased restrictions on their liberty to per-
form risky acts, to keep the level of risk below the level
which causes uncompensated-for-fear. The other is that
those who do not cooperate have a comparative advantage, in-
sofar as they have more risky options available to them, in
cases where they are competing with those who cooperate.
These considerations of fairness explain why an enforceable
fairness principle is appropriate for changing people's
natural entitlements to perform and to prohibit non-aggressive
risky acts. They also explain why we should view the problem
of cumulative risk as a problem which all of the people in
an area are collectively responsible for solving and, there-
fore, why we should look for a solution to the problem which
appeals to established public rules which satisfy law bound
38principles.
The second thing to note about the modified version of
the enforceable fairness principle is that some natural ob-
jections to it are objections which lead us in the direction
of accepting the special principles which the natural position
adopts. One objection might be that we want to know more
about the properties of the public rules which regulate
people's risky activities. This will lead us to adopt more
structured law bound principles for evaluating the laws that
are needed to solve the problem of cumulative risk. Another
is that it appears arbitrary to permit some to simply usurp
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the right to publish and enforce the laws which are needed.
This will lead us to adopt special principles for evaluating
procedures which determine which people are specially en-
titled to publish, interpret, and enforce the laws which are
needed. This suggests that once you concede that there is
an enforceable version of the fairness principle you must go
all the way and adopt the natural position.
I have, I believe, shown that Nozick has not adequately
defended his belief that there is no modified version of the
enforceable fairness principle. What is certainly clear is
that a person who accepts a modified version of the enforce-
able fairness principles does not have to base his acceptance
on a belief that it is permissible to throw a book into a
person's house and then force him to pay for it, Now I will
argue that Nozick can use the principle of compensation to
get certain conclusions which he wants only if he appeals to
a modified version of the enforceable fairness principle.
6.7 Nozick's Need for the Enforce4ble Fairness Principle:
The principle of compensation says that it is permissible
to prohibit a risky act only if those who ere disadvantaged
by the prohibition are compensated for these disadvantages.
Is each person who gains increased security from the prohibi-
tion supposed to pay? Or, is it each person who, in fact,
voluntarily endorses the prohibition and agrees to pay?
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Nozick discusses two applications of the principle of compehn-
sation. One is the case of a protective association which
prohibits non-members, or independents, from privately en-
forcing their rights. This prohibition disadvantages poor
people who cannot afford to buy a protection policy and,
therefore, are left without any means of enforcing their
rights. The other is the case of prohibiting driving a car
without liability insurance in an auto dependent society.
This prohibition also disadvantages poor people who can
afford cars but who are prevented from using them because
they cannot also afford to buy liability insurance. In the
first case the benefits of the prohibition are divisible so
there is no problem about. forcing some to provide benefits
for others and, therefore, violating the libertarian side
constraint. Nozick notes that a protective association can
offer its clients a choice between two policies:39
Policy 1: those who buy this policy will receive pro-
tection against all violations of their rights by
independents except those which result from an inde-
pendent's use of a risky procedure for enforcing
his rights.
Policy 2: those who buy this policy will receive
protection against all violations of their rights
by independents including those which result from
their use of risky procedures for enforcing their
rights,
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The second will cost more. The difference will cover the
costs of compensating independents for the disadvantages
which they will suffer because they are prohibited from
privately enforcing their rights against those who choose
to buy the second policy. Those who do not buy it will not
receive any protection against violations of their rights
which result from the use of risky procedures by independents.
They prefer to live with the risks and to collect compensae-
tion in those cases where the risky procedures wrongly
punish them and, therefore, violate their rights.
Things are much more complicated in the second case.
We are to imagine that there are some poor people who do not
have the resources to purchase automobile insurance in an
automobile dependent society. Nozick is puzzled about how
to treat them. He writes:
Yet how can people be allowed to impose risks on
others whom they are not in a position to compensate
should the need arise? Why should some have to bear
the costs of other's freedom? Yet to prohibit risky
acts (because they are financially uncovered or
because they are too risky) limits individuals'
freedom to act, even though the actions might in-
volve no cost at all to anyone else. 40
Some forty pages later he returns to give the solution to
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the puzzle he raised. He writes:
We canvassed, in Chapter 4, the possibility of
forbidding people to perform acts if they lack
the means to compensate others for possible harm-
ful consequences of these acts or if they lack
liability insurance to cover these consequences.
Were such prohibition legitimate, according to
the principle of compensation the persons prohi-
bited would have to be compensated for the dis-
advantages imposed upon them, and they could use
the compensatory payments to purchase liability
insurance! Only those disadvantaged by the pro-
hibition would be compensated; namely, those who
lack other resources they can shift (without dis-
advantaging sacrifice) to purchase the liability
insurance. When these people spend their compen-
satory payments to purchase liability insurance,
we have what amounts to public provision of spe-
cial liability insurance. .,. Providing such
insurance would certainly be the least expensive
way to compensate people who provide only normal
danger to others for the disadvantages of the
prohibition.41
This solution goes much too quickly. We must look more
closely at who it is that prohibits, what he prohibits, and
who pays the compensation.
A person who drives an automobile imposes risks on all
those who share the roads with him. These include other
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drivers, their passengers, and pedestrians. The protective
association can invoke the principle of compensation, a prin-
ciple which each person acting alone in the state of nature
is entitled to enforce, to prohibit driving without insurance
provided that it compensates those who are disadvantaged by
the prohibition for the disadvantage of not being able to
drive. How can it collect the money needed to pay the
compensation by what Nozick would consider to be morally
permissible means? It cannot tax all those who would benefit
from the prohibition on the ground that it is only fair that
they pay for the increased security which each will get as
a result of the prohibition. This tax would violate the
libertarian side constraint and could only be justified by
appealing to some version of the enforceable fairness prin-
ciple. If we concentrate on the case where the person who
is disadvantaged by the prohibition poses more than normal
danger to others, so that provision of a free insurance
policy is not the cheapest way to compensate him, then it
may be impossible for the protective association to collect
the money needed to pay the compensation by morally per-
missible means. It can only collect the money through
voluntary contributions. But each potential contributor
will consider whether the contribution which the association
asks for is worth the benefit he will receive. Although
it may be clear to each that he prefers situation a) where
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he pays m/n dollars (where m is the amount of compensation
owed and a is the number of people who will receive the
benefits of the prohibition) and receives the benefits of
the prohibition to situation b) where he pays nothing and
is subjected to the risks and fear which accompany no prohi-
bition, there is no guarantee that each will voluntarily
contribute m/n dollars, Many may hold out in the hope that
the rest will be willing to pay just a little more and, con-
sequently, they will get the bene.fits without paying any-
thing. If Nozick wants to guarantee that these prohibitions
of very dangerous acts will take place he may have to concede
that there is an acceptable version of the enforceable fair-
ness principle which can be used to force each person who
benefits from a prohibition on risky activities to pay his
share in compensating those who are disadvantaged by the
prohibition.42
What will happen in the case where the person who is
disadvantaged by the prohibition poses only normal dangers
to others? Here it might appear that there is a voluntary
approach which will lead to "the public provision of special
liability insurance." The protective association will offer
its clients a choice between two policies. The more expen-
sive policy provides those who buy it with insurance against
any injuries which a poor person might cause them in auto-
mobile accidents. The people who buy this policy voluntarily
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give up all claims to sue the poor person and agree to
accept the compensation that the insurance policy provides.
The less expensive policy will not provide the people who
buy it with any insurance against the injuries which a poor
person might cause them in automobile accidents. Those who
buy it, however, will retain their natural rights to collect
from the poor person for those injuries. Is it reasonable
to believe that most will buy the more expensive policy and,
consequently, provide poor people with what amounts to free
liability insurance? We cannot answer this question until
Nazick tells us what a person's natural rights are against
a poor person who causes injury to another person. It seems
clear to me, however, that he will have to say that he has
the right to compensation for those injuries. This is the
only solution that is compatible with the requirement of
weak absoluteness. In fact, it would seem to me that he
has the right to appropriate that person's property in order
to collect the compensation. I can see no way that Nozick
can avoid these conclusions. If this is so, then the most
economical thing to do might be to buy an insurance policy
in the open market which provides you with protection from
the injuries which a poor person inflicts on you by his use
of his automobile and which has a large deductible. By
buying one with a large deductible you can get it quite cheap.
You should, however, be able to get the deductible back in
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court. The poor person has a car which must be worth some-
thing. You can sue him and force him to trade in his car or
agree to pay some percentage of his wages until he has paid
full compensation. I am not saying that I approve of your
doing this. I am only saying that this would appear to be
the economically feasible thing to do and, therefore, that
Nozick has not provided us with any compelling reasons to
accept his conclusion that in a libertarian society there
will be public provision of special liability insurance to
poor people with automobiles. In order to establish this
conclusion he would have to concede that the members of a
libertarian society accept some version of the enforceable
43fairness principle.
6.8 The Risk of Death:
There is one very important problem concerning how to
apply the principle of compensation which we have not yet
discussed. Is any person acting alone in the state of nature
entitled to prohibit any act which subjects him to a risk
of death and causes him to suffer uncompensated-for-fear
provided that he compensates those who are disadvantaged by
his prohibition? I do not see how Nozick can avoid the
conclusion that he is. There are, to be sure, many reasons
why a person would not invoke this right unless the risk of
death is non-negligible. One is that it will cost him time
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and effort to make the announcements which are necessary to
put the prohibition into effect as well as time and effort
to enforce it,. Another is that he will have to compensate
any person whose acts he prohibits for the disadvantages
which result from the prohibitions. Still another is that
any person whose acts he prohibits might, when he otherwise
would not, invoke the same right to prohibit against him.
One person's use of the right to prohibit might lead to reta-
liatory uses of the right to prohibit and, consequently, to
a mutually disadvantageous position.
It would appear, therefore, that the de facto system
in the state of nature, among people who accepted the system
of entitlements which I have attributed to Nbzick, would be
similar, if not identical, to the system which Nozick attri-
butes to Charles Fried and rejects:
Charles Fried has recently suggested that people
would be willing to agree to a system which allows
them to impose "normal" risks of death upon each
other, preferring this to a system that forbids
all such imposing of risk. No one is especially
disadvantaged; each gains the right to perform
risky activities upon others in the pursuit of
his own ends, in exchange for granting the others
the right to do the same to him. These risks others
impose upon him are risks he himself would be willing
to take in the pursuit of his own ends; the same is
true of the risks he imposes on others. However,
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the world is so constructed that in pursuing
their own 'ends people often must impose risks
upon others that they cannot take directly upon
themselves. A trade naturally suggests itself.44
Nozick goes on to suggest that Fried's system is not the
fairest system and to offer a system which he believes is
fairer. Nozick's discussion is of interest to us for each
of the following reasons:
1. He denies that any person acting alone in the
state of nature is entitled to prohibit any act
which subjects him to a risk of death and causes
him uncompensated-for-fear provided that he com-
pensates the person whom he prohibits for any dis- *
advantages which result from the prohibition.
2. He appears to appeal to considerations of
fairness to justify his denial.
We must examine Nozick's discussion carefully.
In order to understand Nozick's argument against Fried
we must first note that he believes that a natural rights
theory can adopt one of three positions about people's
entitlements in risky situations in the state of nature.
45
They are:45
1. The action is prohibited and punishable, even
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if compensation is paid for any boundary crossing,
or if it turns out to have crossed no boundary.
2. The action is permitted provided compensation
is paid to those persons whose boundaries are
actually crossed,
3. The action is permitted provided that compen-
sation is paid to all those persons who undergo a
risk of boundary crossing, whether or not it turns
out that their boundary actually is crossed.
He believes that this third possibility suggests an alter-
native that is fairer than Fried's system. He writes:
Putting Fried's argument in terms of an exchange
suggests another alternative; namely explicit com-
pensation for each risk of a boundary crossing
imposed upon another (the third possibility listed
above). Such a scheme would differ from Fried's
risk pool in the direction of greater fairness. 4 6
Before we can assess Nozick's claim that his alternative
is fairer than Fried's risk pool we must note that Nozick
interprets the third possibility so that a person is only
entitled to compensation for having his boundary subjected
to a risk of being crossed. He is not entitled to further
compensation when his boundary is actually crossed. Consi-
der the following:
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Unlder the third alternative people can choose the
second; they can pool their payments for under-
going risk so as to compensate fully those whose
boundaries are actually crossed. The third alter-
tative will be plausible if imposing the risk on
another plausibly is viewed as itself crossing a
boundary, to be compensated for, perhaps because
it is apprehended and hence imposes fear on another.
(Persons voluntarily incurring such risks in the
market are "compensated" by receiving higher wages
for working at risky jobs, whether or not the risk
eventuates.)47
If people were entitled to compensation for having their
boundaries crossed as well as for undergoing the risk of
having their borders crossed, then there would be no reason
for people to pool their payments to assure that those whose
boundaries are actually crossed receive additional campen-
sation,
In order to better understand the third position we
should contrast it with the first position and the following
position which Nozick never considers:
4. The action is permitted provided that compen-
sation is paid to all those who undergo a risk of
a boundary crossing and additional compensation is
paid to all those whose boundaries are actually
crossed .
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According to the first position the risk bearer has the
right to prohibit the risky act. The risk creator is per-
mitted to perform the act only if he pays the risk bearer
market compensation for the right to perform it. Different
risk bearers will demand different payments and some will
insist on prohibiting the act. The third position is dif-
ferent from the first. in that it does not give the risk
bearer the right to prohibit the act. The only way he can
avoid undergoing the risk is to leave the area, at his own
expense, in which the risk creator is operating. If he
stays in the area he must accept a certain amount for under-
going the risk, Nozick does not tell us how this amount is
determined. We can see, however, that Nozick's analogy to
the compensation which a person receives when he takes a
risky job in the market is out of place. That person re-
ceives market compensation for undergoing the job's risks.
Furthermore, it is likely that he will insist on both a
premium for undergoing the risks and the right to additional
compensation in case he is actually injured on the job.
The way NJzick describes the third position the risk
bearer is only entitled to compensation for undergoing the
risk. The fourth position says that the risk bearer is also
entitled to compensation when his borders are actually
crossed. It seems clear to me that the fourth position is
fairer than the third. The third position gives the risk
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bearer the choice of either pooling his compensation payment
or not pooling it. If he pools it he will, if enough others
also choose to pool their payments, receive compensation in
case his borders are actually crossed. He will, in essence,
be choosing Fried's risk pool. If he does not pool his pay-
ment, then he will..not receive :any compensation when his
borders are actually crossed. It is not at all clear that
this is fairer than Fried's risk pool. Why, however, should
he have to make this choice? Isn't the fourth position
clearly the fairest? I suspect that Nozick actually had the
fourth system in mind when he introduced the third. It
seems to be fairer, so long as we focus on a world in which
enforcement has no costs, than either Fried's risk pool or
Nozick's third position. I will, to make Nozick's position
as strong as possible, assume that he meant the fourth
Position when he described the third,.
Does Nozick have any argument for why we should adopt
the fourth position in cases where one person subjects
another to a normal risk of death? I have suggested that he
should adopt the view that a person is entitled to prohibit
any act which subjects him to a risk of death and which
causes him to suffer uncompensated-for-fear provided that he
compensates each person whose actions are prohibited for
any disadvantages which result from the prohibitions. Can
he explain why his view is preferable to the view which I
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have suggested he must adopt to the person who a) accepts
the principle of compensation and b) believes that it should
apply to all acts which create a risk of death, even those
which only create a normal risk of death, and cause uncom-
pensated-for-fear? This person may be one who is meticulous
about never doing anything which subjects another to a risk
of death. He claims that it is unfair that others should be
able to subject him to the risk of death at all. So far as
I can tell Nozick never offers an argument which will con-
vince this person, who takes Nozick's theory seriously, that
the fourth position is fairer than the position which I have
suggested. He cannot argue for his position on the ground
that my position will lead to a situation which will lead
to disastrous consequences for all. This is for two reasons.
One is that it would amount to .giving up I as a constraint
on how to assign entitlements. The other is that it is not
clear that the adoption of the position which I have sug-
gested will lead to disastrous consequences for all. There
are compelling reasons to believe that people will only
invoke their right to prohibit in cases where they are sub-
jected to a high risk of death. We can conclude that Nozick's
move towards the fourth (or, if he insists, the third)
position proceeds without argument and appears to be income
patible with his commitment to the principle of compensation.
We can also conclude that Nozick has provided us with no
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explanation for how a person who wishes to work within his
theory can avoid what we all regard as an untenable conclu-
sion: that any person acting alone in the state of nature
may, by invoking the principle of compensation, prohibit any
act of any person which would cause him to suffer uncompen-
sated-for-fear.
6,9 The Relevance _of Transaction Costs:
We can now turn to Nozick's brief discussion of how
matters are complicated by the fact that there are high
transaction costs associated with enforcing the fairest
system of entitlements. Consider the following:
Putting Fried's argument in terms of an exchange
suggests another alternative: namely explicit
compensation for each risk of a boundary crossing
imposed upon another (the third possibility listed
above). Such a scheme would differ from Fried's
risk pool in the direction of greater fairness.
However, the process of actually carrying out
the payments and ascertaining the precise risk
imposed upon others and the appropriate compen-
sation would seem to involve enormous transaction
costs. Some efficiencies can easily be imagined
(for example, keeping central records for all,
with net payments made every n months), but in
the absence of some neat institutional device
it remains enormously cumbersome. Because great
transaction costs may make the fairest alternative
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impracticable. one may search for other alter-
natives, such as Fried-'s risk pool. These alter-
natives will involve constant minor unfairness
and classes of major ones.48
Nozick's point seems to be that even when people in the
state of nature have the fairest system of entitlements there
will still be, due to the high transaction costs of enforcing
that system, some unfairness. More specifically, the high
transaction costs of locating each person who subjects you
to a risk and negotiating a fair price for being subjected
to that risk will almost always deter you from attempting to
collect compensation in cases where you are being subjected
to a risk. What appears to be the ideally fair system turns
out to be a system which is, in practice, radically unfair
to those who are risk bearers more often than risk creators.
It may be obvious to all that there is an alternative system
of entitlements which is much fairer than the ideal system
of natural entitlements when the distortions produced by
high transaction costs are taken into account.
Can Nozick claim that any person acting alone in the
state of nature is entitled to set up and enforce this alter-
native system? It seems clear to me that he cannot. This
position would be incompatible with his commitment to I.
Can he claim that each person has a duty to establish
systems which minimize the amount of unfairness in the world?
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He might claim this. Even if he makes this claim, however,
he cannot make the further claim that it is permissible to
use force to make a person enter an agreement to establish
these systems. When people's natural entitlements are in-
convenient or unfair they can, through their voluntary con-
sent, choose to adopt an alternative system of entitlements
which is mutually beneficial.4 9  Those who do not choose to
change their natural entitlements, however, cannot be
forced to do so. Others must treat them according to the
laws of nature.
Even if we assume that considerations of fairness are
relevant to determining what a person's entitlements are
when we view each case of risk imposition as an isolated
situation in an ideal world in which there are no transaction
costs, they have no further role in Nozick's theory. If
high transaction costs effectively prevent some from getting
what they axe entitled to that is simply tough for them.
They cannot force others to cooperate in a scheme which comes
closest to the distribution of benefits and burdens that
would have occurred in a world in which there were no trans-
action costs. The others can simply insist on being treated
according to their natural entitlements. Any movement away
from these natural entitlements must be by their voluntary
consent. I see no way for Nozick to avoid these conclusions.
If a) you believe that our clearest beliefs about how to
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assign entitlements to perform risky acts in a fair manner
are our beliefs about how to assign them in an ideal world
of no transaction costs and b) you want the assignment of
entitlements in our world to lead to the same distribution
of benefits and burdens which would have occurred in the
ideal world, then you must accept law bound principles which
give a central authority the right to assign entitlements
to perform non-aggressive risky acts and to collect compensa-
tion which will achieve this result.
6.10 A Possible Misinterpretation of Nozick's Position on
Non-Aqqressive Risky Acts:
It might appear that I am trying to commit Nozick to
a precise view about what people's entitlements in risky
situations are when his own view is that precision is im-
possible to come by. He can adopt one of three positions
about what people's natural entitlements are in risky
situations. These are:
1. They are clear and convenient so that people
in the state of nature will have no reason to esta-
blish a central authority with the right, through
their consent, to publish and enforce laws which
define a different system of entitlements.
2. They are clear but not convenient so that
people in the state of nature have a reason to
establish a central authority with the right,
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through their consent, to publish and enforce
laws which define a different set of entitle-
ments which are mutually beneficial to all.
3. They are not clear and, therefore, people
in the state of nature have a reason to esta-
blish a central authority with the right,
through their consent, to publish and enforce
laws which define a clear set of entitlements
which are mutually beneficial to all.
The arguments in this chapter have established that Nozick
does not adopt the first position. I have interpreted him
so that he adopts the second. It may appear to some, however,
that he adopts the third. Consider the following:
Actions that risk crossing another's boundary
pose a serious problem for a natural rights
50position.
It is difficult to imagine a principled way in
which the natural rights tradition can draw the
line to fix which probabilities impose unaccept-
ably great risks upon others.51
If no natural-law theory has yet specified a
precise line to delimit people's natural rights
in risky situations what is to happen in the
state of nature? 52
All of these quotes suggest that Nozick believes that the
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natural rights tradition, a tradition which is committed to
F and I, cannot provide a clear solution to the problem of
non-aggressive risky acts. We should note, however, that all
of these quotes appear before Nozick's presentation of the
principle of compensation which is part of his attempt to
solve the problem. It is for this reason that the reader
simply does not know whether Nozick actually accepts the
second or the third position.
If our aim is to prove that Nozick's solution to the
emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts is not the
optimal solution, then it does not matter which position we
attribute to him. It would appear, however, that we put his
theory in the most favorable light when we attribute the
second position to him. The theory looks more defensible
when it provides a solution to the emergent problem, even when
its solution assigns counter-intuitive and inconvenient
entitlements, than when it concedes that it cannot, so long as
it retains F and I, provide any solution at all. In either
case, however, Nozick is committed to the-view that the "real
solution" to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky
acts is whatever solution people "voluntarily" agree to in
order to remove the inconveniences of remaining in the state
of nature. There are compalling reasons for saying that the
optimal solution should not be a solution which essentially
says that what is right is whatever people agree to. I
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will explain what these reasons are in the next, and last,
chapter.
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POWER AND PRINCIPLE
7.. Aims:
I have argued that Nozick's commitment to F and I as
constraints on solutions to the emergent problem of non-
aggressive risky acts causes him to adopt one of the follow-
ing positions although it is not clear which one:
1. People's natural entitlements in risky situa-
tions are not clear.
2. People's natural entitlements in risky situa-
tions are clear but not convenient.
In this section I am going to argue against each of these
positions on the ground that its solution to the emergent
problem of non-aggressive risky acts fails to satisfy the
following emergent constraint:
People who accept the principles to which that
solution appeals will generally agree that the
conflicts which those principles are intended
to resolve are resolved in an impartial manner
rather than a manner which reflects the rela-
tive power of each of the parties to the conflict.
I will then argue that a solution which appeals to a law
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bound principle and the natural position can satisfy this
constraint to a high degree. We will be able to conclude
that this solution is preferable to Nozick's and, therefore,
that his solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky
acts is not the optimal solution.
S7, The Shortcomings of the First Position:
There is one very obvious shortcoming with the first
position. Let us assume that most people in the state of
nature agree to establish a central authority with the
right, through their consent, to publish and enforce laws
which define people's entitlements in risky situations.
Most believe that the establishment of a central authority
is the rational response to the inconvenience of being in
a situation in which their entitlements are unclear. Some
people may not, however, agree to establish the central
authority. We will call these people "independents." What
are their entitlements in risky situations? By hypothesis
their natural entitlements are unclear. Is there any basis
for the claim that the central authority can simply enforce
its system of entitlements against them? It would appear
that there isn't. These independents did not, after all,
agree to those entitlements. Can Nozick argue that the
central authority is entitled to enforce its system of
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entitlements against them provided that it can establish
that they are be.ter off in the situation in which they com-
ply with the requirements of the system and receive the
benefits of others' compliance than they would have been in
the baseline situation in which people's natural entitlements
are unclear? Nozick's rejection of the enforceable fairness
principle prevents him from using this argument.1  He must
say, if he adopts the position that people's natural entitle-
ments in risky situations are sometimes unclear, that there
is no principled way for the central authority to deal with
independents in those situations.
A second shortcoming of the first position is that it
throws grave doubts on Nozick's claim that it is possible
to provide a justification of the state. More specifically,
it throws grave doubts on whether Nozick can claim that a
state will arise from a nonstate situation in which people
accept his moral theory by means which all, or even most,
of those people would consider to be morally permissible.
We will say that a person accepts Nozick's moral theory when
he accepts each of the following:
1. Moral theory is clear in just those places
where Nozick says it is clear. This implies that
he accepts PE and UP.
2. In places where moral theory is not clear, it
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must be extended in ways which are compatible with
F and I.
3. A person is morally bound to adhere to an
agreement, which he has no natural duty to enter,
only when he was not coerced to enter it.
On my view two people can both accept Nozick's moral theory
even though they accept different principles for solving
emergent problems. So, for instance, two people can accept
Nozick's moral theory even though they have different views
about copyright or about people's entitlements in some
risky situations. Each will have his own view about how the
theory should be extended to solve those problems. Each
may, for instance, appeal to a different emergent constraint
to show that his solution is the best one. They agree,
however, that the correct solution must be compatible with
F and I.
Will people who accept Nozick's moral theory and who
offer different solutions to emergent problems establish
a stata by means which each considers to be morally permis-
sible? Let us first note how it is possible for two people
to disagree about whether an agreement between them arose
by morally permissible means. The explanation is trivial in
cases where the people accept radically different beliefs
about when it is permissible for one person to use force
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against another,. A perfectionist believes that it is per-
missible to use force to get another to increase the amount
of intrinsic value in the world. A libertarian denies that
it is permissible. Consider the case where a perfectionsit
threatens to use force against a libertarian to get him to
help increase the amount of intrinsic value in the world
and where the libertarian agrees only because he prefers to
contribute than to fight. The perfectionist will believe
that this agreement arose by morally permissible means
because he believes that his threat to use force was morally
permissible. The libertarian will deny that it arose by
morally permissible means. He will insist that it was
coerced from him by the perfectionist's immoral threat of
the use of force. Even though he will concede that the per-
fectionist acted as his conscience dictated, he will insist
that he has a just complaint against him. Furthermore, he
will deny that he is morally bound by his agreement.
The same points can be made in cases where people agree
on many moral beliefs but sometimes disagree about when it
is permissible for one person to use force against another.
The disagreement may be about what principle applies to a
problem which both recognize as an emergent problem or it may
be about how to apply a principle which both accept. If one
is in a position to impose his view of right on the other
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who prefers to agree than to fight, then it is doubtful that
the other will believe either that the agreement arose by
morally permissible means or that he is morally bound to
abide by it. This is especially so when a) the disagreement
is about a problem that is of particular importance to him
so that he is not indifferent as to how it is solved, b) he
believes that he has compelling reasons to support his solu-
tion, and c) he agrees only because he believes that he
has no chance of imposing his solution, the correct solution,
on the other. From his point of view his agreement was
coerced from him by the other's immoral threat of the use
of force and, since there is no natural duty to enter the
agreement, he is not morally bound to it. 2
We can again make the same points when we change the
example so that neither is in a position to impose his solu-
tion to the emergent problem on the other and each prefers
to compromise than to fight. Each may believe, so long as
his power relative to the other remains the same as it was
at the time of the agreement, that it is in his self inter-
est to abide by the compromise agreement in order to avoid
the conflict that is certain to follow in case he breaks
his agreement. He will not, however, believe that he is
morally bound by the agreement. He entered it only because
of the other's immoral threat of the use of force against
him in case he tried to impose his solution, the correct
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solution, on the other.
What would happen in a state of nature situation in
which people accepted Nozick's moral theory? What will
people do when their common moral beliefs do not force a
conclusion on how to solve an emergent problem concerning
when it is permissible for one person to use force against
another and they disagree about what the correct solution
to the emergent problem is? Will they compromise because
each believes that that is preferable to fighting? Some-
times Nozick writes as if they will compromise.3 This comes
out in the following:
Not only does the day seem distant when all men
of good will shall agree to libertarian princi-
ples; these principles have not been completely
stated, nor is there one unique set of principles
agreed to by all libertarians. Consider for example,
the issue of whether fullblooded copyright is legi-
timate. Some libertarians argue it isn't legiti-
mate, but claim that its effect can be obtained
if authors and publishers include in the contract
when they sell books a provision prohibiting its
unauthorized printing and then sue any book pirate
for breach of contract; apparently they forget
that some people sometimes lose books and others
find them, Other libertarians disagree. Similarly,
for patents. If persons so close in general theory
can disagree over a point so fundamental, + two li-
bertarian protective agencies might manage to do
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battle over it. One agency might attempt to
enforce a prohibition upon a person's publishing
a particular book (because this violates the
author's property right) or reproducing a cer-
tain invention he has not invented independently,
while the other agency fights this prohibition
as a violation of individual rights. Disagreements
about what is to be enforced, argue unreluctant
archists, provide yet another reason (in addition
to lack of factual knowledge) for the apparatus
of the state; as also does the need for some-
times changing the content of what is to be en-
forced. People who prefer peace to the enforce-
ment of their view of right will unite together
in one state. But, of course, if people genuinely
do hold this preference, their protective agencies
will not do battle either.4
Here Nozick suggests that people will compromise, even with
regard to such fundamental issues as copyright and patent,
rather than fight. He never asks, however, whether these
people will consider the compromise solution to be morally
binding. It seems unlikely that they will. If each firmly
believes that his solution is the only defensible solution
(i.e., the only defensible extension of the libertarian
position), then each will view the compromise solution as
something which arose as a result of the other's threat to
forcefully subject him to the requirements of the wrong
solution. If that is the case, however, then these people
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will not believe that the central authority which enforces
the compromise has the legitimate authority to do so. They
will reject the view that the central authority arose by
morally permissible means and, therefore, that the state,
should the central authority ever claim to have the authority
of the state, arose by morally permissible means.
Now is a good time to recall some of the important
social problems which appear to be emergent relative to
Nozick's account of our clearest moral beliefs. They include:
1. What principles apply to the evaluation of
distributions of natural resources and the bene-
fits which result from their use when natural
resources are no longer abundant?
2. Which acts which are done for legitimate pur-
poses and which are certain to lower the value of
another person's property also cross the boundaries
established by that person's property rights and
which do not?
3. When is it permissible to prohibit, rather
than to permit provided that compensation is paid,
an act which is certain to cross the boundary
established by another's rights when the crossing
will be an incidental side effect of the act?
4. When is it permissible to prohibit, rather
than to permit provided that compensation is
paid, an act that creates a risk of crossing
the boundaries established by another's rights
when the risk is an incidental side effect of the
act?
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If Nozick believes that moral theory is unclear about one or
more of the above, then he has no basis for his claim that he
has used his moral theory to provide a justification of the
state. People who a) found themselves in the state of nature,
b) accepted his account of what is clear in moral theory, but
c) disagreed about how to solve the emergent problems, would
not believe that the compromise solutions to which they
agreed, and which they permitted the central authority to
enforce, arose by morally permissible means. If they wouldn't
then how can Nozick?
7.3 The Shortcominas of the Second Position:
The argument which I have sketched, for the conclusion
that Nozick cannot use his moral theory to provide a justifi-
cation of the state, does not apply if Nozick adopts the
position that his moral theory provides clear solutions, even
if they sometimes assign counter-intuitive and inconvenient
entitlements, to the emergent problems. If he adopts this
latter position he can say that people who found themselves
in the state of nature and accepted his moral theory would
voluntarily establish a central authority with the right,
through their consent, to publish and enforce laws which
change their natural entitlements in a way which is beneficial
to all. Since we are assuming that there is agreement on what
people's natural entitlements are there is no basis for the
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argument that each will view the new system of entitlements
as a compromise which is coerced from him by what he perceives
as others' immoral threat of the use of force against him.
Those who agree to the new system of entitlements, which the
central authority is authorized to enforce, genuinely believe
that it is an improvement over the system of natural entitle-
ments which any person acting alone in the state of nature
is entitled to enforce.
Furthermore, this position does not leave Nozick with
the embarrassing problem of how the central authority is
entitled to treat those independents who do not voluntarily
choose to change their natural entitlements. Since moral
theory is clear on what their natural entitlements are it
must simply respect their natural entitlements. We should
note, however, that it must respect their natural entitlements
even when respecting them causes great inconvenience to those
who have voluntarily agreed to change their natural entitle-
ments in their mutual relations. So, for instance, it must
refrain from using force to coordinate the behaviour of inde-
pendents even when failure to coordinate their behaviour will
lead to a situation in which their independent actions, none
of which causes uncompensated-for-fear, collectively produce
a risk which does cause uncompensated-for-fear.
On what ground can we object to Nozick's adoption of the
position that there are clear but inconvenient solutions,
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which are compatible with F and I, to some of the emergent
problems? First, we can note that we are not satisfied with
his claim that the pxoblem of non-aggressive risky acts
causes difficulties for the natural rights tradition and
his further claim, without argument, that something like the
principle of compensation must be right. The issue is whether
F and I should be constraints on how to solve the problem.of
non-aggressive risky acts and, therefore, whether anything
like the principle of compensation will do. For the purpose
of argument, however, let us assume that he has provided us
with clear solutions to the emergent problem of non-aggressive
risky acts which define inconvenient entitlements. Why
should we object to those solutions when Nozick can explain
why people will voluntarily choose to change their natural
entitlements to more convenient ones? Will we get the most
reasonable solutions when we let people voluntarily agree to
what they believe are the most reasonable ones? It seems
clear to me that we won't.
We have already noted Nozick's belief that the fairest
system of natural entitlements may, due to the high transac-
tion costs of enforcing it, actually lead to a situation
which is extremely unfair. More specifically, it might lead
to a situation which is extremely unfair to those who are
risk bearers more often than risk creators. Is there any
reason to believe that people in the state of nature will
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agree to a new system of entitlements which will rectify the
de facto unfairness which exists in the state of nature?
Naozick might now adopt the view that each person has a
natural duty to minimize the amount of unfairness in the
world. People who accepted this natural duty would volun-
tarily agree to a new system of entitlements which is fairer,
when we take account of the distortions caused. by high trans-
action costs, than the system of natural entitlements, But
if minimizing the amount of unfairness in the world is an
important goal, then why can't people use force to assure its
satisfaction? Why doesn't Nazick take the next step and
say that there is an enforceable natural duty to establish
a central authority which is entitled to publish and enforcea
laws which will, when we take account of the distortions pro-
duced by transaction costs, define the fairest system of
entitlements and which are enforceable against people without
their consent? Would this use of force against a person
without his consent go against the root ideas that each
person is separate and inviolable and not a resource for any
other person? It seems clear to me that it would not. It
is only intended to correct the unfair distributions of
benefits and burdens which result, according to Nozick's own
account of fairness, because of high transaction costs.
The only ground that Nozick can give for objecting to the
use of force here is that it is incompatible with F and I and
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will interfere with his aim of providing a fundamental ex-
planation of the political realm and an invisible hand ex-
planation of the state. These are, as I have argued, no
reasons at all. Unless Nozick concedes that it is permissible
to use force to achieve the goal of achieving a fair solution
to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky acts, there
is no basis for his claim that people will agree to a solu-
tion which is fair. Why should those who are the beneficiaries
of the distortions produced by high transaction costs be
expected to give up their benefits?
The main liability of the view that people's natural
entitlements are inconvenient and that we should simply let
people agree to new, more convenient, entitlements is that
it leaves too much room for considerations of power to in-
fluence what agreements are reached. The only constraint
it puts on what is a morally acceptable agreement is that
the agreement must leave each party better off than he would
be in the situation in which his natural entitlements are
respected. If this baseline situation is an extremely in-
tolerable situation, then a person really has no choice but
to accept almost any alternative situation, even one which
is clearly designed to benefit others much more than it
benefits him. When he accepts this system, however, he
cannot complain that he is being treated unjustly. He did,
after all, voluntarily agree to it.
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Isn't it reasonable to believe that people in the
state of nature will, since they are of relatively equal
power, agree to entitlements which are impartial? There are
two responses to this. The first brings us back to our dis-
cussion of the distortions pxoduced by high transaction costs.
Why should those who benefit from these distortions be ex-
pected, in the absence of an enforceable duty to do so, to
accept a system which takes these benefits away from them?
One would expect them to accept a system which reflects their
initial advantaged position. The second response is that if
we want to assure an impartial solution, then why don't we
search for enforceable first principles which will assure
an impartial solution? Why are we running the risk that
people might voluntarily accept solutions which have no claim
to being impartial? If this involves giving up F and I and
searching for an emergent constraint, then why don't we do
that?
7,4 The Power of an Entrenched Protective Association:
The point that people may agree to solutions which re-
flect the relative power of each of the parties can be made
more forcefully by focusing on the situation in which a cen-
tral authority has already emerged and been in power for a
long time. We will assume that this authority has been
authorized to publish laws which define its member's rights
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in risky situations and to provide protection to its members.
A person's relation to this authority is the same, according
to Nozick, as his relation with any private business.5 Con-
sider the following:
A person will swallow the imperfections of a
package P (which may be a protective arrangement,
a consumer good, a community) that is desirable on
the whole rather than purchase a different package
(a completely different package, dr P with some
changes),. when no more desirable attainable dif-
ferent package is worth to him its greater costs
over P, including the costs of inducing enough
others to participate in making the alternative
package. One assumes that the cost calculation for
nations is such as to permit internal opting out.
But this is not the whole story for two reasons.
First, it may be feasible in individual communities
also to arrange internal opting out at little ad-
ministrative cost (which he may be willing to pay),
yet this needn't always be done. Second, nations
differ from other packages in that the individual
himself isn't to bear the administrative costs of
opting out of some otherwise compulsory provision.
The other people must pay for finely designing
their compulsory arrangements so'that they don't
apply to those who wish to opt out. Nor is the
difference merely a matter of there being many
alternative kinds of communities while there are
many fewer nations. Even if almost everyone
wished to live in a communist community, so that
277
there weren't any viable noncommunist communities,
no particular community need also (though it is to
be hoped that one would) allow a resident indivi-
dual to opt out of their sharing arrangement. The
recalcitrant individual has no alternative but to
conform. Still, the others do not force him to
conform, and his rights are not violated. He has
no right that the others cooperate in making his
6
nonconformity feasible.
There can be no doubt that Nozick's position is that the cen-
tral authority can offer any package it chooses provided
only that it leaves each person the option of opting out and
living according to the principles of the law of nature. Let
us examine the implications of this view.
A central authority, or protective association, can say
to any person who lives within its area that if he wants to
continue to receive its protection he must obey its laws.
There are no moral constraints on what these laws may be.
They may, for instance, include any one of the following laws:
1. No person is permitted to practice Catholicism,
2. Every person must donate 10 percent of his income
to the poor.
3. No person is permitted to own a gun without the
express consent of the central authority,
4. People who live near factories must assume the
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risks and, therefore, receive no compensation in
case their borders are actually crossed' ,because of
the factories' use of risky procedures.
The central authority cannot force people to obey these laws.
That is, it cannot say to them that either they obey these
laws or they will be punished. It can, however, offer them
the following ultimatum:
Either you accept our total package, which includes
obedience to these laws and the provision of a
protection policy, or you become an independent
and live according to the laws of nature.
Nozick's view is that no matter how unattractive the choice
of being an independent is, a person cannot complain that he
is being treated unjustly when he is given this ultimatum.
This is because his choice will be, on Nozick's view, a
voluntary choice. This follows from Nozick's beliefs that
a) people do not have duties to collectively cooperate to
prevent him from having to make this unpleasant choice, and
b) his actual choice is not influenced by an immoral threat
of the use of force by any person. 7
Will a central authority be able to get away with
offering outrageous packages and retaining its clientele?
Remember that we are asking this question with regard to a
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central authority which has been operating for a long time.
It has developed a highly sophisticated system for providing
its clientele with protection against breaches of the law
as well as a highly sophisticated procedure for determining
guilt and innocence. It must in principle permit people to
opt out of the package it offers and to either protect
their own natural rights or establish an alternative associa-
tion for protecting their rights. It has the right, however,
to prohibit the use of any procedure for determining guilt
and innocence which it believes is unreliable. It will,
according to Nozick, almost certainly prohibit the private
enforcement of one's rights. When we consider the joint
facts that a) it would be very expensive to set up an alter-
native procedure which is as sophisticated as the central
authority's, and b) any people who attempt to set one up
must take the risk that the central authority might prohibit
its use, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that an alter-
native association will not arise. A person who decides to
reject the package will be prohibited from enforcing his
own rights and will be provided with a protection policy.
We cannot say how attractive this option is without examining
exactly what this policy looks like. If it turns out to
provide a person with very little protection, then it does
not seem unreasonable to say that the central authority can
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get away with offering some pretty outrageous packages. This
is especially so if the package is intended to harm the mem-
bers of an unpopular minority group.
Nozick never offers a detailed discussion of what kind
of protection must be provided to those who are prohibited
from enforcing their own rights. He tells us that they must
be compensated for being disadvantaged by the prohibition
and suggests that it will-do to provide them with an unfancy
protection policy which is at least as good as the cheapest
one which the central authority offers.10 We need more
detail than this. We want answers to the following types
of questions:
I, Will independents be provided with the right to
counsel?
2. Will independents be provided with the right of
appeal?
3. Will independents have the right to subpoena
members of the protective association as witnesses
in disputes between them and members of the association?
4, How much will the central authority spend to in-
vestigate when an independent claims that his rights
have been violated?
Unless Nozick can defend answers to these questions which
indicate that independents will receive adequate protection
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of their natural rights he will not be able to block my
claim that the central authority will be able to get away
with offering some pretty outrageous packages. There is
nothing in the book, so far as I can tell, which suggests
that Nozick can provide the answers which he needs.
I do not believe that I have to say more to make the
point that there are grave liabilities with the view that
people's natural entitlements are inconvenient and that what-
ever entitlements people voluntarily agree to in order to
remove these inconveniences are morally acceptable. The
reader should be aware, however, that I have offered two
distinct arguments. The first is that there is no reason-
to believe that people will reach agreements which have any
claim to being impartial. To the contrary, people will pro-
bably reach agreements which reflect the relative bargaining
position of each. So long as this is so people will consider
their relations with regard to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts to be based on considerations of power rather
than principle. This argument clearly assumes that people's
natural entitlements are inconvenient.
The second argument does not even have to assume that
people's natural entitlements are inconvenient. It brings
attention to the fact that any central authority which emerges
may, as part of the total protection policy which it offers,
ask any person to give up any one of his natural entitlements.
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This person has no complaint when he is given the choice of
giving up his natural entitlements and receiving a good pro-
tection policy and becoming an independent. The people who
control the central authority can, with some reason to ex-
pect success ard with no fear of being accused of acting
unjustly, create a society which answers to their interests
and whims and which shows little concern for the interests
of others. It becomes clear that what people's natural en-
titlements are, whether they are convenient or inconvenient,
ends up playing a very small role in what the just society
looks like. The just society may well be a society in which
people view their relations as essentially based on considera-
tions of power rather than principle. Do we want to say that
the optimal solutions to the emergent problems can lead to
a society which has this undesirable property? It seems
clear to me that we do not. We can avoid it, to some extent
at least, if we accept solutions which reject F and I in favor
of law bound principles and the natural position.
7.5 The Advantages of the Naturgl Position:
What are the advantages of solutions to emergent prob.
lems which reject F and I and adopt the natural position?
With regard to the emergent problem of non-aggressive risky
acts one obvious advantage is that they drop the unrealistic
assumption that we must view each non-aggressive risky act
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as an isolated act between two people in a state of nature.
Once it becomes clear that the root ideas of Nozick's theory
do not force a conclusion on how to assign entitlements there
is no basis, other than an irrational commitment to F and I,
for retaining the assumption. We should, instead, view the
problem of assigning entitlements in risky situations as a
problem of evaluating the consequences of adopting alterna-
tive sets of public rules which assign those entitlements.
This approach takes account of the following important facts:
1. each person is, in the course of his life, both
a risk creator and a risk bearer.
2. the system of entitlements which is adopted
will have direct effects on a person's life pros-
pects by influencing the chances that he will be
a victim of another's risky act and by influencing
the opportunities he will have to pursue his own ends.
3. the system of entitlements which is adopted will
have an indirect effect on a person's life prospects
by influencing the level of productivity and the
level of innovation in his society.
4. any reasonable solution to the problem of how to
assign entitlements must take account of the trans-
action costs of enforcing that solution.
For these reasons it is appropriate to view the problem of
assigning entitlements froma perspective which sees each
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person as both a risk creator and a risk bearer and which
looks at the long term consequences of adopting a public
system of rules which assign entitlements.
A person who accept? Nozick's root ideas, but who
rejects F and I as constraints, micvht suggest the following
solution:
We must evaluate public rules which assign
rights to perform non-aggressive risky acts
on the basis of how well they achieve the
following results: 1) they assure that no
person is subjected to a risk of having his
boundary crossed which is above a specified
level, 2) they assure that each person whose
boundary is crossed by another's non-aggres-
sive risky act receives compensation for the
harm caused by the crossing, and 3) they assure
that each person who is disadvantaged by a pro-
hibition of his non-aggressive activities is
compensated for the disadvantages. Furthermore,
we are to evaluate rules which achieve all of
these results on the basis of how well each
achieves the further result of maximizing
utility.
I do not claim that this solution is the optimal solution.
I only suggest it as an example of a solution which may be
appealing to a person who accepts Nozick's account of the
root ideas of the correct moral theory. 1 1 This solution is
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not a utilitarian solution to the problem of non-aggressive
risky acts. Utilitarian considerations only come into play
after we have assured that those whose borders are crossed
by others' risky acts are compensated and that those who are
disadvantaged by prohibitions of their non-aggressive risky
acts are also compensated.
It is clear that people who accept this solution, which
is incompatible with both F and I, will often disagree about
which laws optimally satisfy the principle to which it
appeals. Principles which reject F and I do not remove moral
disagreement. They do, however, handle it in a way which
makes it plausible to claim that people who accept them will
view their relations as based essentially on:o-considerations
of principle rather than power. First, people who accept
them will alsoaaccept special political principles which
evaluate procedures for determining which people are entitled
to publish, interpret, and enforce the laws which are intended
to satisfy the principles. These special principles will
guarantee each person the right to express his opinion about
which laws optimally satisfy the principles and to have a
vote in determining which laws should ultimately be adopted.
Perhaps it is here where democrats invoke the view, a view
which Nozick mocks, that each person has a right to a say
over what affects him.2 Once we accept that there are prin-
ciples which are incompatible with both F and I and that there
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is room for reasonable disagreement about which laws opti-
mally satisfy them, then it is plausible to claim that each
person should have a right to some say over which laws are
adopted. This right to have a say becomes especially impor-
tant when we recognize the natural tendency for each person
to apply common principles in a way which advances his inter-
ests. The right to have a say provides each with some pro-
tection against the tendency of others to apply principles
in ways which disadvantage him. It enables him to express
his views about why the principle is being improperly applied
and to demand an answer in the public forum.
It is too optimistic to believe that there will ever
be complete convergence of opinion, even after each person
has heard every other person's point of view and votes his
conscience, about which laws optimally satisfy the common
principles. This is in part because there may be reasonable
disagreement about what the consequences of adopting different
systems of public rules will be. It is also because it may
be impossible for people to be completely impartial in
applying the principles. What is important is that the
principles do not leave too much room fox disagreement about
which laws optimally satisfy them. The principle which I
have suggested is, on this score, much better than the prin-
ciple which simply says that we should adopt the public
system of rules which maximizes utility. Even here, however,
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it would be preferable to have a principle which evaluates
the consequences of laws in terms of more specific concepts
than maximizing utility. This principle would leave less
room for partiality to work behind the scenes and would lead
to more convergence of opinion. It seems reasonable to say
that people will view their relations as based essentially
on considerations of principle rather than power so long as
a) the principle fixes certain critical features of just
laws, and b) the laws which are enforced are the outcome of
the use of just procedures. Certainly, it is more reasonable
that they will view their relations as based on considerations
of principle rather than power than will the people in
Nozick's system. In that system people are not guaranteed
any right to a say over which laws apply to them and their
natural entitlements have little influence on what those laws
are.
We now come to the second significant feature of how
the natural position handles the disagreement which is bound
to occur over which laws optimally satisfy principles which
are incompatible with F and I. It appeals to special prin-
ciples for the problem of when a person is morally bound to
obey a law which results from the use of just procedures.
These principles will imply that a person is sometimes morally
bound to obey a law which results from the use of just proce-
dures even though that law does not optimally satisfy the
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principlewhich it is intended to satisfy. People adopt the
perspective that they must sometimes tolerate laws which they
do .not believe are optimal because the benefits of having
just procedures which are intended to produce optimal laws
will be available to all only if each accepts the burden of
obeying laws which he believes are reasonable but not optimal.
Even Nozick is willing to concede that..people who accept
common principles must sometimes tolerate applications of
those principles which they do not believe are optimal:
It seems that persons in the state of nature must
tolerate (that is, not forbid) the use of proce-
dures in the "neighborhood" of their own; but it
seems that they may forbid the use of more risky
procedures. An acute problem is presented if two
groups believe their own procedures to be reliable
while believing that of the other group to be very
dangerous.13
Similarly, people who accept principles which are not compa-
tible with F and I must tolerate laws which are in the "neigh-
borhood" of those which they believe are optimal. They do
not, however, have a duty to obey those which they believe
are way off the mark. Furthermore they have the right to
criticize any law, even those which they are bound to obey,
which they do not believe is optimal.
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7T6 Conclusions:
Nozick's state of nature approach to the problem of
what principles characterize the just state begins with the
assumption that none of the first principles of justice apply
directly to the evaluation of institutions. I have argued
that Nozick has not established that we should retain this
assumption. My argument has been.-internal to Nozick's theory
in the sense that I have given Nozick his account of our
clearest moral beliefs. I have argued that even when we
accept his account of our clearest moral beliefs we are not
compelled to accept his solutions, solutions which are compa-
tible with F and 1, to the difficult moral problems which
are emergent relative to those clear beliefs, Furthermore,
I have argued that once we see the limitations of his account
of our clearest moral beliefs we must search for an emergent
constraint which can be used to evaluate the competing solu-
tions to the emergent problems and pick out the optimal ones.
I have argued for an emergent constraint which focuses on the
desirability of having a society in which people view their
mutual relations as based essentially on considerations of
principle rather than power. Once we. adopt this constraint
it becomes clear that the optimal solutions to the emergent
problems will appeal to law bound principles and the natural
position which includes special principles for evaluating
publication, enforcement, and collection procedures. One
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reason why it becomes clear is that there are grave liabili-
ties associated with the alternative view that each person's
membership in the state is essentially a matter of voluntary
choice. My conclusion is: even when we begin the search
for the principles which characterize the just state by
focusing on moral problems in a pre-institutional state of
nature, we end up with the view that some of the main problems
of justice are problems of institutional design.
291
FOOTNOTES
Chapter One
1I. Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State, and Utopia ( New York:
Basic Books, 1.974.), pp. 4 - 6. All future page references
will be to Anarchy. State, and Utopia unless otherwise noted.
2, p. 5.
3, pp. 6, 22 - 24.
4. p. 114.
5, p. 26.
6. p. 9 and the introduction at xiv.
7. p. 87.
8,. p. 87..
9.. I establish this point on pages 68 - 76 below.
10. I establish this point on pages 76 - 84 below.
11. p. 33,
Chap ter Two
1. pp. 33 - 34.
2. p. 206.
3. p. 171.
4. p. 161.
5. pp. 58, 158.
6. pp. 34, 48 - 51.
7, pp, 51.- 52. I do not claim that this list is complete.
Nozick might attempt to expand it by arguing for a natural
right to privacy and he might attempt to contract it by argu-
ing that a) the natural right to make contracts can be de-
rived from the natural right to pursue one's life plan or b)
the natural right to one's labor and to what one has legiti-
mately acquired can be derived from the natural right to
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one's body. The list is included here in order to give the
reader an intuitive idea of the position which Nozick wants
to defend.
8. p. 33.
9. pp. 31 - 32.
10. pp. 33, 171 - 172.
11. p. 34.
12. introduction at xiv.
13. In the next four pages I present what I believe is a
defensible reconstruction of the structure of the argument
which Nozick develops in the first half of Chapter Seven
on pages 149 - 182. The best evidence that this is the
structure of his argument is found in his discussions on
pages 150 - 153 and 174 - 182. The reader should also pay
careful attention to his discussion in the note on page 162
and to his subsequent discussion on pages 184 - 187.
14. p. 175; see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 329
( Laalett ed., 1963 ) ( Second Treatise ).
15. Although Nozick never uses the expression "emergent
problem," he should be comfortable with the concept of an
emergent problem. He claims on page 90 "that no new rights
'emerge' at the group level." Furthermore, on 205 he asks:
"Are the fundamental principles of justice emergent in this
fashion, applying only to the largest social structure yet
not to its parts?" A reader who objects to my use of the
concept of an emergent problem to explain how Nozick de-
velops and defends his theory has the burden of offering a
more illuminating account of how he develops and defends it.
16. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ( Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 1971 ), pp. 8-9, 244 - 248,
and 543.
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17. id. at 333ff.
18, id, at 284ff.
19. id at 8.
20. id. at 8.
21. I am not committing myself to the view that there are
only two types of emergent problems. One important problem
which Nozick recognizes as an emergent problem which does
not fall neatly into either of the categories which I dis-
cuss below is the problem of how to resolve conflicts which
arise when each of many people desires to punish the same
person who deserves punishment. In his discussion of a sys-
tem of open punishment in a state of nature at 138 - 140 he
appears to assume that we have clear beliefs, so long as we
assume that people do not have conflicting desires to punish
the same person, that each person has a natural right to
punish any person who has violated the law of nature, Rela-
tive to these beliefs the problem of who has the right to
punish in cases where there are conflicting desires is an
emergent problem. One solution is that in cases of conflict
the right to punish is held jointly by all people who desire
to punish. If we adopt this solution we will have to face
the problem of determining which procedures adopted by a
group to select its representatives who alone have the right
to excercise the group's right to punish are just procedures.
Only those who are chosen by the just procedures will have
the right to punish. If we adopt this solution we will
have an easy answer to one of the anarchist's (and Nozick's)
doubts about the possibility of providing a justification
of the state. This is the doubt which can be traced to the
belief that the state violates a person's natural rivht to
enforce his rights when it prohibits the private enforce-
ment of rights. If we adopt the solution sketched above,
then we can tell the anarchist that a persons natural
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right to enforce his rights does not extend to cases in
which his desire to enforce them conflicts with another's
desire to enforce them. Therefore, we can tell him that a
person's natural right to enforce his rights is not viola-
ted when he is prohibited from enforcing them and a justly
selected official of the state enforces them instead. It
is because Nozick rejects this solution that he becomes
pre-occupied with the problem of providing a justification
of the state, Furthermore, he rejects it even though he is
aware of the grave inconveniences of having a system of open
punishment. His only argument against the solution sketched
above is that it goes against his belief that there are no
rights which are (see 139) "possessed jointly by people
rather than individually." On pages 68 - 76 below I examine
the role which this belief plays in Nozick's theory and in
Chapter Five below I examine whether Nozick can defend it.
22. Nozick makes an assumption very much like this on 59
and on 339 in footnote 7.
23. Nozick attempts to cope with the distortions created
by high transaction costs in his discussion on 76 - 77.
I evaluate his discussion on pages 255 - 258 below.
24. p. 57.
25. See Nozick's discussion on pages 28 - 30 for possibi-
lities which Nozick discusses and rejects and which I do not
discuss.
26. p. 58.
27. pp. 63, 90 - 91, and 95.
28 The reader should be aware that it is consistent for
Nozick to claim both that a person always has the right to
enforce his rightsrand that he sometimes has the duty to
retreat from an aggressor. The duty to retreat (see 62 -63)
applies in cases where the amount of force a person is
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permitted to use to subdue an aggressor is not sufficient
to subdue him in the case at hand,
29. p. 59.
30, Pp. 76 - 77.
31. Nozick appears to appeal to the concept of an emergent
constraint in his discussion in the note on 153. He writes:
"If the principle- of rectification of violations of the
first two principles yields more than one description of
holdings, then some choice must be made as to which of
these is to be realized. Perhaps the sort of considera-
tions about distributive justice and equality that I argue
against play a legitimate role in this subsidiary choice.
Similarly, there may be room for such considerations in de-
ciding which otherwise arbitrary features a statute will
embody, when such features are unavoidable because other
considerations do not specify a precise line; yet a line
must be drawn," He is saying that the property of leading
to a more equal distribution may be an emergent constraint
on solutions to problems which cannot be solved by appealing
to the theoretical considerations at hand.
32. p. 57 (emphasis in original).
33. The reader can find a definition of a law bound prin-
ciple on pages 11 and 12 above.
34. There is additional compelling evidence on pages 32 -
34 and on page 39 for my claim that Nozick believes that
rights are absolute in this sense. In other places, how-
ever, Nozick appears to retreat from this claim. First, he
says in a note at 30 that side constraints "may be violated
to avoid catastrophic moral horror." He does not, however,
elaborate on what constitutes catastrophic moral horror.
One wonders whether the anarchist could justify the use of
force to prevent the emergence of a state on the ground
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that the long run tendency of any state situation would be a
situation of catastrophic moral horror. Second, he makes
the puzzling claim at 41, while discussing the utilitarian
position on when it is permissible to kill people, that "ept-
ness is hard to come by" with regard to "decisions where
the number of persons is at issue." He never tells us, how-
ever, why numbers will pose a problem for his theory which
views rights as absolute side constraints. Finally, his
discussion of compensation at 58 suggests that a person is
entitled to full compensation when another crosses his boun-
dary without his consent only when he took reasonable pre-
cautions to minimize the amount of harm that might result
from that type of crossing. He does not, however, elaborate
on how we determine what counts as a reasonable precaution.
Is it a matter of convention? Are there special principles
Which apply to the evaluation of conventions? May a conven-
tion be enforced against a person who has not consented to
its requirements? No attempt is made to answer these im-
portant questions. His only further discussion of the prob-
lerm of reasonable precautions occurs in the note at 76 where
he refers to Coase's famous article "The Problem of Social
Cost" and at 80 where he suggests that airlines might be
able to reduce their liability to those whose boundaries
they cross when they fly over their homes by offering to
soundproof those homes. Interestingly enough, he does not
tell us how airplanes cross our boundaries when they fly
over our homes. What becomes clear is that Nozick does not
defend the view that there is always strict liability in
torts. Insofar as he believes that each person is respon-
sible for taking reasonable precautions he leaves room for
the concepts of comparative and contributory negligence.
35. p. 32 (emphasis in original).
36, p. 33.
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37. pp. 33 - 34 ( emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
38. He argues for this conclusion in his discussion at 28 -
30 where he argues against the view that each person is
bound (see 30) "to minimize the weighted amount of violations
of rights in the society, and that he should pursue this goal
even t-hrough means that themselves violate people's rights."
39. Nozick never explicitly accepts P4 and he can defend his
position on blackmail without appealing to P4. In Chapter
Four I argue, however, that it would be incoherent for him
to accept his position on blackmail without also accepting
P4. See my discussion at 156 - 159.
40. Nozick's anti-paternalism and anti-perfectionism come
out clearly in his discussions at 34, 58, and 324. He ap-
pears to defend an extreme form of anti-paternalism which
denies that it is legitimate for the state to use force to
a) tax people for the purpose of supporting research into
which products are safe so that people ban make a rational
choice about which products to buy and b) require manufac-
turers to provide information about how dangerous their pro-
ducts are so that consumers can make rational choices about
what to buy. Nozick would defend his position that the
state is not permitted to use force for these purposes by
claiming that no private individual in the state of nature
is permitted to use force for these purposes. He would
probably then tell an optimistic story about how consumer
safety laboratories would arise in a free society and make
a profit by selling product safety information to a public
that wants that information. He would conclude the story
by telling us how the combination of consumer safety labora-
tories and the normal laws which protect people against
fraud would provide responsible people with all the protec-
tion that they need.
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41. p. 24.
42. p. 25.
43. p. 30.
44. This is, I believe, a fair statement of the principle
which Nozick attributes to Hart and Rawls and which he cri-
ticizes on pages 90 - 95.
45. pp. 13 - 14, and 89.
46. A more complete discussion of the natural position
would also include a discussion of the need for special
principles for evaluating the official conduct of those
who alone have the right to interpret the law bound prin-
ciples and the public rules needed to satisfy them. We
would call these special principles "principles of judi-
cial review."
47. Similarly, two people can accept the same law bound
principles and agree that law bound principles create the
need for the special principles which are included in the
natural position but still disagree on what the content of
those principles should be. One may be a democrat while
the other is not.
48, One person who agrees with Nozick that we should ac-
cept F is the act utilitarian. This is of some interest
because disagrees with the act utilitarian on almost every-
thing else. Another person who accepts F is Robert Paul
Wolff. In In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and
Row, 1976) he writes (at 100): "Either all moral agents have
the right, under some conditions or other, to use force to
implement their purposes, or none do." My defense of the
hatural position can be taken as an argument against Wolff
as well as an argument against Nozick.
49. p. 118 (emphasis in original).
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50. p. 89.
51. p. 90.
52. pp. 149, 230 - 231.
53. Nozick expresses his belief that it is not permissible
to use force against a free rider at 89 - 90, 93 - 95, and
265 - 268,
54. pp. 72- 73, 89 - 90,
55, pp. 12ff.
56. pp. 54ff.
57. p. ae.
58. pp. 89 - 90 (emphasis in original).
59. p. 234.
60. pp. 235 - 238.
61. pp. 246 - 250.
62. Nozick appears to give a general endorsement to this
type of argument in the section "Macro and Micro" which be-
gins at 204. At 206 he claims that "it is 'undesirable to
protect principles by excluding microtests of them." Also
see his discussion in the note at 167. It is of interest
to note that Nozick cannot argue against a principle which
states that people have a right to be free from unconsented
to risks, including cumulative risks, above a threshhold
level by claiming that it cannot be confirmed by microtests.
His objection to it must be that it is incompatible with I.
63. Nozick appears to endorse the view that the amount of
punishment which a person deserves puts an upper limit on
the amount which he may receive in his discussion at 60 -
63. He had ample opportunity to endorse principles of
comparative justice as acceptable principles of punishment
in the sections "Retributive and Deterrence Theories of
Punishment" at 59 - 63 and "The Right of All to Punish" at
137 - 142. His failure to endorse them is evidence that
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he would not endorse them.
64. I discuss this point in section 5.7 at pages 199 - 206
below.
65. p. 74.
66. p. 82. The principle of compensation is discussed in
detail in Chapter Six, especially in section 6.2 through
6.5.
67. p. 82.
68. See Nozick's discussions on 41 - 42, 153 - 155, and 202.
69. p. 42.
Chapter Two
1. p. 71.
2. p. 59.
3. P3 wasintroduced at page 45 above.
4. pp. 66, 78.
5. p. 64.
6. p. 57.
7. p. 65.
8, p. 64 (emphasis in original).
9. In the section "Fear and Prohibition" which begins at
65 Nozick often talks about general systems permitting dif-
ferent acts and he often compares two systems which permit
different acts by examining what consequences would follow
upon the public adoption of each. Furthermore, he clearly
believes that a comparison of these hypothetical conse-
quences is relevant to the task of establishing which acts
a person is, in fact, permitted (or forbidden) to do. Let
us call the general system which does best in these compa-
risons "the optimal general system." There is nothing in
Nozick's discussion which suggests that he believes that
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the acts a person is actually permitted (or forbidden) to do
depends upon both a) whether the optimal general system says
that he is permitted (or forbidden) to do them, and b) whether
the optimal general system is, in fact, an established gene-
ral system. The discussion seems to assume that a person is
permitted (or forbidden) to do an act which is permitted (or
forbidden) by the optimal general system even when there is
no established public rule which a) says that the act is per-
mitted (or forbidden), b) causes people to have reasonable
expectations about how others will act and, therefore, c)
brings about the good consequences which make the optimal ge-
neral system a desirable system. This strongly suggests that
Nozick intends his discussion in this section to establish
what people's natural rights to liberty are. It also strongly
suggests that the type of argument which Nozick appeals to is,
contrary to what I have claimed, compatible with I. The argu-
ment can reach the conclusion that a person's act is permitted
(or forbidden) without examining the actual acts of other peo-
ple who are acting independently of him. It simply looks at
whether his act is permitted (or forbidden) by the optimal
general system. Therefore, it reaches the conclusion about
whether it is permitted (or forbidden) by examining it as an
isolated act in a pre-institutional state of nature. This
is true, but it is not sufficient to establish that the argu-
ment is compatible with I. I requires both that we consider
the act as an isolated act and that when we so consider it we
establish that it is serious enough to warrant forceful inter-
ference. Nozick's generalization type argument does not sa-
tisfy this second condition. It never shows that each act it
classifies as a forbidden act is serious enough to warrant
forceful interference when it is considered as an isolated
act. It only shows that the system which permits that act
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would be serious enough to warrant forceful interference.
A person whose act was forcefully interfered with on the
basis of this type of argument could complain that his act
is being interfered with eyen though it is not serious
enough to warrant interference when it is considered as an
isolated act. I elaborate on this point in section 2.7
below.
10. I am assuming that a libertarian would say a) that Sam
acts within his rights when he refuses to give John the rope
and b) that John is not permitted to use force to take the
rope from Sam after Sam has refused to'give it. The liber-
tarian need not, and almost certainly would not, say that
Sam's refusal is a good act. In section 2.8 below I offer
what I believe is overwhelming evidence that Nozick accepts
a) and b) above. This evidence will also, I believe, answer
the suggestion that Nozick would say that John is permitted
to forcefully take the' rope because the taking is necessary
to prevent (see note 34 in Chapter One) "catastrophic moral
horror." When Nozick talks about catastrophic moral horror
he has something more catastrophic in mind than the acciden-
tal death of a little girl.
11. We may be inclined to say that John should not have to
pay market compensation for the rope because the exchange in
which he buys the rope from Sam would not be a voluntary ex-
change and we may be inclined to say that the exchange would
not be a voluntary exchange because John's alternative '-choice
of increasing the likelihood of his daughter's death is an
unacceptable choice. Nozick's discussion of voluntary ex-
change at 262 - 264 clearly indicates that he would say that
the exchange in which John buys the rope is a voluntary ex-
change.
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12. This principle is not restricted to cases where the
boundary established by a person's right to his property
will be crossed. It also applies to cases where the boun-
dary established by a person's right to his labor will be
crossed. If John could only save his daughter by using
both Sam's rope and Sam's help in using the rope, then he
would have the right to use both provided that all of the
requirements of MA were satisfied. MA sometimes requires a
person to respond to another's orders when the other takes
the initiative to prevent a serious harm to himself or some
third person. It does not, however, require a person to
take the initiative to aid another. We would need another
principle to get the conclusion that a person is sometimes
required to aid another even when nobody requests his aid.
A person who accepts MA would almost certainly accept some
principle of this type.
13. These conclusions follow from the assumption that John
has a natural right to enforce his emergent right just as
he has a natural right to enforce the natural rights which
appeared on the original list on page 16 above. In fact,
this emergent right would appear to be a matual right inso-
far as the argument which John uses to establish his right
does not appeal to the fact that some established public
rule says that he has the right. See the discussion in
footnote 9 of this chapter.
14. p. 71.
15. p. 57 in the note.
16. p. 84.
17. It should also be clear that we can use P3 to establish
that John (or Bob) is forbidden to cross Sam's (or Jim's)
boundary in those cases where John (or Bob) does not intend
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to compensate Sam (or Jim) for the harm caused by the cross-
ing.
18. p. 66. There is an interesting problem about how we
should calculate the amount of compensation to which a vice
tim of an assault in a system which permits assaults pro-
vided that compensation is paid is entitled. Let us assume
that the. victim attempts to defend himself and, consequently,
suffers more harm than he otherwise would have suffered. Is
he entitled to compensation for all of the harm or is he only
entitled to compensation for the harm he would have suffered
if he hadn't fought back?
19. p. 66.
20. p. 67.
21. p. 664,
22. p. 67.
23. p. 67.
24. p. 68.
25. p. 68.
26, p. 68 (emphasis in original).
27, See the discussion at pages 94 - 95 above.
28. See the discussion at page 100 above..
29. pp. 66 - 67
30. p. 67 in the note.
31. Here I take issue with the position which Nozick defends
at 174. It seems to me perfectly plausible to claim that
fraternal feelings will develop among people who live within
a system which requires each to do acts which promote the
well being of the rest. This is, clearly, an empirical issue.
32. p. 69.
33. p. 137.
34. It is of some interest to note that in Nozick's initial
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discussion of punishment at 59 - 62, where he compares retri-
butive and utilitarian theories of punishment, he assumes
that there is a uniform system of punishment. That is, he
assumes that there is a central authority which prohibits
certain acts and which must adopt a uniform policy conerning
which punishments should be attached to each of the acts
which is prohibited. He argues that the principles which
apply to the evaluation of the policy which is adopted are
basically retributive rather than utilitarian. Furthermore,
he argues that there is an upper limit on what amount of
punishment is appropriate for each act and that it is not
permissible to surpass that limit even when it will lead to
greater deterrence. This is compatible with I. He does not,
however, go on to accept a principle of comparative justice
which says that those who deserve the same amount of punish-
ment ought to receive the same amount. We have already noted
(see the discussion on pages 83 - 84) that accepting these
principles is not compatible with I.
Nozick does not discuss the problem of punishment in
the state of nature until page 137. He asserts that any
person acting alone in the state of nature is entitled to
punish any violation of the law of nature. This immediately
leads him to the problem of who has the right to punish in
cases where more than one person wants to exercise his right
to punish. I have already discussed this problem in
footnote 21 of Chapter One. Here I will repeat and elabor-
ate upon the earlier discussion. We noted that he rejects
the solution which says that in cases of conflict we should
assume that the right to punish is a right which is held
jointly by all people. This solution would create the need
for special procedures which are used by the group which
has the righ-t to punish to determine which people should
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alone have the right to exercise the group's right to punish.
Nozick's grounds for rejecting this solution are a) that it
would be the only right which is held jointly by people and
b) that there is no institutional apparatus already existing
in the state of nature which people can use to determine
which people alone have the right to exercise the group!s
right to punish. These reasons are not very convincing,
They become less convincing when we examine Nozick's own
solution to the problem. He writes: "To the extent that
it is plausible that all who have some claim to a right to
punish have to act jointly, then the dominant agency will
be viewed as having the greatest entitlement to exact
punishment, since almost all authorize it to act in their
place. In exacting punishment it displaces and preempts
the actions to punish of the fewest others." Does this
imply that a representative of the People's Republic of
China is entitled to punish any violation of the law of
nature which occurs in the United States since he represents
more people than the representative of the United States
does? Nozick must, I believe, either give up his belief
that any person has the right to punish any violation of
the law of nature or his solution to the problem of how to
resolve conflicts which arise when more than one person
wants to exercise his right to punish the same person.
35. In fact, the members of a mutual aid society would pro-
bably agree to permit many more crossings than MA permits.
They would probably elect representatives who have the right
to publish and enforce rules which coordinate the activities
of members in cases where coordinated activity is neces-
sary to prevent another member from suffering a serious in-
jury, So, for instance, the representatives might have the
right to publish rules which coordinate the activities of
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members so that they effectively sandbag a river which is
about to overflow and destroy the property of other members.
They might also have the right to publish rules which coor-
dinate the activities of members so that they effectively
work to mitigate .the harm which other members suffer as
a. result of some natural disaster. The important point is
that in many cases aid requires the coordinated behaviour
of many. A reasonable mutual society would not overlook
this fact.
36. p. 72 (emphasis added).
37. pp. 71-72 (emphasis added).
38, p. 101. The reader should also see Nozick's comment
in the note on page 160 where he claims that a person may
sometimes legitimately own the entire supply of drinking
water. It is clear from the context that Nozick believes
that when a person legitimately owns something he doss not
have to let others use it without his consent.
39. p. 238.
40. p. 23- (emphasis in original).
410. Nozick discusses the problem. of how-we.determine how
much harm may be inflicted on an aggressor to prevent his
aggressive act at pages 62 and.63. He acknowledges that
the amount. that is. needed is sometimes more than the.amount
that..is permitted and, therefore, that a person sometimes
has a duty to retreat. The.amount. of harm that Sam is per-
mitted to inflict on John to prevent him from taking the
rope may be low. This .may establish the conclusion.that
Sam will. have to. retreat and let John take the rope. It
will not, however, establish that Sam has no right to punish
John for taking the rope without his consent.
42, In Chapter.Three I discuss the problems which emerge
when we drop assumption two and in Chapter Four I discuss
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the problems which emerge when we drop assumption one.
43. Nozick worries about the problems caused by sadists
at 138. There is, however, a more pressing reason why he
should want to avoid the conclusion that any person acting
alone in the state of nature is entitled to punish John.
It is his commitment to the view (see 69) that "a person's
ill gotten gains are to be removed or counter-balanced, if
any remain after he has compensated his victims, apart from
the process of punishment." If Nozick considers.John's act
of taking the rope to be punishable then he must, to remain
consistent, also believe that it is permissible to remove
John's ill-gotten gains. In this case the ill-gotten gain
is his daughter's life. How is that supposed to be removed?
It seems clear that Nozick must change his view (see 60 and
69) about how to interpret the maxim that no person shall
profit from his own wrong. It is> simply too counter-intui-
tive to hold, as Nozick appears to hold, that a person should
be subjected to extra hard treatment when he violates ano-
ther's rights for the purpose of providing a great benefit
to a third party.
44, pp. 138 - 139. Nozick does. not explicitly deny that
the. victim has the right .to grant mercy. What he.says,
however, certainly suggests that he would deny it.
45. pp. 72 - 73.
46. See the.. discussion at 130 - 131 above as well as the
discussion in footnote 35 in this chapter.
Chap ter Three
1. pp. 84 - 85.
2. In the note on pages 84 - 85 Nozick asks us to ignore
the following types of complications: i) A might be a
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person whose existence benefitted B over the long run but
not in this particular and ii) A might be withholding in-
formation which he stumbled upon and he might be charging
less than the next person who would have stumbled upon it
would have charged. Since Nozick ignores these complica-
tions so will we. We should note, however, that Nazick's
commitment to I would appear to force him to ignore each
type of complication,
3. Can Nozick avoid saying this by claiming that there is
a natural right to privacy? In footnote one of Chapter One
I noted that Nozick might want to extend his list of natural
rights to include a natural right to privacy. This right
might provide each person with some protection against the
blackmailer. This is because some of the information which
a blackmailer might threaten to reveal is information whose
revelation would constitute a crossing of the boundary esta-
blished by a person's natural right to privacy. In the
cases where he threatens to reveal the information there will
be no difference between what he does and what the racketeer
does; each threatens to do an act which he has no right to
do. In the note on page 86, however, Nozick explicitly dis-
tinguishes between the blackmailer's activities and the
activities of the racketeer. Therefore, he seems to be as-
suming that the blackmailer's activities do not threaten to
cross a boundary established by a person's rights. In any
case, many of the things which a blackmailer might threaten
to reveal are things whose revelations do not threaten the
boundary established by the right to privacy on any reason-
able account of privacy. For instance, he might threaten
to reveal information that another committed a crime or that
another's property line is not where his neighbor believes
it is.
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4. p. 67 in the note.
5, p. 86.
6. See note 2 above for a list of complications which
Nozick ignores and which we will also ignore.
7, The racketeer usually threatens to forcefully cross the
boundary established by another's rights unless the other
pays him to refrain from crossing. These forceful crossings
are certainly forbidden by P2. They are also forbidden by
P3 since the racketeer does not intend to compensate the
people whose boundaries he threatens to cross.
8. p. 86. See the quote at footnote 5 on page 146 above.
9. pp. 85 - 86.
10. The problems of when it is permissible for one person to
sell his silence and when it is permissible for one person to
buy another's silence are difficult problems. It would seem
that the correct solutions must examine and evaluate the con-
sequences of adopting alternative policies. This approach
is not available to Nozick, however, since it is incompatible
with I and it presupposes an account of the public interest
which is enforceable against a person without his consent.
At 67 Nozick argues against a system which permits those who
violate the rights of others to bribe their victims to keep
silent. His argument appeals to the fact that this system
will create uncompensated-for-fear. This argument is incon-
sistent with his commitment to I and, therefore, is not
available to him if he wishes to remain consistent.
11. Nozick discusses problems relatipg to the right to
speak at 129 - 130, 260 - 265, and in footnote 6 on page 342.
None of what he says suggests that special principles are
appropriate for solving the problem of when one person is
permitted to speak.•; That is, he appears to believe that acts
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which involve speech are to be treated the same as other
types of acts.
12, p. 84. I take issue with Nozick's claim that a person
who pays this person not to build the structure is served
productively. It seems more appropriate to classify the
exchange in which he pays the other not to build as what I
will call a "semi-productive exchange." See my discussion
of semi-productive exchanges in section 3.4 below.
13. Nozick never uses the expression "semi-productive ex-
change." However, he introduces the concept at page 86 and
clearly uses it when he states the principle of compensation.
14. This problem was initially discussed in Chapter One on
pages 30- 32.
15. We will discuss which acts fall into this category when
we discuss the principle of compensation in Chapter Six.
16, pp. 85 - 86.
17. P. 86 in the note.
18. p. 32.
19. p. 86 in the note.
20. We will not, however, examine cases of semi-productive
exchange where the motive of one of the parties to the con-
tract is to injure the other and the other is paying not to
be injured.
Chapter Four,
1, Does a risk creator ever have a legitimate complaint
when the cost of performing his risky activity goes up?
Usually we assign entitlements so that the risk creator
must simply bear this cost. For instance, we usually say
that it is simply unfortunate for a factory owner and the
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people who work for him when there is an increase in the
number of people who live in the vicinity of the factory
which causes an increase in the factory owner's liability
insurance which in turn causes him to go out of business.
Sometime, however, we may adopt the position that since
the factory owner was there first, those who move into the
vicinity must assume the risks which the factory creates.
If we believe that it is sometimes appropriate to adopt
this view, then we believe that the risk creator sometimes
has a legitimate complaint.
2. pp. 86 - 87 (emphasis added).
3. p. 78.
4. p. 82.
5, See the discussion in section 3.5 above.
6. Does Luke at least have to tell Matthew that he intends
to use the chemical so that Matthew can take steps to mini-
mize the amount of harm he will suffer? Leo Long has sug-
gested that t.he answer to this question is "yes."
7, p. 64 in the note.
8. Nozick must square his discussion of how to assign en-
titlements in cases where one person incidentally but cer-
tainly dumps the effects of his productive activities on
another with his later discussion (at 79 and 80) of how to
assign entitlements in the case where airlines impose noise
pollution on the people who live near the airport. It would
seem that this is a clear case of one person incidentally
but certainly dumping the effects of his productive activity
on another. Yet, Nozick does not suggest that the homeowners
have the right to market compensation for the harm they suf-
fer as a result of the flights. That is, he does not suggest
that they may prohibit the airlines from flying their planes
and, therefore, that the airlines may fly their planes only
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if they manage to negotiate an agreement with the homeowners.
9. There are, in fact, places where Nozick suggests that for
the purpose of assigning entitlements to perform acts we can-
not distinguish acts merely on the basis that one is m re
likely to cross the boundary established by another's rights
than the other. See his discussion of the right to perform
risky acts in the state of nature at 74 - 75 and his discus-
sion of pre-emptive attack at 126 - 130.
10. I will discuss this position at length in Chapter Six,
expecially in sections 6.2 - 6.5.
Chanter Five
1. I have explained why the anarchist believes that it is
impossible to provide a justification of the state on pages
47- 52 above.
2. p. 18 (emphasis in original).
3. It turns out that Nozick never provides a justification
of the state. At 114 he concedes that the protective associ-
ation is not permitted to prohibit independents from pri-
vately enforcing their rights against other independents.
At 112 he says that an independent who is prohibited from
privately enforcing his rights but who has the resources to
pay for the protective services which the association pro-
vides must pay for those services. If he does not pay, then
he need not be given protection. Finally, the protective
association is not permitted to prohibit people who use re-
liable procedures from privately enforcing their rights.
Nozick has, at best, explained how a state-like entity would
arise from a state of nature by what he comsiders to be
morally permissible means. An anarchist could accept this.
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4. Nozick is aware that a person who gives up F and accepts
the enforceable fairness principle, which we discussed in
section 1.3 above will again discuss in section 6.6 below,
can use it to provide a justification of the state. It is
not at all clear to me, however, how Nozick can defend his
apparent belief that people who appeal to it to justify the
prohibition on the private enforcement of rights must intend
to establish a state while people who appeal to the prin-
ciple of compensation, the principle to which Nozick appeals,
to justify the same prohibition will not intend to establish
a state. I suspect that in each case the people who prohibit
the private enforcement of rights intend to establish a state.
In any case, we cannot determine what their intentions are
by simply asking whether they appeal to a principle which
is consistent with F.
5. p. 6 (emphasis in original).
6. p. 19.
7. Nozick often contrasts his position with other positions
without giving examples of theories which adopt the other
positions. Can the reader confidently give examples of moral
theories which offer either type (2) or type (3) explanations
of the political realm? I can't. We run into the same prob-
lem when Nozick says at 33 and 34 that a person who rejects
his account of rights as absolute side constraints has three
alternatives but never gives examples of theories which ac-
cept each of the alternatives. (The relevant quote is on page
42 above at footnote 37). Which of these alternatives have
I committed myself to by defending law bound principles and
the natural position?
8. p. 6
9. I introduced the concept of an emergent constraint on
page 36 above.
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10. See my discussion on pages 18 - 22 above.
11. p. 176.
12. p. 176.
13. pp. 177 - 178 in the note.
14. pp. 179 - 180 (emphasis in original).
15. p. 179.
Chapter Six
1. p, 86.
2, p. 88.
3. p. 82.
4. p. 83.
5, pp,. 106 - 107.
6. pp. 96 - 98.
7. pp. 105 - 107.
8. I say "usually" because we might want to-say that there
are some acts which are so risky that the risk creator is
responsible for warning each person who is exposed to the
risk of the danger that he is in and is liable to punishment
in case he imposes the risk on somebody without warning him.
Furthermore, we might want to say that he is liable to punish-
ment even though the person who was exposed to the risks cre-
ated by his non-aggressive risky act never warned him that
he would be punished for doing the act. The problem with
this type of case is that we will usually regard the fact
that the risk creator failed to warn the risk bearer of the
danger as evidence that the risk creator intended to impose
the danger on the risk bearer and, therefore, that he was
acting aggressively. Still, it is impossible to imagine
cases where we would be willing to:oconclude that the risk
creator was acting non-aggressively but negligently. If we
believe that the risk creator is liable to punishment in
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these cases, we adopt the controversial view that a person
is sometimes liable to punishment for his negligent beha-
viour. Since most retributivists are reluctant to adopt
this view, we can assume that Nozick would also be reluctant
to adopt it,
9. p. 87.
10. pp. 145 - 146.
11. pp. 82 - 83 (emphasis in original).
12. p. 81.
13. p. 82.
14. p. 82.
15. This appears to follow from Nozick's discussions at 79,
111, and 112,
16. p. 82.
17. Nozick uses the expression "disadvantaged relative to
the normal situation" at 82.
18, This question is intended to raise doubts about whether
Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice satis-
fies the addition and deletion conditions which he discusses
on pages 209 and 210 and which he believes are important
conditions.
19. p. 86 (emphasis added).
20. This is an oversimplification of Nozick's position. At
112 he says that a rich person who is prevented from private-
ly enforcing his rights because of the prohibition on private
enforcement must for the protective services he receives.
21. p. 146 in the note ( emphasis in original).
22. More precisely, he must say (see 89) that the right "is
decomposable without residue into those individual rights
which are held by distinct individuals acting alone in the
state of nature." Furthermore, once we realize that the
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right to restrain is held by each individual acting alone
in the state of nature, then we can see that the society
can save a lot of money by adopting the following strategy.
Each year a different member invokes his right to restrain,
those who are considered to be dangerous. Since this person
only has to pay those who are disadvantaged by his prohibi-
tion up to the point where he is as disadvantaged as they are
and since he has fewer resources than the society has when
it is considered as an individual, he will .have to pay out
much less than the society would if it issued the prohibition
as an individual. On this view one person could preventively
restrain each year and the rest could be free loaders. On
what ground could a person who was restrained charge the free
loaders for the benefits which they receive at his expense?
If the restrainer cannot charge others for the free benefits
which he provides them when he restrains others through his
use of the principle of compensation, then how can those
who are restrained charge others? I will pursue the question
of who must pay those who are disadvantaged when the principle
of compensation is invoked in section 6.7 below.
23. p. 143.
24. p. 143.
25. Aren't we overlooking the plight of the factory workers?
The prohibition might disadvantage them by depriving them of
their only employment opportunity. It is unlikely, however,
that Nozick wants to claim that a worker has a property right
in his job which enables him to complain when anothert!s non-
aggressive act causes him to lose his job. See Nozick's com-
ments on whether people have a right to have their needs saw
tisfied at 234- 235, his comments on whether there is a right
to equality of opportunity at 235 - 238, and his comments on
whether people have a right to a say over what effects them
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at 268 - 270.
26. Any theory which says that the appropriate way to assign
entitlements in situations where people desire to perform
non aggressive acts is to evaluate the consequences of adopt-
ing public rules which make alternative assignments, can pro-
vide an explanation for why being there first should make a
difference. By assigning some weight to the fact that one
p arty was there first we provide each person with some gua:-
antee -that the value of his property will not change due to
circumstances beyond his control and, therefore, provide him
with some incentive to improve the value of his property.
For a relevant discussion see Michelman, Propoertty Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensption" Law, 80 Harvard Law Review 1165 (1967).
27. pp. 73 - 74 (emphasis in original).
28. This becomes clear when he returns to the problem of
cumulative risk on pages 89 - 90. The relevant quote appears
on pages 80 - 82 above and is discussed on pages 79 - 86
above.
29. See the discussion on pages 52 - 58 above.
30. p. 95.
31. p, 95.
32. p. 95 (emphasis added).
33. See the discussion oh.pages 214 - 216 above.
34. If Nozick were to accept this additional condition he
would be able to justify some curfews and some gun control
laws by appealing to the enforceable fairness principle.
He would not, however, be able to justify forcing people
to cooperate in the scheme for broadcasting radio programs
which he discusses on pages 93 - 95.
35. p. 95.
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36. It is of some interest to note that the people who com-
piled the Restatement of Restitution (91i7, 1937) expressed
the belief that it is sometimes permissible to use force
(i.e,, sue) to gain compensation for services rendered to a
person who did not voluntarily agree to pay for those ser-
vices. See the section "Benefits Voluntarily Conferred"
which begins at 487. The discussion in that section seems
to imply that in each of the above cases the person who pro-
vides the benefit is entitled to compensation. In any case,
I am only claiming that it is more plausible to claim that
they are entitled to compensation than are the people in
Nozick's examples. Furthermore, I argue on pages 236 - 238
below that the considerations which lead Nozick to accept PE
do not force him to accept the conclusion that the people in
my examples are not entitled to compensation.
37. Nozick, who denies that there is an acceptable version
of the enforceable fairness principle, claims that those who
set up compulsory schemes "must pay for finely designing
their compulsory arrangements so that they don't apply to
those who wish to opt out." See 322.
38. A person who wants to defend Nozick might argue that he
has answered the argument from considerations of fairness
which I have proposed in the section "Philanthropy" which
begins at 265. There he argues that once we assume that we
have a solution to the problem of who owns what, then we
cannot appeal to considerations of fairness to force people
to cooperate in contributing to the needy and ending poverty.
The most that the argument which he develops there can be
used to establish is that once we assume that we have a solu-
tion to the problem of non-acaressive riskyv acts, then we
cannot appeal to considerations of fairness to force people
to cooperate in the task of keeping the level of risk below
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the level which creates uncompensated-for-fear. The argument
does not, however, affect my claim that we should appeal to
considerations of fairness when we first determine what the
solution to the problem of non-aggressive risky acts is.
The reader should re-examine myzdiscussion of the relation
between the enforceable fairness principle and the liber-
tarian side constraint against aggression on pages 52 - 58
above, especially the discussion on page 57.
39. p. 114.
40, p. 78.
41. p. 115.
42. Nozick might still insist that he can get the conclu-
sion which he wants without appealing to any version of the
enforceable fairness principle. He might argue that people
would respond to the inconveniences of not having an enforce-
able version of the fairness principle by voluntarily giving
the protective association the right to enforce some ver-
sion of the enforceable fairness principle. In Chapter Seven
I examine the shortcomings of this approach.
43. See the previous note.
44. p. 76 (footnote omitted),
45. p. 75 - 76.
46. p. 76.
47. p. 76.
48. p. 76 - 77 (emphasis added).
49. It is because people's natural entitlements are incon-
venient in cases where people are subjected to the risk of
death that each has a reason to sell his right to compensae-
tion in case he is killed to a company which buys such
rights. By selling his right to compensation he is able
to enjoy the benefits of having this right in his lifetime.
It should be clear that the position which I am attributing
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to Nozick is consistent with his comments on pages 77 and 78.
50. p. 74.
51. p. 75.
52. p. 76.
Chapter Seven
1. This is not, strictly speaking, correct. We have defined
the enforceable fairness principle so that it only applies in
cases where it is clear what people's initial entitlements
are. It is easy to extend it so that it also applies in
cases where we do not know what people's initial entitlements
are but it is clear that people are better off with. the tule
than without it.
2. Will an independent who is prevented from privately en-
forcing his rights on the ground that he uses unreliable
procedures for determining guilt believe that his procedures
are unreliable? If he doesn't, then he will believe that
his compliance with the prohibition on private enforcement
was coerced from him by the protective association's immoral
threat of the use of force.
3. There are other times when Nozick writes as if people
would not compromise. See the long paragraph on pages 98
and 99 which begins "When sincere and good persons differ
. He never dwells on what the implications of the view
he states are for the problem of whether it is possible to
provide a justification of the state.
4. pp. 141 - 142 (emphasis in original). Also see Nozick's
discussion on page 330.
5. p. 25.
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6. pp. 321 - 322. Also see Nozick's discussion on pages
133 and 134 where he discusses the problem of what the li-
ability of a corporation is to those who voluntarily asso-
ciate with it.
7. The evidence that this is a fair account of Nozick's
beliefs about when a choice is voluntary can be found on
pages 162 in the note, 169, and 263 - 264.
8. p. 109.
9,. The reader should now reconsider Nozick's claims on
pages 33 and 271 - 274 that the night-watchman state is
neutral among its citizens. Although there may be market
considerations which mandate that a protective association
must offer a neutral package when it first goes into busi-
ness, these considerations almost certainly disappear when
it becomes the dominant association. On Nozick's view
there are no considerations of justice which force it to
remain neutral. Control of the state is much more of a
prize than Nozick realizes. See his discussion on page 272
where he suggests that control of the state is not much
of a prize.
10. p. 113.
11. I have stated the principle so that it does not iden-
tify which people are liable to compensate those whose
boundaries are crossed and which people are liable to com-
pensate those who are disadvantaged by prohibitions on
risky acts. One might argue that Nozick's root idea. of
separateness forces us to assign the first liability to
those who cause the boundary crossings and the second
liability to those who benefit fromrthe prohibitions which
disadvantage.
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12. pp. 268 - 271.
13. p. 98
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